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RECENT LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS 
Honorgble Charles M. Leibson 
Jefferson Circuit Court 
Louisville, Kentucky 
There were three different pressure groups that were involved in recent 
Kentucky malpractice legislation. The first ~as the physicians. Physicians 
in the state of Kentucky were alarmed last year and the year before by the 
I 
availability and the rising cost of medical malpractice insurance. This was 
a crisis brought down on the state of Kentucky, but not by the experi~nice 
of the physicians in the state insofar as suits against them and pay-outs on those 
suits are concerned. The Governor's committee has statistics on this, so that I'm 
not just expressing a personal opinion when I say that problems elsewhere have 
caused carriers to increase the cost of insurance in Kentucky as well as to quit 
writing policies. Nevertheless, the problem is as real to the physicians that 
are involved as if it were one of their own making. Such problems have been dealt 
with in the Act in a manner that should be most helpful to physicians. 
To some physicians, however, the main problem is being sued .. The problem of be-
ing sued subdivides into groundless suits and meritorious claims where someone 
has been injured as the result of negligence by the physician or hospital or med-
ical service provider, and is entitled to fair and reasonable compensation for the 
injury. There were a great many different proposals offering solutions. One 
involved eliminating all claims, groundless or meritorious. The legislature in 
Kentucky did not succumb to the pressure in that respect, nor did the Governor, 
who, as all of us know, had a very strong: hand in what took place .in the state 
legislature this past January. 
Attorneys were also a pressure group. The attorneys had a responsibility, 
or if you want to cnnsider it from an economic standpoint, a selfish interest in 
maintaining the right for suits to be brought when there is a meritorious claim. 
The attorneys have no more right to maintain groundless suits than you have to 
object to meritorious ones. Attorneys have considerable problems, however. The 
cost of malpractice litigation is very high. The persons who are potential 
claimants in many cases are sufering catastrophic injury, are totally unemployed, 
or are deceased. There's very little money available to finance the depositions, 
expert witness fees, and extensive trial procedure. There is also a great deal 
of unnecessary and, I believe, undeserved and perhaps unavoidable hostility that 
attorneys who take such cases experience which causes many attorneys to refuse to 
take such cases altogether. When I was practicing, they used to say, "Go see 
Charles Leibsoni he'll take any kind of case. He doesn't care who gets mad at 
him." That was why I got more of these cases than I ever really cared to have. 
The unavailability of medical testimony forces attorneys to go o~tside of 
state to get experts who are legitimately subject to criticism as being pro-
fessional witnesses. This problem comes because though physicians within this 
state will talk to you confidentially about what has been negligently done, they 
are not available to testify, because of the criticism and ostracism of their 
colleagues when they do. 
Another interest group is the pUblic. There are twa aspects of their 
concern. One aspect is that everyone has to see and pay for doctors and so 
they are concerned with the cost of medical insurance. The other aspect is 
that everyone is potentially a victim of a doctor's negligent act. Their rights 
also had to be considered. 
These statistics were presented to the Governor's Committee covering the 5 
years before it met in 1975. They showed that the five leading, and I believe 
practically exclusive, writers of medical malpractice' insurance coverage earned 
premiums of over $7,365,000 and incurred losses of $4,509,016. The figures showed 
that only about 57 percent of the earned premiums were ever paid out or reserved 
for payment against claims that had been made, which is a pretty good loss ratio 
in any business. This didn't make any difference. These carriers were still 
refusing to write policies, or else they were tripling premiums or pulling out of 
business altogether because of experience in other states. 
In essence, then, what did the legislature do. They passed an act that had 
two principal elements. The first element deals with the unavailability of insur-
ance. It provides a procedure known as a joint underwriting association. Through 
it the Commissioner of Insurance can, if he determines that a crisis exists in the 
availability of malpractice insurance coverage, cause all the various insurance 
underwriters in the state who deal in the liability field and in the hospital and 
physicians'medical payments field to form a pool. This is reserve legislation. 
The commissioner reserves the power to impose this underwriting responsibility on 
this joint underwriting association when he determines that a substantial number 
of doctors in the state may not be covered by malpractice insurance. 
The other major aspect of the law that was passed is the patients' compen-
sation fund. It operates in this fashion. Every doctor and hospital is required 
to insure against his own personal liability in a certain basic amount. It applies 
to doctors and hospitals on a mandatory basis and to other health care providers 
on a voluntary basis if and when the Commissioner of Insurance should order it. 
It says that physicians and hospitals have to provide a basic insurance coverage 
for themselves of $100,000 per occurence, $300,000 per year. It says that they 
no longer have to buy the umbrella policies. These were, we were advised, the 
real problem in causing the enormous expense and unavailability of insurance, 
particularly to the physicians in surgery and anesthesiology. Under this plan, 
every physician and hospital will be assessed an amount equal to 10 percent of his 
premium on basic insurance, which will be paid into a fund known as the patients' 
compensation fund. It will accumulate and will be available to pay the excess of 
any judgment of over $100,000 against a physician or hospital. Those judgments 
in Kentucky have been few and far between. 
I was a great believer in having this fund, but I did not want it to operate 
in the manner in which it did. Why collect money from physicians before a loss 
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actually occurs? One may never occur. I suggested that the act should be written 
in a manner whereby if a lawsuit was won and a loss becomes payable, it would be 
paid out of the general fund of the state, and would then be recouped in the next 
year. For instance, if there was a million dollars that had 'to be paid out of 
the fund for 1975, then on the 1976 income tax, every physician would have an 
assessment against his gross income which would be under one percent--whatever is 
necessary to pay the state so that the money paid by the state would then be 
recouped. If nothing had been paid out, then no assessment would,be made. I 
could well envision that for many years there~ould be no need for physicians to 
pay anything into the fund. 
The physicians on the committee, the hospital administrators, and various 
representatives of the physicians' aides, however, preferred the advance payment 
of a percentage of basic policy premiums. Since it was out of their pockets, 
certainly they were entitled to have the fund constituted in a manner that they 
preferred. 
There are other features in the plan which are of consequence. The first 
has to do with the ad damnum clause in a complaint. This is the demand clause 
in the complaint, which states how much you are sued for. For a long time, this 
has been a real bone of contention for people who are regularly sued for one 
reason or another. The suit is filed for box car figures, and that gets a lot of 
pUblicity. Then later on, if the suit had no merit, it is dropped or settled 
for an amount much smaller than the box car figure sued for. The act simply 
provides that the demand clause in the complaint shall not recite any alleged 
damages sum and that it will just ask for such fair and reasonable compensation 
as the trier or fact should determine is appropriate. You will not be faced with 
that box car figure. The insurance carrier defending you can assess the potential 
value of the claim, and set up their reserve accordingly. 
They are obligated by this act, when they think that the claim has a 
potential in excess of $lOO,OOO,to notify the patients' compensation fund so that 
the fund can deal with its potential liability. A good side aspect to the program 
passed by the legislature is that because of the potential liability of the fund, 
there has to be reporting of claims to a central agency and some kind of investi-
gation where the type or the amount of claims is such as to indicate that we have 
a physician that is really incapable of practicing medicine up to the standard 
that the medical profession has a right to expect. 
"Medical malpractice" is a misnomer which I wish we could get away from. 
In essence, 99.9 percent of the time, all you are talking about when you use the term 
medical malpractice is negligence, pure and simple. You'll find pronouncement 
after pronouncement by our Supreme Court specifying that we're not talking about 
a mistake in judgment which is a reasonable decision in the circumstances. We're 
only talking about those situations where there's been a failure to exercise 
ordinary care and someone is injured as a result of that negligent act or omission. 
That's the only time when compensation should be available. I make that point 
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because that brings me to another point in the Act. 
The Act provides for an objective standard for a claim against a physician in 
cases concerning informed consent. Some physicians have ov~rreacted to the potential 
claim for failure to provide informed consent. The truth of the matter is that 
the cases where there's been compensation awarded on that basis are very, very few 
in Kentucky. To alleviate any fears that doctors might have in this respect, this 
Act provides an objective standard. Informed consent doesn't just relate to what 
the patient or his lawyer might think should have been told to the patient, but 
what a reasonable physician should be expected to tell a patient in the circum-
stanceq. 
Our Court of Appeals has already decided upon this standard:in a very re-
cent case which specifies that informed·consent will be treated just like every 
other negligence problem--reasonable conduct in the circumstances. As with other 
types of malpractice, the plaintiff will have to prove by experts that there was 
a failure to follow standard medical practice in the advice to the patient, unless, 
of course, you have a situation so flagrant that the facts speak for themselves. 
You don't have to worry about subjective standards for informed consent anymore. 
That's a problem that's gone. 
The next problem dealt with by the statutes is the problem of secrecy, 
privileged communication, and confidentiality. Specifically, the .. problem is 
whether evidence developed in peer review procedures showing negligence on the 
part of the physician should be discoverable as are all other types of evidence. 
The Act as passed provides a privilege against discovery for this evidence. It 
states that the proceedings, records, opinions, conclusions, and recommendations 
of any physicians' committee, or similar entity, shall not be subject to discovery, 
subpoena, or introduction into evidence in any civil trial. This, in effect, 
overturns a decision by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Nazareth Literary and 
Benevolent Institution v. Stevenson, 503 S.W.2d, 77 (Ky. 1973), wherein the Court 
ruled against privileges. 
The committee and the legislature did something in passing this Act contrary 
to my suggestion. I suggested that they make participation in the patients", com-
pensation fund in this act voluntary. However they wrote the Act,saying you 
"shall" join the patients' compensation fund. A suit was filed in the United 
States District Court--it's Floyd v. Carroll--for declaratory relief. This suit 
attacks two elements of the Act. The first element is the constitutionality of 
that part of the Act that states that doctors must belong to this fund in order 
to practice medicine and which provides that if they are reported to the state 
licensure board for failure to belong to the fund, it will be grounds for suspending 
their license. The plaintiffs argue that the practice of medicine in which they 
are engaged is a means of livelihood and thereby is property within the meaning 
of the 14th amendment to the Constitution of the united States. They argue that 
the part of the Act that says that if they don't or can't. get into the fund, they 
can't practice medicine, deprives them of their right to practice medicine without 
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due process of law. They may well have something, because the Supreme Court of 
the united States has ruled that an act which took away a man's license to drive 
without prior evidence that he was guilty of any negligence in the way he operated 
, 
fuis car or other misconduct, was unconstitutional. I would think that a license 
to practice medicine should have at least the stature of a license to drive an 
automobile. 
Very surprisingly to me, the doctor plaintiffs also attacked, in this suit, 
that part of the Act relating to the confidentiality and immunity of such proceed-
ings, records, opinions, conclusions, and reco~endations of. peer review boards, 
as wholly incompatible with and contravening a sectio~ of the Social Security Act 
wherein the professional standards review organizati9ns were created ~y the 
congress of the United States. The suit claims that the Act should be ideclared 
void because this is violative of the supremacy clause of article VI of the 
constitution of the United States. The supremacy clause, of course, provides 
that the state cannot pass any law that interferes with the function of the federal 
law. The message is: Don't cancel your umbrella policy. Although the Act 
specifies that it is effective July 1, the Act is not necessarily constitutional, 
and you may very well need that umbr~la policy if it isn't. I understand also 
that there is a state action that's been filed that also attacks the constitution-
ality of the Act as passed. 
can you answer whether the Indiana law is being attacked 
LEIBSON: There is a malpractice suit that has been filed in Indianapolis 
a lawyer named Townsend. I don't remember the name of the suit. That will 
the constitutionality of the Indiana law which will have to be thrown out 
it doesn't go through the screening panel procedures provided in the 
Act. Also, it doesn't restrict itself to the limitations on amounts that 
Those screening panel procedures that I'm talking about are proce-
s that say that before the suit can be filed it has to go by mandatory provi-
to the three-man committee of physicians to render an opinion on the matter. 
Judge Leibson, if a physician is being questioned or reviewed by the 
fessional standards review organization, will he be able to obtain standards 
are applied to other medical areas in Kentucky, and will the act that you 
of affect the confidentiality of those records? 
The act will positively affect the confidentiality of those records. 
to write an opinion about a fellow physician or to give testi-
yourself in any peer review procedure, the information or evidence you 
will be confidential under this Act. As to the other part, we in Kentucky 
r recognize a locality rule. We say that everyone who is a board certified 
dic surgeon should adhere to the basic standards of that profession. 
ity doesn't come into consideration, except if there aren't facilities avail-
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able that he could use to practice his profession. But from a standpoint of know-
ledge, a board certified orthopedic surgeon, regardless of where he practices, is 
supposed to have the knowledge of a board certified orthop~dic surgeon. 
QUESTION: That pleases me. I represent the physician. My point is that I want 
to be able to discover the standards applied, I think arbitrarily, by this 
organization throughout other medical districts in Kentucky. I'm curious to know 
whether the Act will restrict me from even getting those standards. 
JUDGE LEIBSON: I think the Act will restrict you from getting'any infromation 
that is provided before that peer review board; at least I can tell you positively 
that this is the intention of the Act. 
QUESTION: If the patients' compensation fund should become exhausted, would there 
be further assessment? 
JUDGE LEIBSON: No. As I read it, all that it means is that any unpaid portion of 
the claims simply goes over into the next year and the claimant waits until the 
procedures of assessment have replenished the fund before he gets paid. It is a 
socialization, you understand, in the sense that a physician or a hospital no 
longer has a personal liability for his negligence over and above the sum of 
$100,000. It's paid by an assessment against everyone in the entire profession. 
As opposed as I am, being a rugged individualist, to any form of socialization, I 
have to say as a practical matter that anything that relieves the medical profes-
sion from carrying the burden of paying huge premiums for uroorella policies that they 
never use, has to be a progressive step of which I approve. 
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ARBITRATION AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES 
John A. Krichbaum, J.D. 
Assistant Director Legislative Department 
American Medical Association ' 
Chicago, Illinois 
Before I start the presentation of my portion of this program, I would like 
to comment briefly on something that the judge mentioned toward the end of his 
presentation, mandatory pretrial screening laws. To date, there have been only 
two state court decisions on this matter. A recent Illinois decision struck 
- -, 
down the mandatory pretrial screening law (as well as striking down the limitation 
on liability). The Florida Supreme Court, however, ha~ recently upheld the man-
datory pretrial screening panel statute in that state. 
I'd like to talk with you this morning about two subjects. The use of 
arbitration in medical malpractice cases, and the possible use of a no-fault 
system for medical malpractice. First of all I'd like to examine the constitu-
tionality of arbitration as a substitute for the traditional judicial system for 
resolution of medical malpractice cases. Secondly, I'd like to discuss some of 
the potential advantages and disadvantages of arbitrat~on as contrasted to the 
jury system for medical malpractice cases. Finally, I'd like to discuss very 
briefly what some of the states are doing by way of legislation in~~gard to 
arbitration of medical malpractice cases. 
We might start off with a very simple definition of arbitration. Arbitration 
is a procedure whereby parties with a dispute submit their disagreements to an 
impartial third party, other than the traditional judicial system, for resolution. 
It might be useful to keep two questions and two possible answers in mind 
during this discussi'on. First of all, is arbitration, as a substitute for the jury 
system, constitutionally and legally valid? My answer is sometimes yes and some-
times no. The second question to keep in mind is whether arbitration, as a 
substi tute for the jury system is desirable. The answer, again, is maybe yes and 
maybe no. 
First let us consider the constitutionality and legal validity of arbitration 
as a substitute for the jury system. In this examination I'd like to make it 
clear that I will not be talking about nonbinding arbitration, since whether it 
is entered into on a compulsory or a voluntary basis, if it is nonbinding, that 
is if either party has the right to a trial de novo following arbitration, then I 
believe it's more appropriate to call that sort of mechanism a pretrial screening. 
By binding arbitration, I mean that following arbitration there would be only a 
limited right of judicial appeal. There would be no right to a new jury trial, 
but only the right of appeal to the court on questions of law or on an allegation 
that the arbitration decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 
Let's look at compulsory binding arbitration. Under this kind of arbitra-
tion, one or both parties are forced to enter into arbitration for resolution of 
any disputes. This compulsion could be either by operation of a statute or by 
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action of one of the parties. Is compulsory binding arbitration constitutionally 
or legally prohibited or restrained? My answer would be that compulsory arbitra-
tion, in the sense of a statute mandating that malpractic~ cases be submitted to 
binding arbitration, is constitutionally prohibited, and that compulsory arbitra-
tion, in the sense of a health care provided conditioning the rendition of services 
upon execution of a binding arbitration agreement, is legally restricted but not 
necessarily legally prohibited. 
Why would a statute that required submission of medical malpractice cases 
to binding arbitration be unconstitutional? I believe it would be because of the 
constitutional right to a trial by jury in civil cases. Let me make it clear that 
I'm not referring here to this right as stated in the federal constitution. The 
federal constitution does not impose upon the state an obligation to afford trial 
by jury in civil cases. The provision in article III of the u.s. Constitution 
stating that "The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be 
by jury ... " and the seventh amendment, which states "In Suits at common law, where 
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury 
shall be preserved ... " relate to trial in federal court only. The seventh amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution has not been extended to apply to the states. 
There area couple of citations on this. One is quite an old case, Walker v. 
Sauvinet, 92 u.S. 90 (1876). The Supreme Court held therE?' that'trial by jury was 
not considered essential to due process. Since the fourteenth amendment guarantees 
no particular form or method of procedure, states are 'free wi thin the boundaries 
of their own constitutions to retain or abolish juries in civil cases. This 
position was reaffirmed in Williams v. Florida, 399 u.S. 78 (1970). Consequently 
then, the right to trial by jury in civil cases in state courts is not derived 
from the U.S. Constitution. However, the constitutions of every state have a 
provision guaranteeing the right of trial by jury in civil cases. Indeed, such 
a clause was in many state constitutions prior to the adoption of the federal 
constitution. Thus, we reach the conclusion that a statute, either federal or 
state which would make it compulsory that medical malpractice cases be submitted 
to binding arbitration, would be constitutionally prohibited. 
What about compulsory binding arbi tration in the sense of a health care 
provider conditioning the rendition of services upon execution of a binding arbitra-
tion agreement? I said before that I thought such a sitation was probably legally 
restricted but not necessarily legally prohibited. What I mean is that the more 
the cLrcumstances surrounding the agreement to submit bo binding arbitration be-
tween the health care provider and the patient reflects a compulsory term of the 
agreement on the part of the health care provider, the more +ikely such agreement 
is to be struck down by the courts as being invalid because of undue influence or 
duress. On the other hand, the more the circumstances surrounding such an agree-
ment reflect a voluntary agreement to submit to binding arbitration, the more likely 
such an agreement is to be upheld. That's pretty general, but there are principles 
that you have to keep in mind if you are drafting either legislation or private 
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arbitration agreements between health care providers and their patients. 
A voluntary agreement to submit to binding arbitration indicates a waiver 
of the right to trial by jury and is valid in most states. In eight states within 
the past year and a half--Alabama, California, Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, South 
Dakota, Vermont, and Virginia--such voluntary binding arbitration agreements and 
their implementations will have to be in accordance with specific statutes enacted 
in these states relating to binding arbitration in medical malpractice cases. 
In some of the other states such voluntary binding arbitr~tion agreements 
will probably be legally valid if executed and..J implemented in accordance with the 
general statutory arbitration guidelines of the state. There are about 33 states 
I 
which have enacted a general arbitration statute. In other states such voluntary 
binding arbitration agreements might not be upheld because of case or statutory 
law in the state which might say, for example, that the application of the law is 
a judicial function which cannot be done in a binding way by nonjudicial personnel. 
Case law in some states might make it very difficult, as a practical matter, to 
have voluntary binding arbitration agreements construed as actually being voluntary. 
I would like to mention several of the factors which support voluntary bind-
ing arbitration agreements being construed as actuallY,being voluntary. Some of 
these factors are required in the specific medical malpractice statutes which I 
referred to as having been enacted within the last year and a haLf in eight 
1,_ .. 
states. Foremost among these might be the right of the patient to reJect the bind-
ing arbitration agreement within a designated number of days following provision 
, 
of the services or signing of the agreement. This provision is in all but one of 
the statutes that were enacted in the eight states I mentioned. Two of the eight 
statutes apply only to past disputes. You can in those states agree to arbitrate 
only disputes which have arisen. In the other six states you can agree to arbitrate 
future disputes. In five of those six states a provision exists in the law which 
requires that the law contain a provision for the patient to reject the arbitra-
tion argreement within a certain number of days following the provision of the 
services. This is put in to uphold the voluntary nature of the agreement. If a 
patient is coming in for provision of necessary services, he may be quite willing 
to sign anything to obtain those services, but a court looking at that type of 
ra- situation in retrospect might very well conclude that the agreement was really not 
y a voluntary undertaking on the part of the patient. The solution, may be to draw the 
agreement so as to allow the patient to reject the arbitration agreement within 
so many days following either the entry of the arbitration agreement or the provision 
of services. The argument, frankly, doesn't hold up quite as much if the days are 
numbered from the entry into the agreement as it does if the days are numbered from 
the date of provision of the services. 
A second factor which helps uphold the voluntary nature of the arbitration 
:ely agreement is when the circumstances surrounding the execution of the agreement as 
_es well as the language in the agreement make it clear to the patient that the provi-
sion of services is in fact not dependent upon execution of the agreement. It 
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should be noted at this point, however, that whether a condition for rendering 
services is the execution of a binding arbitration agreement will obviously have 
different legal consequences depending on the setting and the parties who are 
, 
executing the agreement. For example, if the condition is part of a prepaid group 
practice plan which the patient enters prior to any immediate need for services, 
it is quite likely that the agreement will be upheld. See Doyle v. Guilucci, 401 
P.2d 1, 43 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1965). Likewise, it would seem likely that an agreement 
to submit to binding arbitration which was entered into between, a physician and a 
patient prior to any immediate need for med.ical care woulq be upheld in most states. 
Both of the situations mentioned above would,be considerably different than 
a situation in which a hospital made entering the hospital conditional upon 
execution of a binding arbitration agreement. In such a setting the agreement 
would probably be struck down by the court. Another California case which you 
might want to have on this is Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California, 
60 Cal.2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963). A very well written law 
review article on this subject is by Fredrich Kessler, entitled "Contracts of 
Adhesion--Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract," 43 Columbia Law Review (1943). 
What are the potential advantages and disadvantages of voluntary binding 
arbitration as a substitute for the jury system in medical malpractice cases? I'll 
list some of the potential advantages first. It's a speedier meth~d of handling 
claims. Proponents of arbitration say that because of the informal nature of 
arbitration proceedings, claims can be handled in less time than in the traditional 
litigation system. The second potential advantage is that it provides a higher 
degree of sophistication in the decision making process. Proponents of arbitration 
say that it permits the use of experienced and knowledgeable decision makers such 
as physicians and lawyers, which will result in more informed and appropriate 
decisions. A third potential advantage is that it provides less emotional or 
irrational decisions. Proponents say that a panel of arbitrators is much less 
likely to be swayed by irrational and emotional appeals than is a jury. A fourth 
potential advantage is less publicity. Since arbitration is a contractual remedy, 
it provides a benefit, proponents say, of having disputes remain in a private 
setting. The sensational aspects of a jury trial are thereby avoided. A fifth 
potential advantage that's mentioned for arbitration over a jury system is that it 
is a mechanism which provides for less judicial appeal. Arbitration awards are 
more final than jury awards, since reasons for judicial appeal are fewer in 
arbitration, and proponents say that this will lessen the number of unnecessary 
appeals. 
Now I'd like to mention a few of the potential disadvantages of arbitration. 
One would be the loss of the procedural safeguards which judicial li"tigation provides. 
The informality of arbitration proceedings is a two-edged sword. The informality 
may speed up proceedings, but it does, of course, sacrifice traditional procedural 
and evidentiary safeguards. Under most of the enacted medical malpractice binding 
arbitration statutes, the formal rules of evidence do not apply. The absence of 
10 
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evidentiary objections probably harms the defendant more than the plaintiff. 
A second potential disadvantage of arbitration is the loss of jury sympathy 
for the defendant. A number of physicians will find this hard to believe, but 
traditionally juries have been quite reluctant to find again'st the defendant 
physician. In fact, national statistics show that, depending on the state, from 
66 2/3 to somewhat slightly over 80 percent of jury decisions in medical mal-
~nt practice cases are decided in favor of the physician-defendant. 
Another potential disadvantage is that pUblicity concerning the effect of 
:es. large malpractice awards on rising heal th iml~rance premiums may cause some jurors 
in to reconsider awarding inappropriately large sums of money. There is some evidence 
I 
I. 
that this is taking place, for example, in California. It is also possible that 
the more sophisticated panel members who might have a better understanding of the 
loss of income may actually place a larger value on it. 
A third potential disadvantage of arbitration is the easy availability of 
arbitration. This factor may encourage some frivolous or nuisance suits. 
A fourth potential disadvantage is that arbitration may more often result in 
compromise dispositions rather than in a clear finding of liability or fault. 
Arbitrators, it is often said, feel that they are doing a good job if they come 
'II down equally on each side of the coin over a period of time. 'Therefore, there 
might be some tendency for arbitrators to try to encourage settlemen~~ rather than 
to reach a clear resolution of the issues. 
A fifth potential disadvantage is that the nonpublip nature of arbitration 
proceedings may make them appear suspect to the public. Some critics of arbitration 
Lon say that it may avoid the healthy pressure of "law suit pUblicity" as a device for 
1 encouraging quality health care. 
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A sixth potential disadvantage of arbitration is that as a mechanism for 
limiting the right of appeal, it may make it considerably more difficult to correct 
erroneous or unjust decisions. 
The problem with making a decision for or against arbitration, even after 
having heard some of the potential advantages and disadvantages, is that there 
hasn't been a lot of experience with arbitration of medical malpractice yet. There 
have been, of course, some voluntary arbitration programs that have been in 
operation for a number of years, but there has been no widespread experience with 
the use of arbitration for medical malpractice cases. 
I'd like to make a few remarks about some of the specific medical malpractice 
voluntary binding arbitration statutes which have been enacted in some states. As 
I mentioned before, all of these statutes were enacted within the past year and a 
half. A few of the specifics in some of these malpractice arbitration statutes 
might be of interest to you. I mentioned that statutes in two states provide only 
for what might be called post-claim arbitration. That is, the statutes provide 
that it is only after a physician or other health care provider has rendered or 
failed to render services out of which a claim has arisen that the parties may 
agree to settle such disputes by arbitration. The two states are Vermont and 
11 
Alabama. The California law, which permits agreements to cover arbitration of 
future disputes, requires that the arbitration agreement contain the following 
, 
language immediately before the signature line in at least 10 point bold red type: 
"Note: By Signing This Contract You Are Agreeing To Have Any Issue 
Of Medical Malpractice Decided By Neutral Arbitration And You Are 
Giving Up Your Right To A Jury Or Court Trial. .. " 
All of the specific medical malpractice binding arbitration statutes except 
one (South Dakota), which permit arbitr~t~on agreements to cover future medical 
malpractice agreements, p~ovide for a certain period of time, either following 
I 
execution of the contract or provision of the services, in which the patient may 
reject the arbitration agreement. I think this fact highlights the importance of 
such a provision. 
Now, I would like to make a few brief remarks regarding a no-fault approach 
to medical malpractice. I think there are severe constitutional questions about 
a no-fault system for medical malpractice cases. The issue of whether state 
legislatures can modify or substitute or do away with rights that existed in 
common law is one problem area. In any number of state constitutions there are 
provisions that rights that existed at common law shall not be changed or modified. 
Of. course, someone might ask about workmen's compensation stat;,~tes which modified 
rights at common law. The legal decisions all the way from the~u.S. Supreme Court 
down to the state supreme courts, relative to workmert';s compensation have indicated 
that if there is sufficient quid pro quo, if something sufficent is given back 
for that which was taken away, then the legislature can constitutionally modify 
or change rights which existed at common law. Therefore, while it may be theoret-
ically possible to structure a no-fault medical malpractice system which would be 
upheld constitutionally, it would be subject to quite a bit of argument about 
whether there was in fact a sufficient quid pro quo, a sufficient trade off. 
For example, the New York panel which recently studied no-fault came up 
with suggestions for a no-fault system. Their suggestions are all very general. 
They are very fuzzy about the question of how you define a compensable medical 
injury. They cite the recent judicial decision in New York upholding the New York 
automobile no-fault statute, but even in their study they note that that statute 
provides for no-fault only up to a point. In other words, you can get a certain 
amount of money under the statute, but beyond that you may sue in court for 
"serious injuries." 
Beyond that, the desirability and workability of a "no-fault" medical mal-
practice program would be subject to serious question. Should physicians, for 
example, support with their premiums a system which is qoinq to provide compensation 
even where the physician is not negligent? Would this greatly expand the number 
of incidents for which doctors are going to pay? I think that it would. 
How do you come up with a definition of what is going to be compensable 
and what's not? Is it going to be easy to say that the person's condition is the 
result of a medical accident rather than the injury or the disease for which the 
12 
rpe: 
:ept 
.y 
of 
ach 
t 
ied. 
ed 
urt 
ated 
fy 
:Je 
nk 
ltion 
.e 
the patient initially sought treatment? I think that this would be extremely 
difficult. One of the approaches being suggested is to try to come up with a 
specific list of all the compensable types of incidents. 
be very workable. 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: 
I don't think that would , 
QUESTION: I have two very brief questions. First of all, you were talking about 
factors relating to the voluntariness of the agreement and the tight of the patient 
to reject it wi thin a certain amount of days" Are there any provisions in the 
statute that deal with the question of what happens i,f the patient dies or becomes 
mentally incapacitated? Would the patient's personal representative have a right 
to reject the agreement? 
MR. KRICHBAUM: Most of the statutes provide that it can either be the patient or 
his authorized representative. 
QUESTION: My second question deals with the potential advantages of the more 
sophisticated decision making process with attorneys and physicians on the panel. 
Is there any provision for any sort of consumer input which would perhaps counter-
balance what might be an over-professionalism in hearing such a case? 
MR. KRICHBAUM: I think that's a good question. I know that most of the medical 
malpractice arbitration statutes indicate that there will be an attorney, a 
physician, and a judge. Several do provide for consumer or lay representation. 
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RISK CONTROL 
Paul A. Van Pernis, M.D. 
American Medical Association 
Chicago, Illinois 
In discussing professional liability, we are forced to talk about malprac-
tice; I don't really know how we can separate the two terms. The word malpractice 
means "bad" practice, and what we have to try to do is minimize the instances in 
which bad practices occur. Although not all professional liability action stems 
from malpractice, where it's truly bad practice, there is insufficient attention 
to risk control. 
Considerable effort to minimize the sources of risk have been made by 
various hospital associations and some of the insurance carriers who write policies 
for institutions. Some efforts at education in this area have been made by "medical 
specialty" organizations whose membership is primarily based in institutions. Most 
notable are the educational efforts of the College of American Pathologists. 
Although many other professional associations have begun similar efforts, little 
has been done by most state or county medical societies. State and local building 
codes, fire department regulations, and some national bureau regulations and 
advisory statements have been promulgated, but follow-up and enforcement is 
sporadic and all too often a catastrophe of some sort follows. My purpose is to 
attempt to point out the sources of the individual physician's risk with the hope 
that more awareness of the problems will occur, that something will be done about 
it on a personal basis, and that each one of you will involve his colleagues in 
clearing up the problems. 
The physician faces risk in the office environment, hospital environment, 
and the community or other agencies in which he or she works. I shall now ask a 
series of questions concerning some of the sources of risk, hoping that you may 
be stimulated to think of some others for yourself, hoping that you'll make comments, 
and most of all hoping that you will resolve to do something about the uneasiness 
such questions may engender. 
The physician's office:--let's start with the patient's waiting room and 
the building in which the doctor practices. Does the building and its environment 
make it easy and safe for patients to come to see you, particularly if they have 
physical disabilities? Is your offices patient waiting area quiet and reflective 
of a professional atmosphere? Have you oriented your office help to your proce-
dures? Do you set a pattern of concern for patients that the office personnel 
can follow? Is the wiring safe for lamps between furniture? Are the floors safe? 
Can patients move into and out of chairs without assistance? Are there accommo-
dations for the elderly and the physically disabled? Are there provisions to 
prevent waiting patients from overhearing conversations between office personnel 
and telephone conversations? Is there privacy between office personnel and 
patients who are discussing finances, consultation arrangements and hospitalization 
or other institutional arrangements? Is there another exit for treated or 
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acutely ill patients other than the main entrance to your o~fice? Are office 
patient's records kept in confidence from other patients or other persons not part 
of your o~fice personnel? These are the things that havebroughtsuitsi these 
are things we have to think about. 
What about the examining and treatment room? Is privacy insured? Do you 
have a nurse present when you examine patie~~s of the opposite sex? Could the 
patient or physician or nurse quickly summon help when nece'ssary? Is the lighting 
adequate? Is sufficient help available to assist both the patient and yourself? 
Are the examining tables and chairs safe? Are the instruments, appliances, and 
other equipment periodically checked for safety, reliability, and accuracy? How 
often are they checked and by what standard? Who checks them? Do office personnel 
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understand the maintenance and purposes of the equipment and the checking against weI 
known standards? Who instructs them? Do you or your personnel explain to patients mee 
why you wish to use the equipment? Do you explain its possible hazards as well phj 
as its benefits? or 
Now let's examine the patient. Is your record of th~ patient's medical COl 
history a thorough ,and complete one? How was it obtained--by Y9u, by your office wi, 
personnel, or by electronic recorders? Did you verify what your 'personnel or the ge' 
black box recorded? Did you add, delete or correct the record? Did you date and tr, 
sign it? Did you make certain of its confidentiality? Did you do a thorough and 
complete examination and record the findings in detail, whether positive or 
Did you request the necessary laboratory, X-ray, electrocardiographic or other 
studies? Can you justify the expense of doing them? Did you personally obtain 
the necessary specimens or supervise the obtaining of such specimens? Who does 
the procedures? Do you know that those doing them are reliable, accurate, prompt, 
and have accepted standards against which the results are checked? 
Have you visited the laboratories personally so that you know the personnel, 
their qualifications, their participation in outside quality control checks, the 
result of such outside checks whether voluntary or legally required, with or with-
out licensure? Did you examine the data obtained, transfer it to the patient's 
records, date and sign such data and make the necessary interpretations or request 
a repeat of the procedure or procedures? If you did not record the results, do you 
have a system that alerts you to abnormal findings so that appropriate treatment 
can be instituted, or medications and dosages changed? Did you relate temperature 
changes of specimens, shipping time, and time of obtaining specimens, or 
medications or dietary factors which might interfere with the data in its inter-
pretation? When necessary, did you explain to the patient why another specimen 
is needed and at whose expense the procedure is to be repeated? 
Do you know the individuals in the radiology laboratory? Do you know the 
individuals in the occupational therapy department? Do you know the people who 
are going to do other tests like an electroencephelograph, for instance? Do you 
know the people who are directing the activities of these people? Did you allow 
sufficient time to obtain the patient's medical history? Do you obtain the 
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necessary consultations, discuss the diagnostic and treatment plans with the 
art patient as well as with the family, your office personnel, the hospital or other 
institutional personnel as indicated? Did you discuss the hazards and the 
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prognosis? Did you indicate this on your patient's record and inform the patient 
that such a record was made? 
Did you obtain the necessary signed consents from the patient or the family, 
including a statement that the patient agrees that he was informed, and that he 
understood your plans, diagnosis and prognosis? Did you inform the patient about 
the relationship of residents and other stude~~s to the patient and what their 
role would be in the situation, provided you're in a teaching situation? Did you 
I 
have a witness to such discussions? Did you note on the record who the witnesses 
were? Did you give the patient written directions concerning the treatment plan, 
medication, consultations, hospitalization, etc? Did you confer .with other 
physicians, therapists, technicians, pharmacists, and social agencies--in person 
or in writing--and did you inform the patient or family memfuer about these 
conferences? Did you ask any of these persons to confirm appointments directly 
with the patient or with a family member? Did you consider how the patient would 
get home, to another office, or to the hospital, etc. and make arrangements for 
transportatioQ when necessary? 
Did you arrange for future appointments and verify such arrange~ents in 
writing for the patient or his family? Were all the surgical procedures or other 
therapy performed in a proper setting with proper techniques and proper assistance? 
Were dressings, casts, applications, or other treatments done by you or under your 
direct supervision, and did you recheck such applications within proper intervals? 
apt, Did you record on the patient's record what was done? If you took photographs, 
did you attach them? Did you date and sign the record and record witnesses when 
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necessary? Do you have a mechanism to handle complaints about your fees? Do you 
discus~ fees in advance with patients? If patients believe they are overcharged, 
do you let your office manager handle the complaint? Does your office staff help 
patients fill out claim forms? Do you refuse to provide information that patients 
need in order to submit claim form~~or instance, workmen's compensation, or 
personal injury claim~~nless you have been paid for the service? If a patient 
needs to have his or her records forwarded to another physician or another insti-
tution, do you resist by making the transfer of information contingent on the 
payment of his or her account? Do you allow enough time for appointments, and to 
listen to the patient's concerns? 
What about the physician himself? Have you put aside or resolved personal 
frustrations that might interfere with the care of patients? Are you certain that 
he personal illness will not affect your care of the patient? Have you provided 
ho sufficient time to provide high quality patient care for both office and hospitalized 
ou 
ow 
patients? Have you arranged for adequate explanation to your office personnel and 
to patients when unforseen interruptions occur? Have you provided time for contin-
uing education,the readingr·o:f journals, and drug experience ihformation for your-
17 
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self and your office force? Have you provided time for participation in peer 
review activities? Have you provided time for reflective review of patient's 
records, your consultations, and did you initiate any necessary corrections? How 
I 
much do you rely on detail men for your knowledge of drugs and their use? What 
about your relationship with the hospital or other institutions? Do you really 
know and understand the medical staff rules and administrative rules of the 
institution in which you practice? Do you understand the use of mechanisms provided 
to make changes you believe need to be made? Are you prepared to explain the use 
of consultants, assistants, and ancillary services to' your patients? Are you 
certain that your discussions with and about p~tients are kept confidential and 
not broadcast by corridor or public area discussion? Are you courteous but firm 
when discussing errors with hospital personnel, and do you inform your patient 
as to the corrections being made? Are your own personnel instructed about hospital 
routine and procedures when they assist or accompany you to your hospital? Have 
you made certain that the hospital records on your patients are complete, accurate, 
and detailed? Did you check the accuracy of notations made by others of the health 
care team? Did you write a summary of the case? Did you discuss with your patient 
the hospital charges and fees when the patient is in the hospital? 
What about the insurance relationship and the follow-up you expect to give 
upon discharge from the hospital? Did you put the necessary"qj.rections to the 
patient in writing and inform a member of the family or the guardian as to your 
plan? Are you certain you were understood? Are you available for further question 
The questions I have raised relate to what we know as traditional medical 
care of patients with manifest disease. Other questions will arise with the 
implications of modern comprehensive health care since health is now a basic 
right. I would suggest that you consider similar questions as related to health 
education of patients, health protection of patients, health maintenance for 
patients, diagnosis and care of symptomatic disease, care of the dying, and 
rehabilitation and custodial care, which are all now considered to comprise the 
range of medical services the public needs. 
I don't want to leave you with a feeling that I know all the questions and 
answers. What I've said is really common sense. It's application of the golden 
rule. I'd like to leave you with this question: suppose you were the patient? 
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A PLAINTIFF'S LAWYER VIEWS MALPRACTICE 
William C. Ball, J.D. 
Ball and Nagel, P.C. 
Waterloo, Iowa 
I assume that anyone attending this conference has reached the point in 
his reasoning where he recognizes there is such a thing as malpractice. I 
run into some physicians who will not recognize this, but I'm not going to spend 
a great deal of time on that problem. Instead I'll try to defin~ it and to talk 
about the three people that are involved in m~}practice. First, we're talking, 
normally, about a patient who's been injured. By an injury I mean some inordinate 
or untold result from medical treatment which mayor may not have been caused 
by the negligence of the doctor. Second we're talking about a lawyer to whom 
the injured patient goes. And of course we're also talking about the physician. 
I'd also include the care facilities, such as the hospital where that patient 
was treated . 
When injured patients corne to me, it's my duty to sort them out. Where do 
they corne from? Basically, they corne from referrals from other lawyers around the 
state of Iowa. On a few isolated occasions they corne from outside the state. 
There are usually two reasons they are referred. The first, in most instances, 
the referring lawyer tells me, is because "It's against a local doc;t.or, and I 
can't handle the case. I need his future cooperation." This implies to me a 
certain unrealistic relationship between the professions. ~he second is more justi-
fiable. He'll call me and say, "Hey, Bill, I wouldn't know one if I saw one. 
Will you please look this thing over and tell me what's there, if anything, and 
I'll be happy to work with you on any basis that you want me to, or if you don't, 
th fine." 
The main characteristic of the people that are sent to me in most instances 
is that they are in the dark. They have not been given an adequate explanation as 
e to the reason for their bad result. Obviously, our hornbooks say that a bad re-
sult does not necessarily mean negligence, but there's usually been a breakdown in 
and communication between the physician and the patient. In many instances this 
.en breakdown is totally unjustified because upon investigation of the case, after 
consultation with a physician who's knowledgeable in the area in which the injury 
occurred, we will often write the patient a letter--which quite frankly should 
have been written by the attending physician--explaining to him the reason for 
the result that was obtained. In some 25 percent of the cases, the patient is 
angry because there's been a complete breakdown of communications between him and 
the physician. In many instances, of course, this is a sign that the physician 
is rather sensitive about the result obtained, whether justifiably or not. Perhaps 
he's trying to hide something. This is a hallmark. It's not a controlling factor, 
but it is something that does happen. 
In some cases there is genuine medical injury which you don't need to be 
a doctor or lawyer to figure out shouldn't have happened as when the clamp 
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slipped off inside the patient. These fall into that terrible doctrine of ~ 
ipsa loquitur. The patient comes in and wants to know what to do. I had one of 
those, and I told the lady to see a surgeon and get i~ removed because she was 
sitting in my office with it in her. 
Finally, there is one thing that the patients recognize--as far as I'm 
concerned, the medical profession is in real trouble with the public in this 
particular area. This is the extreme reluctance, which I consider to still be 
in existence in this country, of physicians to testify in legitimate malpractice 
cases against another physician. I'd-i~ke to relate the observation of a lady who 
brought he.r SOD, in because of an undiagnosed wrist fracture. She wanted us to 
look at the case for her. When I explained this problem to her, she looked at me, 
opened her eyes in surprise and said, "Did the doctors take an oath to protect 
one another?" This was her reaction. I told her no, they take a diffe.rent kind of 
an oath. I think this is something the medical profession should talk about. 
But let's talk about the lawyer for a minute because this is a many-faceted 
problem. The fault, in terms of the crisis in this area--and there is a crisis--
is not only the fault of the medical profession. We can lay part of the problem 
on the lawyers. First of all, what do I tell someone who comes in to see me when 
they think they have a case, or when they want to know if they have a case? I 
tell them that we turn down at least 80 percent of the people who come in after 
we've investigated their cases. I was talking to a leading firm in the midwest, 
which keeps statistics on medical malpractice cases~ Of the 100 cases that they 
screened in the last 2 or 3 year period, they took five. They turned down the 
other 95. Doctors complain about the contingent fee system, but the contingent fee 
system is the best thing the doctors have going in terms of the proper screening 
of medical malpractice cases. There.are no fools taking lawsuits they can't 
possibly win on a contingent fee basis. 
I tell the people that if we accept the employmen4 it will be on contingent 
fee basis, but that it is necessary and vital to the patient's interest, the 
doctor's interest, society as a whol~ and the attorney's that the matter be 
thoroughly screened in order to determine as many facts as possible before filing 
the claim. 
We obtain copies of all records. Many times I'll write doctors requesting 
the records, and I'll send them a patient's authorization, but I won't hear from 
them. Many times the answer to whether or not there is in fact negligence lies 
in the doctor's records. If he doesn't give them to me, what am I supposed to 
do? If the records contain a crucial poin~ I suppose we have to file the suit 
and subpoena ,them. So I would caution doctors at this stage that you should talk 
to your lawyer candidly about this. In certain instances you may want to furnish 
the records where in the past you may not have. 
I indicate further to the client that it's necessary in this screening pro-
cess for the attorney to research the proposed action thoroughly before accepting 
the case. I would exphasize this. The time to do your legal and medical research, 
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inasmuch as it's humanly possible, is prior to making a claim. Don't write doctors 
+etters and tell them you are going to sue them when you don't know in fact whether 
there is a case or not. It detracts from the dignity of our profession, and as 
, 
far as I'm concerned is harassment of the doctor. I'll go on the record as being 
critical of the legal profession when this happens. 
I also tell potential clients during the screening process that I always 
talk to the physician, even in the obvious cases. Normally I will talk to board 
certified physicians who specialize in the area of the injury that was involved. 
Sometimes these are local physicians who have gonfidence tha~ I handle these 
claims honestly, and reject the ones that are spurious ,or not worthy of further 
action. Sometimes they are physicians in distant places. At all times we attempt 
to obtain practicing physicians. The. fact that a physician testifies in the 
medical malpractice case may mean that he feels that the patient.is entitled to 
this testimony in order to balance our society. 
I also tell potential clients that there is going to be a contingent fee 
basis if the case is accepted. There's hardly anyone in this society who can 
afford an attorney on any other basis in these cases. If the doctors are suc-
cessful in their legislative efforts to abolish the contingent fee, they will 
to a large extent abolish medical malpractice suits as well. Obviously the doctor 
has a well-paid attorney who is hired by a multi-million dollar insura,.!lce company, 
and I quite frankly have to ask you whether it would be a fair fight. If the 
patient has serious injuries, he is incapacitated. He might be on social security 
or unemployment. How can he be told that he should hire someone at $50, $75, or 
$100 an hour to prosecute a malpractice claim against a doctor? I submit that 
it's inherently unfair and that it violates our very concepts of justice in this 
country. 
I also mention to the people that come in that the doctors win 75 percent 
of the cases tried in this country. It isn't necessarily because 75 percent of 
the cases are not meritorious. It's more because of the ability of the physician 
to marshall medical evidence on the crucial issues in the law suit--the medical 
ing issues. As you know, medical testimony in a medical malpractice case is 
practically a necessity. A plaintiff's lawyer who goes into a medical malpractice 
ing case without medical testimony should re-examine his case rather carefully. 
~m I also tell the interviewees that in the event we accept the case there 
s are going to be court costs and immense fees involved. This will run anywhere 
from $1500 to $20,000. If you want a genuine medical expert to travel to Waterloo, 
Iowa or Lexington, Kentucky, it's probably going to cost around $1000 a day and 
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travel expenses. These kinds of risks are necessary to enforce what amounts to 
a recognizable legal right in our country. When you talk about limiting the right 
of the patient's redress to the courts, I ask you, in terms of the concept of 
fair play in this country, whether this really makes sense. 
I mention something else to these people--and I think this is something 
that doctors and lawyers should consider very carefully. There's little likli-
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hood that the case will be settled prior to suit. I've had several cases recentl' 
where I literally pleaded with the insurance adjuster to settle the case. They 
were cases of obvious liability. One was a case where a duct was cut in a gall 
bladder operation. Not only did the doctor cut the duct, but he also failed to 
check to determine whether it was cut after he commenced his closure procedures. 
We had two different board certified surgeons say that there was negligence. I 
had another case where a man went in for a gall bladder operation and came out 
with a bad arm which, as you well know, was probably caused by positioning during 
the operation. In both cases the insUrance companY' refused to settle the case. 
It had to be filed, and they then settled the' case after discovery. It's kind of 
a sad commentary. It seems to me that the insurance industry's job is to protect 
their clients. That's their first duty and that's what the courts have said. 
When I see cases such as these that are not settled and I have to file them, I 
get sick because it's not necessary that these cases be filed at all. The surgeon: 
that were involved were basically good doctors, but they made a mistake. They 
injured soneone, but that's why they carry insurance. 
I tell all my doctor friends--you may not believe it, but I have a few--
that one of the first things they should do when the~ are served with notice of 
a malpractice case is to get their own lawyer. In this way, they will be adequate: 
advised and the insurance company can recognize the fact that the doctor is indepeJ 
dently represented. Quite frankly, if I have a case against me that I feel is an 
obvious case of negligence, I'm going to call my insurance company and tell them 
they'd better settle or I'm going to admit liability--as long as the settlement 
demand is within a reasonable area. In the one case I settled, my settlement 
demand was less before I filed the suit than it was when we ultimately settled 
the case. Again, I don't think this is proper; I think that the insurance industr~ 
needs to reexamine itself here. 
Finally, the last thing I mention to these people is that it is an absolute 
necessity that we obtain medical testimony to support their position. I then 
indicate to them the extreme difficulty in obtaining this testimony. I think that 
if I had to put my finger on one area that I consider to be a main problem with 
the medical profession today in this country from a view as the plaintiff's 
attorney, this is it. 
In talks I've given to doctors and lawyers, they ask me if I would testify 
in a legal malpractice case. I always say certainly. I don't understand the 
problem. It's not a personal thing; it's a matter of being professtonal. Your 
first duty is to the public and not to your fellow practitioners, whether you're 
a doctor or a lawyer. It's kind of pathetic when we have to go to New York, 
California, or Chicago to get a medical expert on an issue. I don't think that a 
doctor or a lawyer should have to apologize to anyone, let alone his fellow 
practicioner, for standing up and telling the truth. 
I would like to point out to you that a Health Education and Welfare 
special commission studied the medical malpractice problem in 1973. They made 
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recommendations in this area. They know that there has been a problem in the past. 
The commission recommends that organized medicine and osteopathy establish an 
official policy encouraging members of their profession to cooperate fully in 
medical malpractice actions so that justice will be assured 'for all parties. 
That obviously is not the situation today. The makeup of the commission was very 
nonpartisan. It consisted of doctors, lawyers, insurance industry representatives, 
and government representatives. 
I have never seen a problem solved yet by shoving it unde+ the rug, but 
that's exactly what the present legislative e~actments are doing. Arbitration 
l of can have a proper place in medical malpractice if the arbitration panel, the 
, 
;ect rules, and discovery are structured to safeguard the rights of all parties ade-
quately. But if you force through unfairly structured arbitration panels, of 
course you are going to end up with a loaded deck against the patient. Again I 
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ask you, can our society survive with inherent unfairness in its judicial system? 
I submit that it cannot. 
Limitations on the amount of the awards against physicians for negligence 
can be set. But this,again, has little to do with the premiums that are paid for 
medical malpractice insurance. Doctors complain about the contingent fee basis, 
but they use it when they sue the patient for their fees. If a patient runs a 
stop sign and hits the doctor and severs his hand so he can't operate./ of course 
the patient owes the full amount of the award. 
On the other side of the coin, we have the most aff~uent members of our 
society telling us that they should have less responsibility than others. I hear 
a lot about the price of medical malpractice insurance premiums going up, but the 
question I always ask, and quite frankly it's not answered very much, is whether 
the premiums that are paid have any reasonable relationship to the dollar volume 
of the practice of the doctor. I appeared before a subcommittee of the Iowa 
legislature on medical malpractice and one of the senators said to me, "Well I 
have a friend who's an ear, nose and throat specialist and he's paying $12,000 a 
year. Don't you think that's unreasonable?" I said "I don't know whether it is 
or not; what's his gross volume?" He says about $350,000. So you see that the 
average premium paid by physicians in this country is still around 4 to 5 percent 
of their gross, and it is a business deduction. When the ratio starts getting out 
of line, then I think we'll have a problem. 
In the last 25 years medical costs have gone up 850 percent; food costs 
have gone up 350 percent. And yet medical malpractice insurance dollars, which 
represent less than 1 percent of total medical costs, is being blamed for these 
rising costs. I submit that this is a distortion of truth. 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
QUESTION: How do we resolve the problem of the physician'S peers retaliating 
economically and socially for his having testified? I am a plaintiff's lawyer, 
also. 
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MR. BALL: I wish I had mentioned this. My feeling is that the first positive step 
that can be taken in the area of medical malpractice is to beef up peer review in 
this country because medical malpractice cases are nothing more than society's 
, 
objective methods of enforcing standards of care. The only other review of a 
doctor's work is by his fellow practitioners from the hospital staffs. The 
hospitals should adopt an independent view because quite frankly they are going 
to be sued too. This Nork case is a classic example of where the hospital failed 
to enforce proper standards of review of the medical profession in their review 
committees. I think that it's going to..Jtake courage on the part of a few people 
to stand up in medical peer review committee me~tings and express this idea. I 
think that it has to corne from within the profession and it had better corne fast. 
If it doesn't, it will be hastening the day when we are going to have medicine 
delivered more economically through huge health care units and the private practice 
of medicine is going to pass by the boards. With these huge organizations deliv-
ering medical care, you are going to have peer review, and it is going to be 
effective, and we're going to have the availability of medical testimony. 
QUESTION: You are familiar with charts, obviously, as all lawyers are. In a 
long term hospitalization or even a short term hospitalization, there are pages 
and pages of charts, and when a lawyer does not know whether he has a case, he 
often looks for the dotting of the "i" and the crossing of 'the,,"t" in order to 
get a general overall effect. There frankly are some members of the legal 
profession who fish. It's very easy to fish from a,hospital chart, and that's 
why insurance companies and doctors are reluctant to give that type of document 
to everyone. How should we settle that sort of situation? 
MR. BALL: I understand. You presented an insoluble problem except on a case by 
case basis. The problem you run into is that if I write you a letter and I say 
I'd like a copy of your records and you don't give them to me, if the circumstances 
exist which indicate to me that there is at least a good strong likelihood of 
negligence, I'll probably sue you and subpoena the record because I have a duty 
to do so. I recognize that you stand a substantial risk. You're damned if you 
do, damned if you don't, so to speak. But the most important thing I mentioned 
was to call your lawyer and say, "Hey, call this guy up and explain this thing." 
Explain to him the backgound of the medical treatment given. Have him talk to 
another man in your specialty. I had an orthopedic call me from another county. 
He was a friend of mine. He said, "I have a helluva problem." He said, "This 
guy called for my records. What about him?" I said, "What about him? He's a good 
lawyer. Give him the records. He won't take the case unless there is something 
there." I asked him, "Is there a case there, Earl?" He said no and he told me 
why. I said, "O.K. I'll call the guy up and explain to him. Or I'll write him 
a letter. You write me a letter and set out for me what happened here and why 
this result was obtained and I'll write this guy a letter and tell him the same 
thing, but I won't use your letter." We did this. I called the lawyer later and 
said, "Ed, do you have any question?" He said, "No, I'm not going to take the darn 
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case. I've checked into it and I verified what you fellows have told me." In 
other words, you have to open up that communication. Put yourself in the lawyer's 
position. 
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A DEFENDANT'S LAWYER VIEWS MALPRACTICE 
Galen J. White Jr. J.D. 
Boehl,- Stopher, Graves and Deindoerfer 
Louisville, Kentucky 
I would like to begin my discussion by quarreling with the term "medical 
malpractice." I think some of our previous speakers have alluded to this term 
with derision. A couple of months ago a Lexington doctor suggested to me that of 
all the professions, the medical profession is the only one that has to character-
ize its tort problems as medical malpnactice'cc_,All other pro:fessions speak of 
professional liability. Having just renamed the topic,of this seminar, I want to 
talk to you about what I believe to be some particular problems, fully aware that 
I can't rebut all that my learned colleague stated. 
Judge Leibson talked this morning about the Stephenson case and the Nazareth 
Benevolent Institution case. He talked only about the fact that the decision 
allowed him to get to the records of the hospital and to all the letters of the 
doctors that had been written about the particular defendant doctor. He did not 
mention that he received a verdict of $2.4 million. That was about 5 times the 
amount of any injury verdict this state had ever known~ If that verdict had come 
in this year with the continency reserve fund measures contained in our legislation, 
it would have wiped out the whole fund through 1980. '_ .. 
I'm not talking about the merits of that particular case, but I think it 
does tend to show that the insurance companies are reasona:Qle in their protesta-
tions against what they call the runaway verdict. They can't rate their insureds 
properly because they may be sued 20 or 25 years after the policy is written. We 
got a case the other day from a hospital in an eastern Kentucky county. The 
plaintiff claims recently discovered malpracti.ce from 3 years ago. He sued for 
$2 1/2 million. 
If we deal with malpractice solely in terms of insurance costs, I think 
that is treating the symptom rather than the disease itself. The problem of mal-
practice is more deeply rooted than that. I'd like to review some of those effects 
and then tell you about some of the problems inherent in defending doctors in our 
current legal climate. 
First, malpractice litigation has indisputably increased the direct cost 
of medical care. I'm going to talk later about some procedures that doctors and 
hospitals now feel they have to employ as a result, not of clinical judgment, but 
because of. law suits and judicial decisions. Second, malpractice litigation, for 
good reasons or bad, intimidates capable and skilled physicians from performing 
some high-risk procedures for which they have trained. Increased malpractice 
litigation also influences the availability of health care in particular locations. 
Once it was a problem in eastern Kentucky to even find a doctor. Now we have 
doctors, but they are quite often reluctant to treat problems they may have handled 
4 or 5 years ago. One reason is because they feel they may be second-guessed by 
some expert here at the university. Or they may just find a litigious-looking 
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fellow coming in the front door. A doctor near Carrollton told me just the other 
day that he simply will not treat an individual from out of town who walks into 
his office unless it is a legitimate emergency. He j~st sends them packing down 
to Louisville. That's the way a lot of doctors feel they are forced to handle it. 
Maybe he's making the right decision; maybe he's making the wrong decision. The 
point of the matter is, that's the way he handles his problem. Finally, malprac-
tice litigation has inhibited, I think, the best utilization of manpower. Many 
doctors would like to use paramedical personnel to perform routine procedures, 
but they are afraid to delegate that k£nd of responsibility. 
It's difficult to pick up any magazine,~articularly professional journals, 
without reading the suggested reasons for the 'growth of medica~ malpractice cases. 
The first obvious reason is that malpractice does exist. We ali recognize that, 
but I don't think that's the ultimate problem to be solved in dealing with a great 
many of our cases. Doctors and hospitals have always inflicted pain and injury 
upon a certain number of patients. Although malpractice does in fact exist, I 
think that the frequency of malpractice cases bears little relationship to the 
growth of malpractice litigation. I've read nothing in any surveyor report 
which has suggested that the growth of malpractice litigation is caused by a 
deterioration in medical care. 
One value of reviewing the reasons for the growth ofli±igation in the 
malpractice area is that I think it tells us much about ourselves (lawyers) as 
it does about the medical profession. There are two basic trends which have 
caused the increase in litigation. One is the tremendous advance of medical 
skill in recent years. The other trend involves the growth of patient expecta~ 
tions. A doctor in California noted these trends 20 years ago when he stated 
that he was not concerned about the future cost of malpractice insurance; he 
was worried about whether it would be available at any cost. Advances in 
medical techniques and the increased availability of medical care to more people 
have inevitably increased the chances of medical accidents or unfortunate results. 
Revisionist writers of American history have talked about the politics of 
rising expectations as a pathological development in this country. I think the 
same could be said about the rising expectations of p6.tential patients. My 
experience teaches me that people tend to demand more and more until their demands 
outstrip what can be delivered. The growing number of informed consent cases, of 
which we win most, is a good indication of that trend. 
This is an age of consumerism. At every turn people are encouraged to 
assert their economic rights. Public service announcements tell you where to go 
to file your claim for wage and hour underpayment, where you can file your claim 
for discrimination in employment, and what to do if you have a bad product. I 
think this carries over to the mentality of people in dealing with their physicianE 
While perhaps 25 to 40 percent of our cases involve claims that would have been 
filed 10 or 15 years ago, the majority of them involve claims that I do nat 
believe would have been litigated 10 years ago. The reasons for this are both 
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Much has also been written about how the changing nature of the medical 
profession contributes to the growth of medical malpractice litigation. Writers 
speak of the depersonalization and fragmentation of medical care. Much of that 
is true. Researchers in Germany published a recent study which indicated that the 
average length of any patient visit was less than 3 minutes in that country. I 
think that's probably also a fair statement in this country. However, the patient 
doesn't realize what a doctor can accomplish in 3 minutes--how much he sees, how 
he hears. 
I suggest to you that the medical profession is, being singled out as a 
depersonalized profession when in fact that's what is happening to all of us. 
tellers work side by side with money machines; the old friendly butcher has 
replaced by an anonymous meat cutter. Just recollect intimate Crosley field 
you climb to your $7.50 seat out in right field at synthetic River-
Stadium. 
Consider the changes in the legal profession. There are fewer automobile 
now. Lawyers have time on their hands. They are not intimidated by the 
teries of the medical practice as they used to be. Lawyers are becoming more 
lIed in handling doctors as adversaries and as witnesses. 'They have found 
doctors willing to testify in malpractice cases. If they don't .. know one 
sonally, there are services allover this country that will provide a physician 
will testify for either side on any subject. 
Many lawyers are now filing their malpractice cases for the first time, 
I'm glad that Mr. Ball talked about the obligation of a lawyer to investi-
Some of the cases that are brought into my office reflect an abysmal and 
ignorance by the plaintiff's attorney of the physician's responsibilities 
the patient. Often that lawyer represents an unhappy client with bad 
Because of the favorable climate for malpractice cases, he files a suit 
anything in his file to establish liability. We've gone back and docu-
these cases and have found that these are not cases where the lawyer has 
tly sought medical records or tried to make contact with the doctor. These 
cases where the fellow just had a mad client who filed suit. 
I've talked about the problems but I haven't suggested any solutions. They 
are not part of a solution, you are part of the problem. I confess to 
because I'm paid to defend doctors and hospitals. But I'd like to talk 
the problem of defending doctors and hospitals within the context of 
it mentioned that an error in judgment is not a basis for 
doctor is not judged by hindsight. This is a nice, easily 
rule of law, but as a matter of practice it doesn't always work that way. 
find much uncertainty in anticipating what the courts expect of them. I 
problem with the sponge case or the severed nerve case; I'm talking about 
s that essentially involve judgment, diagnosis, and questions of when to 
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send the patient somewhere else, when to administer medicine, when to do a test. 
Those are questions of judgment, and yet doctors are constantly being second-guessec 
by an expert who looks back from the results to the beginning. 
, 
Doctors find it repugnant that a lay court, often supported by uncertain 
medical testimony or no medical testimony at all, may create criteria for a finding 
of malpractice. I think that when you start to look at how malpractice develops, 
you should look at these things: (1) the quality of the professionals involved, 
and (2) the types of cases they experience. 
Teaching hospitals and universi,ty centers should always provide a higher 
quality of care than do rural hospitals and physicians located away from ample 
libraries and other medical facilities. Yet often they must handle the same 
types of cases. The fact that variation in the performance of a rural hospital 
and that of a university center may exist should not imply that the former is 
guilty of malpractice. Even though malpractice litigation is said to deter 
negligent conduct, a physician is more often than not unclear about what standards 
will be applied to him retrospectively, what standards will be perceived by a 
court and a jury after the whole problem has tried before them. 
Take a look sometime at Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974). In 
that case a Washington court held that as a matter of' law a physician was negligent 
in failing to administer a glaucoma test to a young patient. ~espite uncontradicted 
medical testimony that is was a universal practice of ophthalmologists not to 
administer such tests to patients under 40 unless the test was judged clinically 
appropriate. In that case the doctor tested the patient at age 32 when her 
symptoms suggested to him that glaucoma should be suspected. She had glaucoma--
which he admitted may have been in existence for perhaps 10 years--but which had 
gone undetected. The court didn't let it go to the jury. They held as a matter 
of law the testing of underage persons should have been done. That decision 
reflects to me a good bit of hindsight in a case where a court was overwhelmed by 
a bad result and unduly influenced by the fact that the test was admittedly simple 
and inexpensive. As I said, as a result of decisions like this, the physician 
or hospital is compelled to require procedures or tests that no one on that 
hospital staff believes is necessary. 
Further, a defendant doctor faces not only a detached, retrospective 
evaluation by the courts of his judgmen~ but he is also often compelled to justify 
his actions against a foreign expert whose scientific knowledge is admittedly 
greater than his and who possesses a deeper understanding of the problem. The 
case of Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370 (Ky. 1970) was applauded by the University 
of Kentucky Law Journal back in 1971 as abandoning the locality rule. What really 
shakes me about that case--besides its holding--is that it followed a decision 
coming from the same court that decided the Helling case. 
The Blair case presents a very practical problem of defending many physi-
cians and hospitals. A respected university expert takes it upon himself not only 
to describe the course of treatment the physician should have followed but also 
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st. to state, often on the basis of very little understanding or experience, his 
guesse opinion as to the standard of care that should have been expected of that physician 
in the circumstances in which he found himself. For instance,our office tried 
, 
in a case not long ago where plaintiff brought in a fellow from Boston. He said it 
inding was "the universal practice" to conduct a particular test before surgery in 
ops, particular circumstances. On cross examination he could not name one physician 
ed, in this entire state or in any surrounding state who performed this "universal" 
test, and yet that kind of testimony went to the jury. 
er The plight of the defendant doctor is £~ther aggravated by the contest he has 
e to wage against medical treatises. Last year at the se,minar one of the decisions 
talked about was Heilman v. Snyder, 520 S.W.2d 321 (Ky. 1975), which stated that 
al medical treatises authenticated by an expert or by notice by the court could be 
admitted as substantive evidence. That decision and other decisions I've seen do not 
tell the courts how they are supposed to instruct the jury as to the weight to be 
dards given to that material. The material cannot be cross-examined. The material more 
often than not does not state what standard the defendant should have been following; 
usually it describes only the best possible course of treatment. This material is 
In used, I think, unfairly and without real guidelines for'the jury against the defendant. 
rligent The retrolental fibroplasia (RLF) cases are also a dramatic illustration 
licted of the problems with medical litigation. RLF is a condition which wa~ first 
described by a physician back in the early '40's. It involves the loss of eyesight 
.ly in premature infants because of damage to retinal vessels., A lot of theories 
were advanced throughout the 40's as to why this condition existed. In about 
la-- 1952 some physicians in Australia and England wrote about this condition and 
had opined that probably too much oxygen while the premature infant was in the 
:ter hospital shortly after birth could cause the condition. It was not until about 
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1954 that the first literature in this country came up with the same theory. Yet 
in two cases in the past year doctors have defended themselves against young adults 
in RLF cases. One was born in 1952 and the other in 1954. The juries found that 
they were negligent because they over-oxygenated these children 20 years previously 
only because it was known somewhere, somehow, at the time that there might be a 
connection between over-oxygenation and the premature infant. Those cases dra-
matically illustrate the haz:ards of trying to keep right up to date in the area in 
which you work. One child was born in 1952 when the subject was written about 
only in Australia. 
I'd like to talk now about some helpful hints to doctors. Here are some 
areas in which I think doctors can help themselves in their practices. One is the 
area of consultation. Some of the cases that trouble us most are cases where 
either the patient or a member of the patient's family has requested consultation. 
The principal doctor says there's no need for consultation. This may be all right, 
but he makes no chart of the request or of his reasons for denial of it. It's 
my humble opinion that when you have a case, particularly a serious case, and a 
relative or the patient asks about having another doctor take a look at him, that 
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you should give that very serious thought, and if in your medical judgment it is 
not required, you chart that. 
A second area concerns what choices you should g~ve a patient in terms of 
tests or procedures. If, in your medical opinion, you believe a test should be 
made right now, you should have it done right now or have a good reason for not 
doing it. There's no better way to stick your neck out than to have that patient 
never come back when you're on record as having stated that at some point in time 
this should have been done. Never say to the patient that the test should be 
made now, but that you don't have to doi<t now. You should keep quie.t rather 
than do that. 
Conversely, if the patient suggests that he ought to have a test--an EKG 
or whatever--and you don't think it's necessary, chart it. Sometimes they're 
setting you up, but more often they ask innocently. If the person was con-
cerned enough to want this particular test, put it in your chart as to why you 
didn't do it. 
Informed consent cases present the same questions in terms of your charts. 
If you are a surgeon, do not rely upon hospital consent forms. It is my belief 
that in questions of informed consent, you should have your own consent form or 
your own chart where you put down that you told the pati'ent the risks, the 
possible consequences. Also include the time of day and the date of your discus-
sion. If anyone besides you and your patient is present, make a note of that 
person. 
Finally--and this should be obvious to you--beware of the telephone. 
Doctors probably practice more bad medicine over the telephone than at any other 
time. I want to tell you about what happened to a fellow in Florida. In that 
situation an individual came into a drug rehabilitation center which had no 
physician on duty at the time. The defendant doctor was sick at home and he 
wasn't even a member of the center's active staff; he was on the courtesy staff. 
Someone from the emergency room called him and said they needed a physician's 
signature on their records in order to admit this patient. He said, "Go ahead 
and use my name, but I can't treat him." The center admitted him and 4 days 
later he died-- 1 day after meningitis was diagnosed. The survivor sued the 
doctor, and the trial judge granted the doctor a summary judgment. The Court of 
Appeals reversed and held the case should be tried before a jury on these issues. 
One, whether the physician had accepted the man as a patient. Two, whether he 
was negligent in admitting the patient without seeing him. And three, '-'lhether 
the doctor's failure to diagnose meningitis was the proximate cause of death. 
That's a tough case. I think the next time you practice over the telephone you 
should keep that case in mind. 
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Just a few more points. I'm a defense lawyer but I have no problems with p 
contingent fees. I think people have to go this route. If the lawyer is willing p 
to take the risk of losing, as they do in most cases, that's an appropriate way s 
to compensate as long as the percentage arrangement is not unconscionable. i 
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A lot of doctors, when they first get sued, want to file a countersuit. 
The basis for the countersuit usually is, "I didn't do anything wrong and this is 
frivolous." Well, if it is a frivolous suit, the doctor has a legitimate right 
I 
to complain. But my question is, why should this be limited to malpractice suits? 
When a lawyer signs a pleading and certifies that the complaint is filed in good 
faith, there are sanctions in any bar association, which to my knowledge have 
never been enforced, against a complaint not filed in good faith. On the other 
hand, I can state to you that some of my colleagues are looking for a good set 
of facts to establish a cause of action against the filing of a frivolous suit. 
We'd like to do it in a malpractice case, but such an qction should not be limited 
to malpractice cases. 
The last thing I want to touch on is the problem that often exists between 
the defense lawyer and the doctor. The reaction of a lot of doctors when they get 
sued is one of being hurt. This sometimes goes away after the first case, but 
often it never leaves. That's understandable. However, the only way a case can 
be defended is for there to be complete confidence and trust between the doctor 
defendant and his lawyer. The doctor must never hold back, the doctor must level 
with his attorney. It's unlike any other professional relationship that I know 
of in the tort field. A doctor is personally and professional'wounded, and a 
defense lawyer always has to take that into account. >, 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
DR. LEMON: Mr. Ball, I've seen you taking copious notes over there. Would you 
like to destroy your adversary now in public? 
MR. BALL: One of. the things I did want to mention was the locality rule. That 
is the rule that has historically required a physician who is familiar with the 
standards of practice in the locality where the malpractice occured to testify. 
It has been pretty well abrogated, and now it's more or less universally recognized 
that there are national standards of practice of medicine. This is particularly 
true, with today's ease of communication, when a doctor in Lexington, Ky. can call 
various national health services or for that matter physicians who are highly 
specialized in the particular area of the problem and consult with them on the 
phone. He can call Mayo Clinic, which has that type of service, and hopefully 
get some insight. Or he can refer the patient somewhere else because of the ease 
of transportation. Therefore, it has been my observation that the locality rule 
is more or less a legal fiction. The fact of the matter is that physicians travel 
to seminars allover the coun.try to learn the proper standards of medical practice 
you in given situations. 
As far as defensive medicine is concerned, I certainly admit that this is a 
with problem. The question lies in the degree and the nature and the scope of the 
'illingproblem. A Duke University study authorized by HEW indicates that it is not a 
, way sUbstantial factor in the increase of medical costs. Several of my friends have 
indicated to me that although they feel it can be a problem, particularly among the 
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unsure physicians, that basically investigation is the name of the game. The 
proper tests and procedures make a differential diagnosis; therefore, their job 
is to practice good medicine irrespective of the ~ear of suit. I think that 
lawyers and doctors are professional people, and it takes courage to practice 
any profession properly. 
a 
You brought up the matter of countersuits by doctors. You can tell them 
you got this from the plaintiff's lawyer. The real problem in terms of medical 
malpractice suits does not lie in the filing. The filing often represents some-
thing done from necessity, hope, or~a possibility 'of success when the true facts 
cannot be made known until the discovery process is made available to the plainti 
If that information is obtained and if it appears there is no likelihood of SUcce 
then for the attorney to continue to prosecute the suit up until trial raises 
serious questions. I think the attorney is much more vulnerable by doing that 
than he ever will be by filing the suit. 
DR. LEMON: Would you like to respond to any of that, Mr. White? 
MR. WHITE: No thank you. 
DR. LEMON: Are there any questions from the audience? Would you like to have 
any of these points pursued a bit further? 
QUESTION: I have a question about some of the legislation that is being proposed 
concerning expert witness of the locality, especially in the state of Illinois. 
MR. BALL: I alluded to this. Basically this legislation is designed to make it 
more difficult for the plaintiff to present his case. It doesn't have anything 
to do with the realities of the medical practice in this country. There is, as I 
mentioned, a reluctance of in-state physicians in the state; usually the plaintif 
experts corne from without the state. Consequently, if you limit expert testimony 
to an Illinois expert, then, of course, you cut down the number of medical malprac-
tice suits. But I submit that this is no answer; eventually, this type of tactic 
will fall by its own weight. 
MR. WHITE: I'll make a comment about that. I share the view that this is a very 
bad piece of legislation. We should not artificially construct limits on the 
nature of testimony of people. 
QUESTION: I have a question which apparently no one wants to bring up. Given an 
injured patient and a truly legitimate malpractice act for which that patient is 
eventually compensated, how much of the judgment can that patient reasonably 
expect to receive? What's the average? 
MR. BALL: I believe the HEW studies concluded that the average attorney fee in 
these cases is a third. I know there have been citations of fees going up to 50 
percent. I don't subscribe to that. I don't do it. I don't think it's right. 
If the case is so bad that you have to take 50 percent of it, you probably shouldr 
take it anyway. My own experience in these matters indicates to me that any-
where from 25 percent to possibly, in an unusual case, 40 percent of the net 
recovery is fair. I might add, too, that I have not in my 20 years seen any 
real abuse in this area. I'm sure there have been some, but in my own personal 
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e experience I haven't seen it. 
job DR. DEI10N: Is there a related question at issue? It seems that I have read that 
of all the money that is spent for malpractice purposes--coverage, insurance 
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premiums, cost of defending the actual awards, etc.--that the client who is injured 
actually ends up with less than 10 or 15 percent. 
MR. WHITE: I started to put that percentage in my talk, but I thought it wouldn't 
sound right no matter how I said it. I think it's substantially in excess of 10 
percent. It probably is around 20 or 25 percent. But that includes--and you can 
play with all these figures--the cost of defending every case that's filed. As 
long as a file stays open in a claims office, it cost~ money. The figure of 20 or 
25 percent represents payouts to people who won their cases, as compared with all 
the other costs of maintaining the organization. 
DR. LEMON: That might possibly raise some question about the system. 
MR. BALL: I was going to say I don't agree with the 25 percent figure. By my 
recollection it is 40 percent or so, but that is still a shocking figure when 
you throw it out. But again, you have to get under the surface to really analyze 
the situation, and it does bring into play the question about the efficiency of 
the system itself. By the way, I agree wholeheartedly with Galen that we shouldn't 
call these suits malpractice because the term connotates a bad doctor. That's a 
bunch of nonsense; it isn't true. The problem you have is that the,dpctor has 
the right to refuse to settle and many times--I don't say always--the companies 
will play upon the doctor's emotioRal state and, in effect., waltz him into a 
defensive stance that on the day of the trial he doesn't want to be in. Conse-
quently, they turn around on him and counsel settlement on the day of trial when 
they should have counselled it before the suit was filed. I think this is bad 
practice and I think these people have expertise enough that we should be able 
to analyze the cases quickly, and if the people are reasonable, get in and get 
out. I tell people to be very reasonable in their settlement demands in this 
area. 
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AGENCY REGULATION 
Harry N. Peterson, J.D. 
Director Legislative Department 
American Medical Association 
Chicago, Illinois 
The subject of agency regulation, the law, and the professions can be 
approached from a number of perspectives. Certainly, one approach is from the 
viewpoints of the professions which are represented here--.the phy~icians and 
attorneys. Another angle could be from the viewpoint of the economist, insofar 
as regulation may be responsive to forces operating in our economy such as the 
pressures which are exerted by strong inflationary trends. Other approaches 
could be from the viewpoint of the consumer who is concerned, or from the stand-
point of government itself, with its increasing role as a main purchaser of health 
services. It would be impossible, however, to cover the subject fully from these 
various vie,·Tpoints within the time frame of this presentation. Likewise it would 
be impossible to discuss in depth the reasons, whether real or merely alleged, for 
the extensive regulations which have engulfed the health care field. Rather, this 
presentation will accept the existence of such regulatiQn for the purpose of 
portraying the vast scope which it has developed over the last .10 years. I will 
also talk about some regulatory proposals currently being considered,,~n Congress. 
These indicate very strongly that regulation in general will not diminish; it can 
only increase. 
It might be well to know for background that national health expenditures 
are now at the annual rate of approximately $118 billion and that they have been 
steadily increasing over the years. The forecast is that this will continue. 
Health care expenditures have also been consuming an increasing percentage of the 
*,.<Jross national product. This percentage is now pegged at about 8 percent. The 
heavy intrusion of government at federal, state,and local levels accounts for an 
ever-increasing portion of health expenditures. With the particularly increasing 
role of the federal government in paying for health services--and with the resul-
ting heavier demands for services--the overall costs of health care have risen 
faster than have costs in the economy generally. 
These factors along with others have introduced a degree of regulation in 
the past decade which has not been experienced in the health field before. It has 
even been said that the health care field may be more regulated by government than 
any other sector of the .7\merican economy. Certainly when we consider the cumula-
tive effect of controls by government at all levels--federal, state, county, and 
municipal--this assertion becomes less debatable. 
Regulation of the health field in its early stages was probably aimed at 
quality, but today it more and more directly or indirectly affects costs. Because 
of the nature of medical services, moreover, changes in either cost or quality 
markedly affect the other. 
As we all know, regulation of the professions has been based primarily at 
the state level. Under our system of government the states have residual authority 
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with respect to professional licensing and discipline. The controls exerted on 
the professionals may be either direct or indirect. Licensing would be the most 
obvious example of a direct control. A host of other controls are found in a 
variety of laws and regulations affectinq_hospjtals, nursing facilities, clinical 
laboratories, use of X-ray equipment, drugs, or even disease reporting. Many 
other could be named. The practice of medicine is also affected by the many laws 
regulating the practice of its allied professionals. 
I think it is fair to say that the great proliferation of regulation has 
occurred within the last decade or so.' This is particularly true at the federal 
level, but it is also so at the state level. ,It is often the case that the 
enactment of a federal program has a direct effect on regulation at the state 
level. Sometimes the federal enactment specifically requires this. Sometimes 
the federal law provides a financial carrot for inducement. Sometimes when 
federal controls fail to be enacted the same controls are enacted at the state 
I said that the expansion could be marked within the last decade. Another 
way of saying this is that the acceleration of regulation in the health field 
probably had its origin with the passage of the Great Society programs of the mid 
1960's. The most notable programs were Medicare and Medicaid. While a great 
many regulatory controls can be directly traced to those programs, a variety of 
other laws provided the nucleus for more regulation. LawscQvering medical 
education, medical research, drugs, devices, alcohol treatment and abuse, 
occupational saftey and health, neighborhood health centers,. health maintenance 
organizations, comprehensive health planning, to name only a few, all introduce 
new regulations into the health care field. 
The medical professionals simply cannot escape the effects of these regu-
lations and controls. It might be well to look at a few of the federal programs 
and agencies in order to appreciate the scope of regulations which. is being 
by the federal government. Certain agencies' regulatory activities are to be 
expected and are indeed beneficial to the public interest. Sometimes, however, 
agencies seek an e~pansion of their regulatory activities beyond the authority 
of the law and create requirements deemed to be either detrimental to the public 
health or an improper infringement upon medical practice. It is then, of course, 
that the regulations are of special concern to the medical professionals. 
The area of drug regulation is one example. We have seen the reaction of 
physicians and their professional associations to many recent proposals by the 
FDA as well as to many recent legislative proposals in this area. The FDA has a 
longstanding role to insure the safety of drugs reaching the market. Its duty 
to see that only effective drugs are marketed was added in 1962. Its function of 
regulating drugs for these purposes is clear and established by the Congress as 
being in the public interest. However, is it the FDA's proper role to direct how 
drugs should be used in medical procedures or to prescribe conditions r~sulting 
in the elimination of drugs from the market based on relative effectiveness? The 
FDA does indeed have a right to specify requirements with respect to the labeling 
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of drugs, but it has no authority to use a regulatory process to mandate how 
physicians may practice medicine or to dictate the kinds of procedures to be 
performed with respect to the usage of drugs or devices. 
This question must also be raised: is legislation, now being considered 
in Congress, proper to introduce new and strong regulatory controls impinging on 
medical practice? For instance, legislation is now in Congressional committees 
that would specify that drug usage should be limited solely to the purposes stated 
on the drug labelling. This would contravene long-established medical practice 
which has enabled physicians to use drugs for :the purposes and in the dosages 
which they in their medical judgment deem to be in the,best interest of their 
te patient. Indeed patients could be denied beneficial treatment because physicians 
mes might feel compelled by the added threat of malpractice liability to conform 
n strictly to such labelling. 
~ate Other portions of the proposed legislation would impose additional restric-
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and conditions upon the use of drugs by the medical profession. It would 
drugs on the market upon a conditional basis. It would limit the extent of 
of the drug. Certain bills would even limit the avai;.ability of drugs to 
certain classes of physicians. 
You can readily see that the thrust of new drug legislatlon is toward more 
more regulation. The corollary result is that professional judgme;nt yields 
to new regulations. The science, art, and skill involved in true medical practice 
could be reduced more and more to ministerial functions by regulation. A number 
have recently enacted modifications in their former antisubstitution laws. The 
prescribing physician is confronted daily with both state and federal regulation 
controlling the use of psychotropic drugs, including depressants and stimulants. 
Medical education is another area which will undoubtedly experience 
increasing federal regulation. Federal assistance to medical schools was originally 
aimed at the production of manpower to meet the nation's health care delivery 
demands. Since the enactment of that legislation in 1963, there has been a steady 
increase in the number of both medical schools and medical school graduates. 
Approximately 13,500 students now graduate from medical schools annually. 
The number of schools has risen to 114 from the 88 which existed only about 10 
years ago. The thrust of this legislation, now that the raw numbers have 
.on of increased, is shifting to other purposes. While the purposes in some cases may 
the be beneficial, the controls exerted to achieve them are not always desirable. 
has a For instance, the funding under some proposals, would be used in numerous ways 
luty to require that students upon graduation practice in medical shortage areas. 
~ion of A proposal which has already passed the u.S. House of Representatives would 
:s as require every student, after graduation, to repay to the government the money 
~ct how which the school received in his behalf unless the student served in a shortage 
.ting 
:? The 
lbeling 
At this point I might stress that this should be of particular interest to 
law profession inasmuch as there are many who hold the view that a mandate of 
service or forced payments would be invalid. 
Consider also proposed legislation that would create federal standards for 
licensure of physicians with the intent that those st,andards would become effec-
tive at the state level. The standards would include the actual preparation by 
the Secretary of HEW of the license examination and would also establish elements 
as to continuing education requirements. These provisions, while they are a 
highly improper intrusion of the federal government into state activities, actu-
ally represent modified positions. The earlier proposals would have provided for 
the direct federal licensure of medical: professionals. 
Another proposal would give control to ~he federal government of all 
residency training programs in the country. This proposal would authorize the 
Secretary of HEW to divide the country into 10 regions and create councils in the 
various regions. These councils would provide advice to the Secretary, but he 
would have the ultimate authority to recognize the programs of residency training 
throughou·t the country. He would decide where they should be located, and he 
would determine the number of positions in the various specialties in each one of 
these programs. 
Aside from the extremely serious potential adverse effect upon the quality 
of training programs throughout the country, the program is objectionable on its 
face because of the intrusion of federal government into this 'educational field. 
Moreover, these proposals are being advanced notwithstanding the fact that the 
goals which are sought to be achieved through the legislation are in fact already 
being accomplished today. Recent figures show that approximately 60 percent of 
all medical school graduates in this last year have entered the fields of primary 
care--and of course this is the basic thrust of the residency control programs. 
Other provisions would eliminate prerogatives which exist in the medical 
staff. One provision would prevent a hospital from denying privileges to any 
member of the national health services corps. Certainly, members of the corps 
must have hospital facilities within which to practice, but at the same time the 
staff should have the responsibility for maintaining the competency of the staff. 
Another provision would enable the Secretary to determine what increases 
in medical school tuition would be allowable for federal payment. Of course, this 
would be a new handle of control upon medical education. 
National health insurance proposals are also before the Congress, as you 
know. Some of these would seek to establish programs which would be based upon 
many existing private sector mechanisms. While all can be expected to result in 
new regulatllions, there are some proposals which would clearly impose what would 
be onerous controls on the medical profession. For instance, some wbuld establish 
vast governmental bureaucracies to administer the program. We are all familiar 
with the amount of red tape and paper work that would be generated through such 
administration. One program would create a strict budgeting process which would 
freeze the amount of funds that would be allocable in a particular area for a 
specified number of individuals. This proposal also calls for the setting of 
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fees, the setting of prospective budgets for institutions, and the establishment 
of regulatory bodies to oversee the programs with respect to cost, services, and 
quality. 
Two years ago Congress enacted a law which many individuals now see as 
being of equal or greater significance than national health insurance--the 
National Health Planning and Resources Development Act. It is currently being 
challenged in court. 
All the ramifications of that law are not fully known at ~his time, but 
it takes no special insight to see that it hasjprofound implications in relation 
~o the practice of medicine and the future of our entire health care delivery 
I 
system. Essentially, it is a law intended to provide for the planning and 
development of appropriate health care facilities throughout the country. In 
its many-tiered structure, however, it has created a system of p;Lanning which 
",,'< 
~~J:,l control all elements of the delivery system. Billed as a program of plan-
i}lng at the local level, the structure in fact gives extreme authority to the 
~~deral government and the Secretary of HEW. The planning will ultimately control 
not only the development of facilities but also the distribution of physicians 
:and other medical manpower. This particular law is an.example of extreme regula-
t~on through action at the local, state, and national levels. ' We view it as an 
~?{ample of overreaching by the federal government in the exercise o:l;.~ocal 
~l.lthority. The planning process contemplates review of institutional health 
~l9rvices to determine their propriety. It also provides fqr rate regulation, at 
present time, in six states. 
The Medicare and Medicaid programs have introduced a number of direct 
~~Etulatory controls affecting the practice of medicine and delivery of care. 
~hey encompass such important matters as patient benefits, medical procedures, 
''-7;f<:,', 
~~~mbursement for services, office administration, review of services, and stan-
;:;f~',' 
.~ards for facilities. For instance, the Medicare program of reimbursement for 
~hysicians was first set at the 83rd precentile of fees in any of the localities 
")" 
J,,:Qvolved. Then it was arbitrarily lowered to the 75th percentile. Moreover, this 
payment level was based upon data which was already 2 years old before it was put 
·~.~to the formula for determining the fee. Subsequent to this, additional 
restrictions were placed on the prevailing charge level in the form of an economic 
i.ndex which is established by the Secretary. He determines the components of that 
index, and this acts as a further ceiling upon any allowable increases in physicians' 
fees. The controls imposed under Medicaid in many states have been fashioned even 
more arbitrarily. 
All these limitations have produced a discriminatory result by imposing on 
ghysicians controls which are not imposed upon other sectors of the economy. A 
:taw which created some of these controls, Public Law 92-603, was enacted 4 years 
~~o. Certain regulations which were issued pursuant to sections of that act were 
so harsh and unfair that unprecedented litigation resulted. These controls 
~~cluded utilization review requirements which acted in a detrimental way to proper 
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patient care. These regulations are currently undergoing modification. 
Other provisions of the law related directly to reimbursement for hospitals. 
These have also been challenged in the court. The law ~ould permit, for instance, 
the Secretary to determine certain costs to be unnecessary if he felt the services 
were not needed in the efficient delivery of health care. Under this provision 
the secretary made arbitrary classifications of all the hospitals, classifying 
them by size and location, and then determined that payment at the 9Qth percentile 
level would be proper reimbursement. Subsequently, he reduced that figure to the 
80th percentile. He thus in effect determined that payments ahove such amounts 
automatically constituted services which were unneeded in the efficient delivery 
of health care. 
I have presented only the surface of a vast reservoir of real and potential 
regulation. Responsible individuals are now calling for relief and deregulation. 
It is even becoming a campaign theme for the forthcoming election. As a reaction 
to the regulation imposed on the public and the profession, the federal govern-
ment has recently enacted some laws whiah themselves recognize the pervasiveness 
and the influence of these regulatory agencies. Two of these laws--the Privacy 
Act and the Freedom of Information Act--attempt to require that only certain 
information pertaining to individuals be collected and that the information be 
subject to notification of the individual. .... ~ 
The Congress has also recognized the problems of a massive bureaucracy by 
establishing a federal paperwork commission. This commission is charged with 
investigating the amounts of forms and paperwork which are required from the public 
by regulatory agencies. This commission is currently in the process of holding 
hearings around the country in order to hear from the public with respect to this. 
Other responses by the Congress are represented by pending bills which would in 
effect wipe out certain regulatory agencies unless they could periodically justify 
themselves and be approved by Congress within a certain period of time. This 
certainly is a novel approach. It represents a reaction by the Congress. I 
understand that Colorado has enacted a law which would provide for this objective. 
All of the latter may be encouraging, but it may perhaps be too late to 
reverse trend of regulatory agencies to control our lives. Indeed, when the at tern 
to reform the agencies are compared with the number of bills presently pending 
which in one form or another would increase that bureaucracy and would increase 
the number of regulatory agencies and their power, one cannot help but believe 
that Congress will continue in its enthusiasm for enacting more legislation 
effectively expanding the agencies. 
In closing I should say that I recognize that I have dealt almost exclu-
sively with regulation at the federal level. As much or even more could be said 
about state activities. Enactments are now proliferating in the fields of 
continuing education, licensure, discipline, malpractice, drug usage, certificate 
of need, HMO's, and comprehensive health insurance; all of them have the cumula-
tive effect of further regulation of the profession. I recognize also that I have 
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?itals. see the potential applicability of regulatory measures to the legal profession. 
tance, 
('vices 
ion 
ng 
entile 
o the 
nts 
very 
ential 
tion. 
ction 
rn-
ness 
'acy 
be 
:y by 
~h 
ling 
) this. 
in 
~ctive . 
to 
e atte 
Lng 
~ase 
::::lu-
said 
ficate 
mula-
43 

UNJUSTIFIED REGULATION: WHAT RECOURSE? WHAT RESPONSE? 
B.J. Anderson, J.D. 
Assistant General Counsel 
Office of General Counsel 
American Medical Association 
Chicago, Illinois 
I've been with the American Medical Association for almost 12 years now, 
was with them in 1965 when Medicare was enacted. Basically, at that time, 
adversary to the government. The position of the AMA in terms of 
relationship with the federal government shifted from that of an ally to 
adversary at approximately the same time as'the Truman administration 
During the first few years following enactment of the Medicare and Medicaid 
ams, government needed medicine and therefore government was willing to talk 
They had to rely upon the expertise of the medical profession, the hospital 
strators, the private health insurance carriers, the Blue Cross-Blue Shield 
and others because they had a great deal of work to do if this gigantic 
-which would be small in comparison to national health insurance--was to 
and if the benefits were to be available to thope people for whom 
After the program became entrenched as the law of the land, many of its 
cted undesirable features became apparent. Its fundamental design required 
deral government to write a blank check at the beginning of the year with-
what the total costs wouldbe until after the close of any given fiscal 
The programs were also imposed as we were coming out of some of the popula-
oom effects of the end of the Second World War, but no provision was made 
increasing deficiencies in the supply of medical and health manpower 
beds. As a result Sf this limited supply and ttie tremendous increase 
fantastic escalation in the cost of health care occurred in this 
Government never takes responsibility for this kind of activity, of 
be responsible. Physicians and hospitals have thus 
primary scapegoats of the program. There seems to be little that the 
profession alone can do to correct that kind of public preception. 
regulatory processes continued and as HEW had to respond with increasing 
the demand for some kind of cost containment, we began to be aware 
become highly frustrated when you have to deal with Congress. But 
more frustrated when you are dealing with the regulatory 
are responsible for the implementation of these programs both at the 
state levels. In the case of the federal agencies, this comes about 
simple reason. Secretaries of Health, Education, and Welfare 
in the background in the regulatory agencies are those career 
them are the Roosevelt era's young brain trusters, some of whom 
ily responsible for part of the initial draftsmanship that brought 
the Medicare program. They can be highly selective in what they tell 
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the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare or the top echelon in the admin-
istration of the~r agencies about our needs. 
As the decade following the implementation of Medicare proceeded, we at 
AMA were frequently faced with a hue and cry--sometimes from the ultra-conserva-
tive physicians and sometimes from the ultra-liberal physicians--that "they can't 
do that to us. That's directly in violation of section 1801 of the Medicare law." 
Section 1801 is used by some attorneys to introduce a speech in order to be humor-
ous because it says that nothing in this title shall be construed to permit the 
federal government to control the way in which medicine is practiced or the way 
in which hospitals or other health care ins~itutions are administered, or to intel 
fere in the contracts that hospitals enter into to carry out their business 
activities. This, of course, is the kind of statutory language that is observed 
only in the breach. 
Many times it would have been tempting to file a section 1801 suit against 
the Secretary. Even if you work for the AMA, you still have certain responsibil-
ities to your client. It is very rarely that you can succeed in challenging 
regulations, whether at the federal or state level, because regulations can be 
changed at any time. You can be out of court befor~ you really get a foot in the 
door because the Secretary can issue a new set of regulations which make every 
legal issue that you raised in your complaint moot. 
In addition, most lawyers, and I think many physicians, are becoming 
increasingly aware that lawsuits are not won on legal issues alone. In order to 
have a respectable chance of success in a courtroom, you must also be able to 
raise certain social issues with which the public, and therefore the judge, can 
relate. 
At one point we felt that the ideal lawsuit had come along. It was based 
on a set of utilization review regulations under the 1972 amendments to the Socii 
Security Act, promulgated by the Secretary in final form on November 29, 1974. 
What coalesced to bring this about? There were a number of factors--specificalll 
three sections of the law. One provided that each case of hospital admission of 
greater than 60-day duration must be reviewed. The penalty for failure to 
implement this kind of review in a state Title XIX program was a loss of up to 
one-third of the federal matching funds for the state's Medicaid program. 
A second provision provided that Title XVIII and Title XIX utilization 
reVlew plans must be the same. In other words, if you have a hospital that is 
certified to participate in Title XVIII and certified to participate in Title XI 
only one style of utilization review plans should be required. You shouldn't ha 
two different systems for performing utilization review in the same hospital. 
The third section dealt with Title XVIII. It said in the event that the 
Secretary found the utilization review plan imposed by the state for the Medicai 
program superior in its effectiveness, he could require the state to also use tr 
plan for its Title XVIII program. Simultaneously, the Secretary issued Title X] 
regulations and said that he found the Title XIX ones superior in their effecti\ 
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There are 7,000 hospitals in the united States. Almost all of them are 
to participate on either Medicare or Medicaid, and the majority of them 
The figure runs at around 6,000 hospitals. The total number of hospital 
ssions per year in the United States is a phenomenal figure. These sets of 
lization review regulations would have required each admission which was 
le for benefits under a federal program to be reviewed within 24 hours of 
The review would then have to be completed within 48 hours at the 
that in effect you had a committee gecision as to.whether or not 
was medically necessary. 
To the uninitiated, "medically necessary" is strictly a term of art; it 
medically appropriate or medically justified. It means reasonably 
sary in order to restore the patient as a productive member. of society. It 
somewhat artifical concept·when applied to the over-65 age group of the 
are the primary beneficiaries of the program. 
We filed suit in the Northern District of Illinois. We were fortunate to 
judge who once sat in a wheel chair outside an X-ray department 
hours waiting to be X-rayed. He decided that it was a physical impossibility 
committee to decide whether or not hospitalization would be medically 
hour period because they wouldn't even have,· the test back 
t amount of time. 
The government did not believe that there was any possibility that the 
would issue a preliminary injunction to halt the enforcement of these 
As a consequence, Judge Hoffman, who recognized that the Secretary 
any moment remove the objectionable provisions in the regulations to 
lawsuit moot, was amazed that Secretary Weinberger refused to talk to 
decision was reached. The government then appealed to the Court 
This was a surprise because the issue on appeal was so narrow. The 
issues of the lawsuit aren't me.t when only a preliminary injunction 
The burden is to show that injury has occurred, or that there is 
of injury for which there would be no adequate recourse at law. 
difficult burden for us. On appeal you only ask whether or 
abused its discretion in issuing a preliminary injunction. 
than use the attorney from the U.S. Attorney General's Office in Chicago, 
Department sent up one of their big guns from Washington to argue. 
however, upheld Judge Hoffman's granting of the preliminary injunction. 
One of the noteworthy things in Judge Hoffman's opinion was that he said. 
on 1801 does in fact place a limit on the exercise of the Secretary's 
that the Secretary has been given. Regulations are unreasonable if you 
~~"LLVHotrate to the satisfaction of the court that they do in fact constitute 
control over the way in which medicine is practiced. 
Judge Hoffman was particulary impressed with testimony by physicians that 
the primary considerations in making a decision as to whether or not a 
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patient needed hospitalization would have to be a consideration .of the patient's 
fear of acommittee decision that the hospitalization was medically unnecessary. 
The patient would then have to be out of the hospital w~thin 24 hours because that 
is when federal benefits are cut off. That can be a very traumatic experience, 
particularly to an older person who fights going to a hospital in the first place 
and then is suddenly told he doesn't need to be there. 
Judge Hoffman, I suppose, felt very strongly that when government sees a 
problem, their solution is often geared wrongly to the masses. When a physician 
sits down with a patient, there is an individual with very unique problems and 
his concerns should be directed to that. When a 'lawyer sits down with a client 
he has to same kind of relationship. Not all federal judges, of:course, are so 
inclined. Some of them are products of the Great Society days and believe that 
when government sees a problem and devises a mass solution; it does not 
unnecessarily harm a class of individuals. 
After the preliminary injunction was upheld, Secretary Weinberger left and 
Secretary Matthews came in. Judge Hoffman made it clear that if we didn't sit 
down and talk to Matthews, we would go to trial on the merits within 2 weeks. 
Matthews was going to be unable to arrange that but Hoffman said, "Very well, 
I will schedule trial on Monday." Matthews then met with us on Friday. We were 
able to establish communications with him. 
That in itself was really our victory--we could now talk to HEW. We may 
not always be able to reach a common understanding, but at least we can talk to 
one another. 
The second victory came when, without our request, Congress revised one of 
the sections of the 1972 amendments upon which the Secretary had relied in 
promulgating the first of the utilization review regulations so that there would 
be no mandate for review of each hospital admission. The language now says 
"review or screening" and it also includes language that permits this to be done 
on a sample basis. The language does go on to suggest that a sample could be 100 
percent, but there is still room to breathe now. 
There are other instances, however, in which litigation has not been as 
successful. When the 1972 amendments to the Social Security Act were enacted, 
some people thought that PSRO meant Please Stand up and Roll Over--it means 
Professional Standards Review Organization. One of the groups of conservative 
physicians who felt very strongly about this instituted litigation in July 1974 
to contest the constitutionality of this statute at a time when there had been 
no implementation, when there were no regulations, and when there were no Profes-
sional Standard Review Organizations yet designated. There was very little hope 
of being able to demonstrate to a court that there was either injury or such 
immediate threat of injury that there should be relief from the PSRO requirements. 
A three-judge federal district panel found that the law was constitutional on its 
face. The United States Supreme Court affirmed without opinion the three-judge 
decision. Government attorneys now interpret that to mean that the Supreme Court 
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that the federal government has a constitutional right to require phy-
perform peer review. This shows you the difference ,between the workings 
man's mind inside the government and the workings of man's, mind outside the 
_"L,~'~m,pnt, because I don't believe any self-respecting lawyer would come up with 
kind of interpretation. 
are involved in another lawsuit against the Secretary of HEW for much 
reason that we became involved in the utilization review suit. This is 
ation contesting the validity of maximum allowable cost regulations, which 
federal reimbursements for drugs availabl~ from multiple sources to a 
allowable cost established by a review board. 
In order for physicians to rely upon this regulqtory system the ~ood and 
need a current capability to determine the th~rapeutic 
any single drug which is made by more than one manufacturer. This 
are talking about drugs available under brand names and generic 
, from large manufacturers and small manufacturers. I don't know any 
he is employed by F.D.A.--who believes that the F.D.A. has 
to the American public that it has such capability. 
this kind of regulatory system requires physicians to keep in mind 
than medical considerations and clinical experience when they pre-
a drug for a patient. To give a good example of how this coerces 
about a pharmacy and therapeutics committee in a hospital 
is dependent for 40 to 60 percent of its total cash flow on the Medicare 
the Medicaid programs. If the federal government reimburses for drugs at 
allowable cost, the hospital will make certain that the shelves of 
are stocked with those drugs. This means that your pharmacy and 
committee, which comes up with the formula which governs the drugs 
may prescribe to your hospitalized patients, will not have the range of 
that was available. 
We don't anticipate being successful in this suit, I might add. It's 
pretty muddied up because the Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Association 
Pharmaceutical Company both filed separate suits in the District Court 
Columbia to contest the regulations. Because of the first-filed 
in federal court, the government moved for either a motion to dismiss or a 
to stay the Washington, D.C. suits pending determination of the Chicago 
filed by the American Medical Association, because we filed before they did. 
until they clocked in the proposed regulations at the Federal 
r and then had rushed over to the court house so we would have the right 
We know about the first-filed rules, you see. 
Consequently, after PMA got thrown out in Washington they came into the 
suit, intervening a\ a co-plaintiff with the American Medical Association. 
was followed by the states of Massachusetts and Connecticut inteLvening in 
the federal government. 
It's been interesting because even though Massachusetts is a co-defendant 
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with the government, the director of the Title XIX Massachusetts Medicaid program 
joined with nine other directors of state Medicaid programs in signing a petition 
asking the Secretary to delay the effective date of the maximum allowable cost 
, 
regulations because they would be unable to implement them for another year. It's 
a case of the right hand not knowing what the left hand is doing. 
The most recent litigation in which the AMA has filed a petition is a suit 
initially filed by the state of North Carolina. It concerned the National Health 
Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974. From the very beginning, of 
course, we've said that this is the most massive pie~e of bureaucratic control 
that has ever corne on the American scene and tpat it deprives the states of 
their 10th amendment rights. The ideal plaintiff for this suit is North Carolina 
because their Supreme Court said 4 years ago that a certificate-of-need law 
violates the state constitution. No attempt has been made to introduce subsequent 
certificate-of-need legislation in North Carolina partially because their state 
supreme court insists that to do so, they would have to amend the constitution. 
Even if we don't win, I think that certain things will be accomplished. 
One will be that the implementation and development of the programs under that 
law will be undertaken with much greater care. There is a strong possibility, if 
North Carolina gets the three-judge court convened, that a number of other states 
will have an interest in joining this litigation. If even 5,?r 6 states contested 
the constitutionality of this kind of law, you might see a very good reaction from 
Congress. 
I really don't have any particular conclusions in terms of how to challenge 
new regulations. There is an apparent push in the legislatures to get their 
teeth into the kind of problems for which the public is crying for solutions. 
The future will show to an even greater extent than the past that the construction 
of health care delivery systems and medical programs will continue to lie with 
the courts rather than the legislature or the regulatory agenci.es. In Chicago you 
see bumper stickers that say, "Help support the lawyer; send your son to medical 
school." . If you can't get your son into medical school be sure to send him to 
law school,because there's going to be an awful lot going on out there. 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
QUESTION: It seems to me that every time an inspector or regulator opens his 
mouth, it costs the government, the institution, and/or the patient more money. 
Has a study ever been done regarding cost effectiveness of regulation? Does it 
accomplish its purpose and does this accomplishment of purposes justify the cost? 
MS. ANDERSON: There have been a number of studies done by hospitals on the cost 
of the utilization review system. The figures run from $13 per patient to $7.10 
per patient. These cost studies are based upon the supposed requirement under 
both the Professional Standards Review Organization and the utilization review 
regulations that you retain nurse coordinators to do the initial screening against 
the criteria developed by the medical staff. The answer to your queston depends 
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~ogram upon your audience. To the government, it's mandatory that we have them. To the 
~i tion public, who never really understand that they are the ones who pay the added costs 
)st for their hospitalization, the regulations aren't unnecessary.' To the consumer 
It's advocate, we've failed utterly i they want more controls. You have to pick your 
1 suit 
Iealth 
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a,ud,ience if you want the right answer. 
I'd like to add something to that. It was very notable when various 
qgrams were considered in the Congress that there was an extreme lack of reliable 
9.Jections as to costs. No one talked about what the overall cos,t would be. 
il~y talked in terms at that time of the need t3 do something, but the questions 
:~/,to effectiveness and cost-benefit ratio that might be derived got lost in the 
I 
There were some very high costs for the program. I think some of those 
',":,i",,';,-"; 
~.i':9::ures are now being borne out as the program is being implemented. Just to use 
3equent PSRO as an example, while it is not even fully implemented at, this time, the 
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requires the designation of PSRO areas around the country. About 200 have 
but that's only about one-fourth of the total. Already the 
',rlgress is beginning to ask questions concerning what they have created, the cost 
.f':,the program and its effectiveness. Unfortunately this has been a typical 
the legislative process. 
It seems to me that I have read that some of the council members in 
AMA were not too much opposed to PSRO because of some funds being filtered 
the program. 
ANDERSON: The policy statement on PSRO by the AMA, jus~ like all other 
came about by majority vote of our House of Delegates. The 
se of Delegates initially said that PSRO is the law of the land; therefore, 
is to work so tha't it does not interfere with the way in which 
practice medicine, then medicine should take a leadership role in 
~~~ng to shape it. Not all physicians necessarily agree with that. The $1 
~llion was an HEW grant for the development of review criteria so that there 
o1.ild be adequate professional and medical specialty input so that physicians 
work with the regulations. The AMA did not derive any benefits from that 
I,million, except the headache of having, to work wi th the committees. 
I probably badly misunderstood something that Ms. Anderson said. I 
quit understand the mechanism of this fight. I understood you to say it was 
is 'j)1Possible to fight regulations until they were written. Then in the next 
Iney.r;(3ath I thought you said that you have no access to regulators and no way to 
s it Did you mean you had access to or some control of regulators or 
cost? fggulations only through the courts, and that there was no use in fighting the 
cost 
$7.10 
,der 
~pends 
land? The AMA's position in influencing legislation before it is 
confused to some physicians . 
• ANDERSON: We have always used our persuasion and education prior to the 
of legislation. We have always attempted to use the same tools to 
way in which regulations will be promulgated. When Casper Weinberger 
of HEW he would not even answer a phone call from the AMA. As 
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nearly as we could tell, he paid no attention to any single written document. It 
was really a point in time when you found that persuasion, education, written 
ducument, and offers to be of assistance were totally ignored. That's when the 
, 
utilization review suit was filed. We now have Secretary Matthews and Dr. 
Theodore Cooper as Assistant Secretary, and so we have good communications with 
the regulatory branches in HEW. If we were to have another breakdown in communi-
cations, then that would be one of the factors that might enter into a decision 
to file litigation, but there are many other factors that,enter into that decision. 
We'll never stop trying to have direct~input into the. shaping of both legislation 
and regulations. 
MR. PETERSON: During the first session of the current Congress, the AMA either 
through appearances before committees or statements of letters in response to 
proposed regulations, appeared about 80 times. This year ':s acti vi ty seems to 
be going at about the same pace. The association, in its responsibility to the 
public with respect to the health program, continues to be active both before 
the Congress and HEW. 
QUESTION: The Kentucky Peer Review Organization has been tentatively designated 
as the PSRO of Kentucky. The hospital I work for has been designated a pilot 
hospital. They told us this about 2 years ago. What 1S the current status of 
PSRO as far as the individual states are concerned? My under·standing of our 
utilization review criteria is that they are much the same as those that the AMA 
had the injunction against, but that we still have 24-hour review in this type 
thing. 
MS. ANDERSON: You should remember the differences in the underlying statutes. 
We contested utilization review regulations in which the underlying statutes did 
not authorize the Secretary to require 24-hour review. However, in the language 
of the Professional Standards Review Act, there is specific authority to require 
PSRO's to conduct prospective review, concurrent review, or retrospective review. 
So there is a great difference, from a legal viewpoint, in the way you would 
view the two programs. 
MR. PETERSON: There is one other aspect to that. In many areas the PSRO program 
is not organizational even at this point. However, the utilization review programs 
which have been in effect in the hospitals continue. There is in the PSRO law 
itself a mandate that where the PSRO finds the hospital's utilization review pro-
gram to be effective, it is required to use that mechanism as the vehicle of 
utilization review. That is not to say that the requirements of the PSRO cannot 
be imposed upon that review system at another time. 
Another factor relates to the cost of the program. Inasmuch as the appro-
priations by the Congress were inadequate to fund all the PSROprograms around 
the country, the Congress devised another system to fund theprQ:gram. That system 
provides for funding through the Medicare program. This wi;};];;;:' the develop-
ment. 
MS. ANDERSON: ~vhat he's saying is that the hospital for parts of 
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utilization review. That cost goes into your reimbursement formula under 
What is the AMA view on the newly-proposed utilization review regula~ 
appeared in the March 29 Federal Register? Why did AMA stand pat on 
of whether you had to have a definite diagnosis made before surgery? 
The Associati.on has not submitted formal comments. The last date 
The Board of Trustees reviewed the regulations and felt 
flexibility in them than in the previous one 
e there doesn't have to be a utilization-<review on each admission. The 
"a for review don't have to be in accordance with national guidelines, which 
of the specific provisions in the older utilization review regulations 
contested. Each hospital medical staff in any particular hospital is 
right under this new set of proposed utilization review regulations to 
list of diagnoses, conditions, and symptoms that invariably require 
What the regulations basically say is that pain in and of itself 
enough to const±tute an elective procedure that does not require review. 
the other illustrations given in the regulations is abdominal pain that 
res further diagnostic testing. This invariably requires hospitalization 
these regulations. If, however, an admission did not me~t one of these 
es, symptoms, or conditions, then a member of the utiliza tion"'r,eview 
ttee would be required to review that admission within 3 working days. If 
that admission was not medically necessary, he would then be required to 
the attending physician, who would have an opportunity to explain all of 
involved in his decision to request admission. If the physician 
of the utilization review committee were not persuaded by this, then a 
physician member of the utilization review committee would have to go over 
information in the chart, the information provided by the attending physician, 
The process would usually take about 5 working days. Under the regulations, 
hospital would establish 5 days per week as working days for the purposes of 
The additional provision that you were talking about is the one that says 
of elective surgery or other elective procedures--and this is defined as 
or other procedures which can be delayed without significant medical 
criteria is made by each particular hospital. The review would 
be performed within 3 working days, or prior to the performance of the 
, whichever would be shorter. I'm quite certain that when the AMA s ub-
will be comments on that particular provision of the 
Mr. Peterson, you used a lot of superlatives when you described what 
consider to be the work of all those boogeymen up in Congress. You said that 
the legislation on national health insurance would clearly impose an 
control and have a profound effect on the delivery of health care and so 
I'm still swayed by the proposition that legislation doesn't just materi-
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alize but instead results from at least what is perceived as a need. Without 
getting into a discussion of whether or not regulation itself is needed, you 
seem to be taking a position that the AMA draws the line at no regulation at all. 
I don't think you mean to leave that impression. Could you tell me what criteria 
you use to distinguish reasonable from unreasonable regulation? 
MR. PETERSON: I don't think you can make a general statement. I think you have 
to look at each case individually. I did use some terminology as you have 
indicated, but I also said that agencies have a proper role in making regulations 
and that regulations are mandated by-bhe law and can be beneficial to the public 
interest. I also indicated in my statement t~at those regulations that we felt 
went beyond the law or were detrimental to the public health would receive 
special attention from the medical profession. As Ms. Anderson has indicated, 
when the litigation was filed on the utilization review, regulations, the Associa-
tion took the action in the interest of the public, and we were sustained by the 
court. However, I would not want to leave the impression that the Association 
is opposed to all legislation. As a matter of fact, in one Congress, we were 
there in support of the proposed legislation in 31 instances. 
MR. KRICHBAUM: Let me follow that up with one example. Section 1122 of the 
Social Security Act, which placed limitations on the portion of reimbursement 
from federal funds to be used for unapproved capital experidi~ures, used the term 
"health care facilities." Nowhere in the law does it define what a health care 
facility is. That's an example of Congress not meeting its effective role. That 
left it up to the agency to define the term. As a result, the agency came out 
with a lengthy regulation defining what Congress meant when it used the term 
health care facility. In essence, Congress writes part of the law and the regula-
tory agency, which is non-elected, continues the writing of the law. Subsequently, 
other problems developed when some states attempted to say what the agency meant in 
its regulations. They try to take it even one step further. 
MR. PETERSON: I'd like to make that point a little clearer. In the regulation 
to which he's referring, the agency included as a health care facility the term 
"organized ambulatory health care facility." That type of general term was 
introduced and it created more ambiguities. It was that term that some states 
then tried to apply to physicians' offices. The net result was that "health 
care facilities"was later interpreted by the states to apply to physicians' offices 
and this caused a great deal of problems. 
QUESTION: I can understand having difficulty with interpretation, but I think 
some of your objections were a little more substantial than semantical. I'm in 
favor of the proposition that the government can impose reasonable limitations on 
reimbursement for health services that are provided under a public assistance pro-
gram. You seem to like neither the 70th percentile or 90th percentile figures for 
reimbursement. I will agree, however, that I can see where you could professional] 
object to the government trying to tell you how to practice medicine. But in term: 
of putting a reasonable limitation on reimbursements, I don't understand your 
objection. 
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The language of the Act provides for "reasonable charges" by 
cians. The question about the regulations is the matter of interpretation. 
Oth percentile that you mentioned was a ceiling arbitrarily decided for 
, 
ursement to the hospitals under the program. That was subsequently arbitrarily 
to the 80th percentile without any justification given for the move. As 
physicians '. charges under Medicare are concerned, they originally set reim-
t at the 83rd percentile and then reduced it to the 75th pe·rcentile. 
regulation even before the law was amended to so 'provide . 
Therefore, I think as attorneys we should, examine wheth.er the regulations 
out the intent of the law. We should also look ~t the application of 
I economic index formulas that apply to one sector of the economy that are 
applicable to any other sector. These are questions that are 
it a step further, after the Medicare program established its 
as, the Medicaid program could easily pay a lower fee on top of that. You 
t the government should have the right to make reasonable reimbursement 
programs that it subsidizes. That may well be, but when the Medicaid 
is paying, 40, 50r or 60 percent of customary charges in the area, the 
under the law is whether that payment will reasonably 'assure that the 
are available to all the individuals entitled to care under'tbe program. 
of whether it is reasonable or not, I suppose, is a matter of inter-
But when reimbursement is set at such low perce~tiles, I think it 
close examination. 
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PANEL DISCUSSION 
REGULATORY IMPACT ON MALPRACTICE, 
CONFIDENTIALITY, CLINICAL DECISION MAKING 
AND OTHER PHYSICIAN/PATIENT REALTIONSHIPS , 
Harry N. Peterson 
John A. Krichbaum 
B.J. Anderson 
QUESTION: If a hospital utilization review committee decides that a patient's 
stay is not covered under Medicare, and the patient has to leave the hospital 
--' 
within 24 or 48 hours, and if some harm comes to the patient, is there any mal-
practice involved in that and who would be responsible?' 
ANDERSON: The utilization review regulations and 'the provisions of ~edicare 
do not require that a patient be discharged because of a decision made by a 
tilization review committee. What the utilization review committee decision does 
off federal reimbursement for that hospitalization 48 hours after the 
patient and the attending physicians. If, for example, a 
ital administrator were to tell a patient that he couldn't stay, and if he 
tained an injury directly related to that early discharge, then the hospital 
t incur liability. However, I do not think that hospital administrators do 
of thing because most hospital policies state that only a. physician 
or discharge a patient. If a physician felt that it was medically 
traindicated to discharge a patient, and if he relied upon a utilization 
ew decision, then it is possible that this would be a factual situation in 
he could incur liability because liability is based upon knowledge of all 
facts. 
In a lot of cases it seems that patients just cannot stay in the 
because they do not have the money to pay. I know that a negative 
mean that they have to leave the hospital when their 
cian thinks they should be there, but in practice the patient has to leave 
have any money. 
I understand and you understand that, but you still have to 
hypothetical fact situation that is going to result in a finding 
Is there a typical case in which the utilization review commit-
stay is medically unnecessary and in which a physician says 
go home? I just don't think those factual situations occur on 
You gave me a hypothetical. What were the contraindications for dis-
the patient? 
This patient had a total knee implant put in by me. On the 14th day 
review committee stated that the stay was no longer 
I felt that this was a dangerous. situation. We had to inspect his 
an hourly basis; it stood a chance to open up. We went throught the 
al mechanism--there were two appeals involved. On both occasions the 
on review committee decision was sustained. When the patient was almost 
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ready to go home, the incision separated and they had to cancel the discharge. 
If this had happened just two or three hours later, we might have been in a 
difficult situation. 
MS. ANDERSON: What the Medicare law contemplates is that a continuum of care will 
be provided for the patient so that you could have transferred him to a skilled 
nursing facility where there would be registered nurses to care for the incision. 
If he had a sophisticated enough family,you could have sent him home and made 
arrangements for home health services; a registered nurse would have made regular 
visits for the home for an appropriate' period of time. 
There have not been any reported court decisions involving that kind of 
fact situation. Discharging patients is a risk that physicians run many times. 
You can discharge a patient who has been monitored for 3 days with minimal chest 
pains and have him walk out the door and drop dead of a myocardial infarction an 
hour later. None of us are really astute enough to be able to predict with 
certainty what the future medical course will be. 
QUESTION: No, this situation is slightly different. Here the physician himself 
feels that the patient has to be in. I~sthe utilization committee. ... I 
11S. ANDERSON: Yes, but what Medicare contemplated was that you would then transfer 
that patient to a skilled nursing facility where coverage could continue because 
of the registered nurses to observe the incision at the regular intervals. 
MR. KRICHBAUM: I think part of the answer is that what you do is going to be 
measured by the necessary standards. The fact that the utilization review com-
mittee has indicated that there's no further need for the patient to stay in the 
hospital is going to be a very strong indication of the prevailing standard of 
the community. Beyond that I think you've extended your protection against mal-
practice by advising the patient of your individual professional jUdgement. 
MR. PETERSON: I think the problem goes a little bit further. It indicates the 
dilemma in which the physician is placed in many situations. I supposed there's 
no real answer from the standpoint of liability until something occurs after the 
decision has been made. For instance, suppose the physician determines in this 
case that the patient should stay in the hospital a week longer. The patient is 
able to pay the hospital bill and stay there at the direction of the physician 
and nothing happens. Then he leaves and begins to think about the decision of 
the committee that all that hospitalization was not medically necessary. You can 
see the other side as to what might happen in this age of consumer litigation. 
MR. KRICHBAUM: There may be some liability for the additional costs that the 
patient incurred, but at least you would have adequately responded to any risk of 
malpractice with regard to injury to the patient had he left. 
OUESTION: Can an attorney, when he's investigating a claim of malpractice, secure 
the information that came before the review committee in order to determine if a 
claim does exist? 
MR. KRICHBAUM: I'm sure that depends to a degree on what you mean be review com-
mittee. If it is a non-PSRO, the answer may well depend on whether the state has 
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granting immunity from discovery of peer review proceedings, as many states 
are 21 states that have such laws. Three or four .of 
also specifically say that they apply to· the proceedings of PSRO' s . I 
one or possibly both of our panelists migh±..like to comment on the 
tial availability of PSRO criteria, standards, and norms to plaintiff's .law-
The criteria, standards, and norms are already available in pub-
the medical and legal community. The question will arise as to 
these standards will meet the ultimat~standards of care against. which 
treatment is measured in the courtroom. I don,' t think this has yet been 
in litigation. The organic PSRO law, as I recall it, does not provide 
the committee is immune from discovery. The AMA, in 
ing a proposed amendment to the PSRO law, has recommended protection for 
facilitate the objectivi±.y of the program. 
No one knows. The law had language in it saying that the records 
be held confidential, in accordance with regulations 
by the Secretary. The law goes on to say that the regulations will make 
that they aren't so confidential that they cannot be used for proper 
However, the Secretary has not yet issued any regulation. He 
the position in an initial draft that since PSRO's are agents of the 
are subject to the federal right to Privacy Act, which means 
whose cases are reviewed have access to the review records, it 
the patient could also have access. However, the Secretary 
addressed the question of whether such records shall be discoverable for 
and there is no case law. 
I'm not as familiar with that statute as both of you are, but I read 
the Secretary adopt regulations for the disclosure of PSRO 
in mind of course the protection of the patient and doctor. 
say, the Secretary has not done so. Don't you think it would be a fair 
this kind of information might have an impact on a cost-effective-
No one has any objection to making statistical studies from PSRO 
take the actual minutes of them and make that information generally 
tends to harm the general public interest. One of the objectives of 
of program is to assure the quality of'services and their provision in 
cost effective manner possible. To open up records of review committees 
looking at individual cases tends to have a dampening effect upon the 
ivity and judgment of doctors of the work of colleagues. On the other hand, 
are one of the contemplated uses of the PSRO activities. 
One of the questions that came up earlier was whether the required 
a blacklist of physicians who have repeatedly failed to meet 
d standards of the PSRO will create a larger target for medical malpractice 
Is this an accurate description of the PSRO law, and if so, are there 
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adequate procedural safeguards in the law for a physician? 
MS. ANDERSON: The PSRO law does require the Secretary to publicize the names of 
physicians who, in a substantial number of cases, have failed to comply with the 
norms, standards, and criteria of the PSRO. Dave Wille~t, a California attorney, 
has predicted that this will have an impact upon the number of malpractice suits 
filed for one very simple reason. Once a patient has benefits cut off because of 
a determination by a peer review committee that services are either inappropriate 
or unnecessary, he has been directly affected in his pocketqbook and would be 
more inclined to file a lawsuit. I don 't, know whether plaintiffs' attorneys 
would agree with that reasoning or not. If you've ever observed the American 
, 
scene, you know that anything that's going to happen in the courts across the 
land happened 10 years ago in California. If the California attorneys are saying 
this is going to happen, then you can predict in about 7 years you'll see your 
first suit in California. They you'll have a little bit of time before you're 
ready to defend it in your own court. 
QUESTION: I attended a seminar on the Kentucky PSRO organization, and I got the 
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impression that criminal penalties were prescribed for a breach of confidentiality.~ ti( 
Could you enlighten me on this? f;! wi 1 
MS. ANDERSON: The Social Security Act itself has penalties for failure to maintair::;' thE 
':'i 
the confidentiality of certain records that are a part of the~ocial Security ~o~ 
Administration system. When HEW wishes to calm the fears of physicians, they 
always say there's a criminal penalty if any of the Secretary's agents violate 
the requirements of confidentiality. But that is a strange and wonderful world 
because the Secretary at the same time tells the PSRO's that very little of the 
information they have will be maintained in confidence. 
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MR. KRICHBAUM: You're definitely not going to be in breach of the PSRO confiden- iThE 
,(),/ 
tiali ty provisions if you otherwise engaged in carrying out what the PSRO is f!(Bui 
(,J 
intended to carry out. There is conflict in the minds of many physicians that the~:Qm 
very functions and duties to which the PSRO is assigned violate basic confiden- ~;; apt 
tiali typrinciples of physician-patient relationships. There's a built-in conflictJ!.MS. 
in the law, I think. 
QUESTION: You stated that the PSRO utilizes the review committees that already 
exist in the hospitals. Can you tell me something about the mechanics of the 
review organizations in each hospital, how they are appointed and of whom they 
consist? 
MS. ANDERSON: The utilization review committee must be composed of physicians 
who are either members of the hospital medical staff--or if the hospital does 
not have enough physicians on the staff--a committee of physicians appointed by 
a county or regional medical society. In the event that neither one of those 
requirements could be satisfied, some other mechanism acceptable to the Secretary 
must be used. If you have a hospital with an organized medical staff 
you could form a committee of three or more of them. A physician who has been 
directly or indirectly responsible for the care of an individual patient must 
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himself when that patient's care is being reviewed. The law mandates that 
commi ttee review all admissions of con-tinued stays of 
whose care is federally financed. 
review is also a mandated medical staf'f function under the 
rds of the A}ffi Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, so that hospitals 
apply voluntarily for accreditation by the commission are required to carry 
se review functions anyway. 
If more than 10 percent of the physicians in a PSRO area indicate 
object to a conditional PSRO as notl:>,eing representative of the physicians 
area, then the Secretary must poll t~e physicians. If more than 
physicians that respond to that poll object to the organization 
esignated as a conditional PSRO, the Secretary cannot enter into a contract 
The end date for this rule is January 1, 1978. 
That doesn't mean you're never going to have a PSRO in such an 
entity will be set up as the PSRO. 
If the Secretary cannot enter into an agreement with an organiza-
within the time limit, then he can enter into an agreement 
organization which is not a professional association afterward. Ultimately, 
can be a PSRO imposed in the area by the Secretary of HEW even with-
with the physicians . 
Such a PSRO would probably be compromised of government employed 
These review committees are not usually government employees; they are 
doctors. Is that correct? 
physicians have a vote on the utilization review committee. 
can collect information and make it easier for the physicians. 
the lack of medical necessity can only be made by physicians. 
Doesn't that make the review committee sort of a rubber stamp of doctors 
actions of their brother doctors? 
You don't know physicians very well, do you? 
know that when you try to get one to testify against another 
do 
Do you know how they solved that problem in California? They have 
of medical experts in California because they found out all it takes 
A more basic question on utilization review is whether it should be 
But who else is going to determine the propriety of medical treat-
physician? Are there any suggestions as to who else would do 
There are other people in a hospital besides physicians. They have 
exerting pressure also. Lack of space also plays a role. The best 
review takes place in those hospitals that have the highest bed 
Where there is a demand for beds, utilization review has always been 
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effective. 
MR. KRICHBAUM: One question raised this morning concerned the extent to which 
the regulations and legislation have affected the betterment of health care in 
the country. I think it's a very good question. This is somewhat related to the 
question of cost-effectiveness. Certificate-of-need laws are an example; have 
they resulted in any lowering of rates in those states where they've been enacted 
as contrasted to the states where they haven't? All the information that we've 
seen indicates that there's been no lessening_,of rates or of occupancy in states 
that have the certificate-of-need laws. In fact, the amount of money that goes 
into the regulatory process may have increased the ambunt of money being spent in 
this area. 
MR. PETERSON: This general question is one that's surfacing in some df the com-
mittee hearings at the present time. The questions that are being asked concern 
programs that have been enacted by the Congress which are not necessarily achieving 
their purpose. Of course these programs are relatively new, but questions are 
being asked as to whether the provision of medical services is most effective in 
this regard, or whether federal dollars should be spent in other areas of health 
education related to the lifestyle of Americans? Would that be more effective 
for the betterment of health generally? Congress is now considering extensive 
programs with respect to health education. 
QUESTION: Would there be any way for the PSRO's to disclose information to that 
Congressional committee or to other committees other than pursuant to regulations 
adopted by the Secretary? 
MR. PETERSON: I think that the committees, prior to the initiation of the hear-
ings; solicited information from the PSRO's by submitting questions to them con-
cerning their activities. At hearings which took place earlier, it was indicated 
that some review activities were beneficial in reducing, for instance, lengths of 
hospital stay. This type of reduction took place in the peer review activities 
of the profession prior to the initiation of PSRO. 
QQESTION: Ms. Anderson made the statement that there was little the medical pro-
fession could do to improve its image. I was particularly jolted by the state-
ment that if review results are negative, this causes patients generally to lose 
confidence in their physician. 
MS. ANDERSON: I said that there's very little the medical profession alone can 
do to change its public image. All of the polls indicate that the medical pro-
fession is not held in as high esteem as it once was by the general public, but 
that individual patients still feel that their physician ranks higher than most 
any other professional person. The relationship between the physician and a 
patient is one of trust. A physician has a fiduciary duty to treat his patient 
with the best interest of the patient in mind. But the public does not perceive 
the medical profession in the same way that an individual who goes to a physician 
perceives his individual physician. There's something about the effectiveness of 
utilization review that many members of the public overlook. That is that there 
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are fixed costs for maintaining beds in hospitals which continue regardless of 
whether the bed is occupied, so that in some hospitals, particularly where there 
is a surplus of beds, the government is really paying increas~d costs for 
decreased lengths of stay. I don't think people eve~ stop to think about some 
of those things. Physicians alone can never change the way the press perceives 
the medical profession, for example. That's one~public view of medicine. 
QUESTION: Then I did misunderstand you. You did not say that the review causes 
patients generally to lose confidence in the medical profession. 
MR. KRICHBAUM: Ms. Anderson suggested we keep Gur eyes on California to see what's 
occurring there. One bill that's pending in the state senate out there that phy-
sicians view as potentially causing problems is one which would restric~ physicians 
to practice in specialties to which they've been certified by the state. : This 
bill has been kicking around out there for a number of years, but it has recently 
passed the house. Physicians out there are closely watching that piece of legis-
lation. We may see similar types of legislation being introduced in other states 
in the coming years. 
Would anyone in the audience like to express a view on continuing medical 
or legal education and whether it should be a required, or whether it's an effec-
tive means of improving quality? 
My own view is that continuing legal or medical education ought to be 
the practitioner. I don't think a physician here at the University needs 
tinuing education as much as a practicing physician in a rural area of the 
I think across-the-board, mandated, continuing education like that takes 
n a lot of people that really don't get any value from it. 
Anyone with another view or opinion on that? 
would think it's a good idea, but the mushrooming of knowledge in 
fields about makes it impossible for a single individual to comprehend 
going on. We might have to get researchers on our medical staffs to keep 
rest of the boys up to date. I've even thought at times that maybe the 
cutive office in the country should be filled by a committee and not by an 
vidual because its getting to be too much for one person to handle. 
ANDERSON: It was when God appointed the committee that we got the camel. 
is occuring in the field of continuing medical education has been an increased 
ization that formal courses alone do not answer the needs of individual phy-
There is increased emphasis on medical audit studies as being perhaps 
more effective mechanisms of assuring continuing medical education in 
on hospital staff level where you have the best capability of tailoring 
process to the needs of the individual practitioner. 
Maybe the lawyers out here have either fallen asleep or they don't 
anything on continuing legal education. Do we have some lawyers that 
comment on that? 
Plaintiff's attorneys do a beautiful job of educating each other 
and are not successful trial techniques. 
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COMMENT: I have not attended every session--obviously I don't have time, 
I don't think anyone has time--of the continuing legal education programs. I 
think I would be appalled if the program were made mandatory" I find them to 
be about 50-50 in terms of value, in terms of content, in terms of any utility 
that I derive from them. 
MS. ANDERSON: Are you talking about your State Bar Association programs? 
QUESTION: The Continuing Legal Education programs. It's not mandated in Kentucky. 
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PSYCHIA'l'RIC/LEGAL CONCEPTS OF DANGEROUSNESS 
Dr. Harvey L. Ruben 
Department of Mental Health 
Connecticut 
The problem in dealing with this topic is that, for the most part, legal 
and psychiatric concepts of dangerousness fail to coincide. My hope is that by 
the end of our session today we'll both have a better understanding of each other's 
position. Then we can begin to reconcile some our conflicting ideas on this sub-
ject. 
Before I start my presentation, I'd like to give,You a small examination. 
I'm going to present four hypothetical case situations. I'd like for you to res-
pond to them in two ways. First, do you believe that this particular patient 
is or will be dangerous to himself or others? Second, do you believe that 
involuntary hospitalization is necessary? 
The first case is Jane, a 27-year-old separated social worker who came to 
me complaining of feelings of depression and anxiety as a result of having recently 
lost her job. She'd been employed as a supervising social worker in a social 
service agency in Boston for several years. She stated that because of a person-
ality conflict with her supervisors, she was given the ultimatum of either resigning 
or being fired. She refused to resign and so her employment was terminated. 
She also said that she' d been having many difficulties. during the past 
several weeks while living with her mother. She said that ,she'd always had 
difficulty getting along with her mother. These problems had resurfaced. Her 
father had been bugging her about the way that she had been dealing with her 
mother. In a fit of anger several days prior to her seeing me, she'd punched 
her father in the face. 
During several weeks of treatment, she continued to have symptoms of 
anxiety and depression. There was also some evidence of impulsive behavior. She 
was continually preoccupied with legal matters in relation to initiating a 
grievance procedure with her former employer and in relation to her forthcoming 
divorce. During a period of 3 weeks she hired and ultimately discharged three 
different attorneys. She also became very angry with me on several different 
occasions. She fired me once only to return the following day and ask if I 
would continue to treat her, which I did. 
Attempts at stabilizing her behavior by using medications were unsuccessful. 
She claimed that she experienced unpleasant feelings from the medications and 
refused to take them. She said that she felt better, but she didn't appear to be 
better. 
Eventually, in the middle of a group session, another patient made a 
simple comment to Jane that she had undoubtedly played some part in her own firing, and 
Jane became exceedingly angry. She started screaming at this particular patient. 
When I attempted to make a comment to help alleviate some of hostile feelings, 
she became quite angry at me. She continued to scream and then ran out of the 
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office. 
Please consider Jane's case in light of the questions of whether or not 
she is dangerous to herself or others and whether you believe involuntary 
hospitalization would be in order. 
The second case is that of John, a 24-year-old single male who received 
a medical psychiatric discharge from the Marine Corps for a psychotic thought 
disorder which he developed. in Vietnam. His diagnosis from the Marines was 
paranoid schizophrenia. He came to me about a year after his discharge when he 
be.came dissatisfied with the services he was-'receiving at the local Veterans' 
Administration outpatient clin~c. During about 6 morlths of treatment, John 
showed an inability to handle closeness with anyone. He consequently had a 
difficult time maintaining a job. During several different jobs he repeatedly 
complained that people he worked with were out to get him or attempting to 
control his thoughts. Ultimately, he left every job. He also complained of 
difficulties in relation to his father; he said that his father did not under-
stand him. He seemed to wish to be close with his father, but he had a great 
deal of difficulty achieving this. On one occasion he came to my office and told 
me that he had purchased a loaded revolver for his protectiop. 
Please consider your course of action in John's case according to the two 
... 
questions that I cited above. 
Eric was a 20-year-old single male brought to me by his family upon his 
return from a year's trek around the country. Eric was a high school graduate 
who had developed some difficulties during his freshman year at college. He 
started using various illegal drugs such as marijuana and LSD, and he starting 
having difficulties with his studies. At the same time his father, who was a 
career military man, was transferred from the city where Eric was attending col-
lege. This left Eric without any familial sources of support while he was 
attempting to negotiate his freshman year. Ultimately, he was unable to complete 
the second semester. 
He continued to use illegal drugs with greater frequency as he attempted 
to deal with his upset emotions. When he left school at the end of the year, 
he hitch-hiked around the country finding various odd jobs and crashing with 
different people that he met along the way. In this erratic lifestyle, he was 
able to survive even though he was suffering a severe emotional disturbance. 
Ultimately, he found his way to the city where his parents were then. residing, 
and he reestablished contact with them. 
When he came to me it was obvious that he was suffering a psychotic thought 
disorder. I commenced outpatient services for Eric, using major tranquilizers to 
help combat his psychotic symptoms. Al though the medication helped 's'@mewhat, 
Eric was quite troubled because he felt that he had done himself irr~Fa:table dam-
age through the use of various hallucinogenic agents and that he woul;;'dnever be 
right again. 
Because he did not wish to live at home with his parents, he;],.t~dwith 
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several young men whom he'd known in the past. After several weeks in his new 
apartment, he called one night at about 12:30 a.m. and said that he had to see 
me. He was calling from a phone booth that was a short distance from my office. 
He arrived at my office 30 minutes later; he was quite upset. He told me that 
his housemates were plotting against him and planning to harm him. I asked him 
how he knew this. He said that he'd heard one of them mumbling under his breath, 
"We're going to get you." When I asked if he had any other evidence to support 
his concern, he said that he had none but that he knew they would harm him. 
Is Eric dangerous to himself or others? Is involuntary hospitalization 
necessary? 
The fourth case is Robert. Robert was a 46-year-old divorced, retired 
I 
army colonel. He came from a family of career military officers, and his sister 
was married to an exceedingly high-ranking military officer at the time he came 
under my care. Robert was stationed in a foreign country in a co~sular position 
when his marriage went awry. In the midst of his marital problems, his functioning 
on duty had suffered, and he was ultimately relieved of his post and transferred , 
back to the United States. 
While the divorce proceedings were still pending and while he was func-
tioning in a relatively low-level administrative position not commensurate in 
any way with his previous position, he made a very serious suicide attempt by 
slashing himself multiple times with a razor blade while sitting in Cl-.bathtub. 
~ 
By chance his sister arrived at his apartment while he was in the midst of the 
suicidal act, and his life was saved. 
I was called into the case while Robert was an inpatient. He was suffering 
from a depression of psychotic proportions. I worked with Robert for approximately 
a year during which time his depression resolved, he retired from the military, 
and he set about establishing a new life. He went back to school in a year-long 
program to obtain a master's degree in foreign relations so that he could obtain 
a civil service job in a foreign country. This would have been commensurate with 
his previous military experience. Although he was able to do fairly well in 
school, he felt that he was not able to learn as much or as rapidly as he wished. 
He attributed this to his age and waning intellectual capacity. 
Since things were going well in Robert's life, he decided to visit me on 
an every-other-week basis. During a week when I was not to see him, I was out of 
town at a meeting. I had left a message with my answering service that if anyone 
called, they could reach me at the hotel in the other city. During that week, 
Robert called my office and told my answering service that he was upset and that 
he had to talk with me immediately. The operator offered to give him the phone 
number or to try to reach me and have me call back. Then he hung up without 
leaving his phone number. My answering service called me at the meeting and told 
me of Robert's call. They asked me if I wanted them to do anything. 
Please respond to this case according to the two hypothetical questions 
that I posed before. 
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As you may have guessed, the cases I have presented are actually true. 
Jane, the impulsive social worker, had a diagnosis of borderline schizophrenia. 
You will recall that she had acted violently in the recent past in relation to 
her father. As she stormed out of my office I experienced several feelings. One 
was fear for myself, for the other patients, and for my family. I have an office 
in my home, and it is not inconceivable that a violent patient could do harm to 
my wife and children. I followed Jane to her car, attempting to talk with her. 
She wouldn't listen. She jumped in her car and drove away in quite a rush. I 
was then faced with the decision of whether -to institute involuntary hospitaliza-
tion on a physician's emergency certificate, accordi~g to Connecticut law. I 
chose to refrain from taking that action until I'd hadan opportunity to talk 
with Jan~s parents who had an appointment to see me an hour later. We discussed 
what happened,and I told them of my concerns about the possibility that Jane 
might be violent to herself or someone else. We also discussed the possibility 
of hospitalization, either voluntary or involuntary. When her parents returned 
home, they found Jane in an exceedingly agitated state. They talked with her about 
the session that I'd just had with them and suggested that she take the medication 
that I had recommended. She agreed to do this. She calmed down and came back to 
see me the next day. Thus, I was able to avoid involuntary hospitalization. 
In the case of John, the former Marine, I decided tha-t althollgh his having 
a loaded gun was an exceedingly dangerous situation, I didn't believe at that 
point in time his use of the weapon was imminent. Thus, I suggested to him that 
he return with his father for a joint session the followin<jj. evening. Since I 
had seen John with his father in the past, this was not an extraordinary move. 
Once he was present with his father, I moved the discussion to John's feelings 
that he must protect himself. He ultimately told his father that he did have a 
gun in the car. By the end of the session, John had agreed to give the weapon to 
his father and to seek his father's help more actively when he was feeling as 
though he needed protection or wanted to talk with someone about it. 
Eric, the hitchhiking drug abuser, seemed to me to be experiencing an 
exacerbation of his psychotic thought process when he came to my office in the 
middle of the night. At that point in time I entertained the thought that Eric 
might act violently towards his roommates were he to return to his apartment. I 
spent abbut an hour-and-a-half talking with him, trying to help him understand 
the reality of the situation. I also got him to accept a major increase in his 
medication at this point. I decided that it would not be appropriate to allow 
him to return to his apartment. With his agreement, I called his parents and 
made arrangements for him to stay with them for several days until things had 
cooled off. 
Robert, the retired colonel, possessed an exceedingly high suicidal 
potential, for he was over the age of 40, he was divorced, he had few sources of 
emotional support in his life, and he had a history of another severe suicide 
attempt. When my answering service was able to reach me--several hours after he'd 
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placed the call to me--I decided that Robert was in severe straits and immediately 
called his sister and asked her to go to his home. I felt at that time that 
involuntary hospitalization was necessary in order to protect Robert from doing 
violence to himself. The tragic end of this story is that later in the evening 
I received a call from his sister saying that he'd been found dead in the bath-
tub. He had put a gun in his mouth and shot himself. 
What is dangerousness? It is interesting that neither Dorland's Medical 
Dictionary,l Hinsie and Campbell's Psychiatric Dictionary,2 nor even the Psychiatric 
3 Glossary of the American Psychiatric Associatign contain a d~finition of danger-
ousness. This finding sugges·ts that "dangerous" is not, a medical nor a psychiatric 
term, but rather a legal term. This happens to be precisely the case. Very few 
psychiatric authors attempt to define "dangerousness," although they do write 
about it from time to time. In a 1967 monograph, The Clinical Evaluation of 
Dangerousness of the Mentally Ill, Usdin says that dangerousness relates to 
aggressive and socially destructive acts. 4 In an excellent article entitled 
"Dangerousness and Psychiatry," Tanany stated that a legal definition of dangerous-
ness is a situation where "an act must occur in the community in the reasonably 
forseeable future." This act, of course, must have a high probability of causing 
substantial injury.II S He derives this legal definition from the findings of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in RoseI1fi~ld v. 
Overholser6 and Millard v. Harris? 
The problem for me as a psychiatrist is that it's impossible to say with 
virtual certainty that an act will occur or that such an act will be associated 
with substantial injury. However, a review of the legal and psychiatric 
literature about dangerousness indicates that such a prediction is just what 
the law wants when a psychiatric expert testifies concerning an individual's 
dangerousness. It appears that the law requires an exact accounting. 
Unfortunately, however, dangerousness is a quality that we can only measure 
in degree. We cannot give an exact accounting. A person may be only slightly 
dangerous or they may be exceedingly dangerous. A finding of dangerousness is a 
subjective finding. Dangerousness is not an inherent quality of an individual. 
Dangerousness can only be ascertained in one individual in relation to another. 
Thus, a lion is only dangerous if it's standing beside me and is not separated 
from me by a series of iron bars. Similarly, Eric (in the case related above) 
had the potential for being dangerous to his roommates since he thought that 
his roommates were attempting to harm him. He was not dangerous in relation to 
me as he sat in my office that night. Alan Stone in the section "Dangerousness" 
in Mental Health and Law: A System in Transition, has said thati~angerousness, 
like beauty, is to some extent in the eye of the beholder. 11 8 Thus, dangerous-
ness is a word which we use to describe a person who is potentially harmful from 
the frame of reference of the person who is doing the classifying. 
The problem with the lack of consensus between law and psychiatry leads to 
the difficulties we encounter in utilizing the concept of dangerousness. The 
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court asks the psychiatrist to make a crystal ball prediction about the behavior 
of the particular individual in order to determine what legal course of action 
should be pursued. Dangerousness is usually at issue in relation to involuntary 
, 
civil commitment and in relation to the insanity defense in criminal proceedings. 
In relation to both of these issues, a court goal is preventive detention. In my 
view preventive detention is valuable in the case of the mentally ill when there 
is substantial evidence that a person is likely to do harm to himself or others 
in the reasonably foreseeable future. In the case of an insanity defense for a 
crime already committed, there is good evidence of the dangerousness of the 
individual so that incarceration is in order to prev~nt him from harming or 
committing a similar dangerous act again in the future. In both these contexts, 
the court asks the psychiatrist to "guess" whether or not the person will behave 
in a dangerous fashion in the future. In the case where there is previous history 
of violent behavior, it is much easier to make such a prediction. With no history 
it is difficult if not impossible. In fact, Kozol and his associates in Crime 
and Delinquency state that "no one can predict dangerous behavior in a person with 
no history of dangerous acting out."9 
A number of recent law review articles have dealt with the issue of whether 
or not psychiatrists can predict dangerousness with any degree of reliability or 
validity. A 1971 Arizona Law Review article on "Dangerousness and <.::ommittability" 
and the 1974 California Law Review article by Ennis and Litwack entitled 
"Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom"ll 
are two notable examples. Both of these articles attempt to prove that psychia-
trists are exceedingly poor predictors of dangerousness compared to laymen or to 
even actuarial devices such as experience tables. 
Ennis and Litwack discuss the fact that psychiatrists tend to "overpredict" 
dangerousness; they are culturally biased; they don't have the proper orientation, 
training or experience to make these judgments; the entire diagnostic system in 
psychiatry is ambiguous and inadequate and so forth. This latter article in 
particular presents a number of misleading facts. For example, it is based for 
the most part on studies that were done at least 10 or more years ago and does 
not reflect the current state of the art. What is more, a number of the articles 
relating to inadequacies of psychiatric diagnosis are from the schizophrenic 
research literature, and they were written at a time when behavioral scientists 
were attempting to standardize their diagnoses so that they could do more reliable 
and valid research. Also, a number of their studies were done in state hospitals 
where attending staff was compared against psychiatric residents, who may have 
little experience and little command of the English language. The major fallacy 
of the Ennis and Litwack article is the assumption that a diagnosis of psychosis 
perforce means involuntary hospitalization will be instituted. Without going 
into more detail about this particular article, the authors were saying that there 
have been many abuses of involuntary commitment procedures based on psychiatric 
expert testimony concerning a patient's dangerousness. This point neither I nor 
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any other thoughtful person would dispute. However, their assertion that justice 
would be better served by flipping coins in the courtroom than calling in psychiat-
ric expert testimony is a major distortion and unfortunately causes more damage 
I 
than good in relation to the reframing of civil commitment statutes. 
One basic problem concerning civil commitment is that the legal and 
psychiatric professions perceive civil commitment as serving different purposes. 
The legal view of the purpose of involuntary hospitalization is in order to pre-
vent injuries such as suicide, homicide, or assaultive behavior., The prevailing 
psychiatric view is that involuntary hospital~zation is for ,the purposes of treat-
ment. Because the law says that involuntary hospital~zation is to prevent harm-
ful behavior, the law demands substantial proof that harmful behavior has in fact 
been prevented when someone is involuntarily hospitalized. 
Based on developments in Donaldson v. o'connor,12 the law also says that 
hospitalization must not merely prevent harmful behavior; it must also provide 
treatment for the patient. The irony, then, is that where a statute cites 
dangerousness as a criteria for commitment, it uses not a diagnostic but a 
predictive label, perhaps better served by detention of nonmedical sort. Yet 
our society has evolved to the point where it specifically requires that treat-
ment be offered in response to such a prediction of antisocial behavior. 
The legal literature spends much time talking about the high .n_~mber of 
false positive identifications of potentially dangerous people that occurs when 
psychiatrists attempt to predict dangerousness. A classic, view of this type is 
from a 1974 Harvard Law Review article called "Civil Commitment of the Mentally 
Ill. ,,13 Citing Livermore, they demonstrate that if we had a 95 percent success 
rate in identifying potential killers and only a 1 percent false identification 
rate, and if 1 person of every 1,000 was a killer, and if we tested 100,000 
people, then we would find 95 of the 100 killers in the population. However, 
we would also incorrectly identify 999 other people who are not killers but who by 
our tests are called killers. Thus, if we used this test to confine people, we 
would lock up 1,094 people to stop 95 killings and would still end up with 5 
homicides. This type of reasoning suggests that we should not utilize the test 
of dangerousness as an indicator for involuntary hospitalization. As I will show 
later, I actually agree with this last premise, but not for the reasonS stated. 
Psychiatrists are trained to deal with clinical states. Dangerousness is 
not a clinically definable state. Rather, it is a word that can be used to 
define or to describe certain types of behavior. When I am treating a patient, 
I am mostly concerned with my ability to successfully help that patient. When 
I see a patient who manifests some type of potentially violent behavior, as did 
Jane in the case described above, I am obviously concerned about whether the 
patient will hit me--or one of the other patients if it's a group--whether the 
patient will return to do harm to my family or to my personal property or perhaps 
just drive off the road into a tree or a bridge abutment. In the case of Jane I 
was also concerned that she might turn her anger and hostility inward and thus 
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attempt to harm herself as punishment for her hostile and agressive outbursts. 
I thought of hospitalizing her involuntarily to prevent this harmful behavior. 
However, I was most concerned about whether hospitalization would help in her 
I 
treatment. 
In relation to the issue of overpredicting, allow me to make th,e unqualified 
statement that as a psychiatrist I would far rather overpredict than underpredict. 
I realize that those of you that are civil libertarians are upset when I say this. 
You believe that I'm talking about a wholesale removal of civil rights from the 
unsuspecting masses. However, what I am sayi~g is that when a patient is sitting 
in my office, ! am wholly concerned with the welfare pf that patient and of his 
family. If I make a wrong judgment about that patient's suicidal or homicidal 
intent, even when all the odds are in my favor, someone may end up dead. At the 
time of my earliest medical school surgical training, I was taught that if I did 
not take out some healthy appendices--either 20 or 30 percent depending on who 
the teacher was--I would most likely not be operating on appendices frequently 
enough. I would have patients dying of ruptured appendices. Similarly, as a 
psychiatrist, if I underpredict rather than overpredict suicidal or homicidal 
behavior, I am going to have patients either dying or killing other people. 
This is a difficult concept for the law to accept. If you personally are the 
victim of the patient, then the law of averages flies out the windo,,!:,. If I 
make a wrong call and you wind up dead, you are 100 percent dead no matter what 
the probability of the patient killing you was. 
One legal misconception is that when a psychiatrist makes a diagnosis of 
a psychosis, this in and of itself is grounds for involuntary hospitalization. 
Nothing could be further from the truth. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of the American Psychiatric Association describes patients as psychotic when 
"their mental functioning is sufficiently impaired to interfere with their capacity 
to meet the ordinary demands of life." 14 This impairment may be accompanied by 
a number of bizarre symptoms of unusual behaviors. There is no particular psychi-
atric psychotic diagnosis that inherently connotes dangerousness. As a matter of 
fact, a number of different studies have shown that psychotic patients are less 
. . h .. d 1 h" d 1 b h' h th . d' . d 1 15,16 11kely to have elt er SU1Cl a or omlCl a e aVl0r t an 0 er ln lVl ua s. 
As an illustration of this point, of the four cases that I presented above, the 
first three patients had psychotic diagnoses. They did not do harm to themselves 
or others. Robert, the fourth patient, had a previous diagnosis of a psychotic 
depressive reaction. However, at the time that he killed himself there had been 
no evidence of a psychotic disorder for well over a year. 
Although psychotic individuals do sometimes commit suicide and homicide, 
the proportion of those who do compared to the number of non-psychotic persons 
who commit these acts is small. One author has estimated that approximately 
50,000 mentally ill people a year are predicted to be dangerous and are thus 
preventively detained. 17 As I said above, psychiatry in truth is not able to 
accurately predict the likelihood of a patient's future dangerous behavior, nor does 
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it claim it can. It is true that we as psychiatrists determine specific diagnoses 
for patients, and as we do this we are able to predict various behavorial likeli-
hoods or tendencies. However, in no instance could this be construed as a specific 
prediction of some future event. It is this misunderstanding'on the part of the 
legal profession that has lead to the current disenchantment with psychiatric 
expertise. When I make a prediction that a patient is suicidal or homicidal and 
seek involuntary hospitalization for that patient, there is no way that I wish 
to have my prediction verified as to validity or reliability. To,do so might 
well mean the loss of human life. However, w~~n in the course of treatment I 
see the patient's state of mind improved, then I am quite satisfied with the 
, 
veracity of my prediction and am obviously quite pleased with the result of my 
treatment. 
Some writers suggest that pe:rhaps dangerousness should not be a criterion 
for involuntary hospitalization. They find the operational definition of 
dangerousness that must be used in order to satisfy the court places psychiatry 
in the position of being unable to fulfill the demands of the court. One suggests 
that were the court to request the psychiatrist to predict whether a particular 
patient is homicidal or suicidal rather than dangerous in the broad sense of the 
definition, we would then have a task amenable to current psychiatric practice. 
Another goes a step further and suggests that since dangerousness in, ,and of itself 
is not treatable, it does not make good sense to confine dangerous persons in 
treatment institutions. Rather, he suggests that preventiv~ detention in 
criminal institutions--since we are attempting to prevent criminal acts--would be 
more appropriate. 
I think it's fair to say that psychiatrists, in the clinical sense, find 
in dangerousness a concept that has very little usefulness. It is far more 
appropriate for psychiatrists to think in terms of psychiatric illness and its treat-
ability or nontreatability than ,of the consequence of potentially violent behavior. 
which may occur in relation to specific psychiatric illness. Preventive detention 
in relation to these violent behaviors may be in order. However, psychiatrists 
believe that therapeutic detention is far more appropriate when possible. The 
question the court asks the psychiatrist should not be whether the patient will 
commit a violent act at some specific time in the future, but whether this disease 
process could best be treated through involuntary hospitalization. This is a 
question that we as psychiatrists could answer. Then you as lawyers would not 
have to spend so much time telling us how poor we are at making predictions of 
behavior. 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
QUESTION: Dr. Ruben, your talk was geared more towards the suicidal and homicidal 
tendencies. To your knowledge, does the concept of dangerousness go beyond the 
realm of physical injury? For example, would a person who is a complusive check 
forger be considered dangerous? 
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DR. RUBEN: First of all, I think that's a legal question. I don't think the law 
has made such a classification. I don't think there's any-thing psychologically 
dangerous about a check forger, either. It could be the result of a psychological 
problem, but I don't think that in and of itself would be con~trued as dangerous. 
MR. BRUTON: I think you've put your finger on one of the problems that Dr. Ruben 
mentioned. A patient can be a high social risk for committing an act such as 
forgery, but with our commitment statutes, there must be some danger of physical 
harm either to the patient or to others. This is a source of frustration to 
psychiatris-ts because if they commit someone aDd his only predictable risk is that 
he's going to write a cold check, then they're going tq get hit with a habeas 
corpus or a false imprisonment action. 
applying the statute. 
It's a fine line they have to draw in 
QUESTION: In scanning the occasional obituary columns of the AMA Journal, I not 
only see more deaths due to overdoses of drugs, but I also see more homicide deaths, 
sometimes defined as gunshot wounds to the chest and things like that. Comment 
please. 
DR. RUBEN: I am sensitive to whether or not I am dealing with what I would con-
sider a potentially dangerous person. But as I said in my talk, I think about 
that in terms of whether or not they may do harm to me, or, frbm what they've 
told me, whether they would do harm to themselves or to someone else. I know of 
instances where psychiatrists have been murdered by their patients, and so I am 
very concerned about that. And because I have an office in my home, I'm 
even concerned about my family's safety. The only thing I can say is that there 
are times when I become involved with the patient's delusional system. That's 
a very dangerous situation to the physician. The physician may be unable to deal 
with it in any appropriate way, including involuntary hospitalization, and the 
unfortunate result is occasionally death. 
MR. PROSSER: If it's any consolation, lawyers quite often suffer the same demise. 
Mr. Barber would also like to respond to that question. 
MR. BARBER: My comment is a little bit different, but I think when we put this 
panel together we wanted to have full integration. One of the fact situations 
that Dr. Ruben came up with--the one concerning Jane--plugs into a case out in 
California, Tarasoff v. Board of Regents. In that case there was a student who 
was under psychiatric care at the University of California at Berkley. He told 
a psychologist who in turn told a supervising psychiatrist that he was going to 
kill his girlfriend when she came back into town. The University officials noti-
fied the police authorities. This notification was subsequently countermanded 
by the psychiatrist, and ultimately this man did in fact kill this young lady. 
Suit was brought against the individuals involved and the University, and the 
Supreme Court of California ultimately decided that this action could be main-
tained on the theory that there was a duty to warn the girl and her family in 
this situation. I ask Dr. Ruben to comment upon that in light of the way that 
he handled Jane's case. 
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DR. RUBEN: As I understand the facts in Tarasoff, a psychologist saw the young 
man who ultimately committed the murder. It was the psychologist who notified 
the campus police, who then picked the guy up. If I remember correctly, they 
kept him overnight in the university health service. It was then that the super-
vising psychiatrist decided that the man was not dangerous. He had him released 
and also, for unknown reasons, had the record expunged. He actually removed the 
references in the record to the fact that the patient had said that he would 
perform a violent act against the young woman. I personally belie~e that, had 
I been in that situation, I would have notifie~_~he family. That doesn't 
necessarily mean I would immediately make a phone call, but I would definitely 
1 
not just send a patient off and say, "I don't believe you." I would perhaps try 
to follow the patient and treat him. If the patient persisted with his stated 
intent, then I would think about involuntary hospitalization and most likely 
about warning the intended victim. In Jane's case, she didn't have a specific 
focus for her potentially violent behavior. She yelled and screamed at the 
patient in the group, she yelled and screamed at me, she'd already punched her 
father in the face, and in other family sessions, she'd been screaming at her 
mother. My wife was one of the attorneys who represented her for a short 
period of time, and when she fired her, she yelled and screamed'at her, too. 
So she was focusing her anger on everyone, but on no one in particulat:. I was 
actually more concerned that she might attempt to commit suicide--that she would 
turn her anger inside. I did discuss it with her parents. ~e'd already had 
family sessions, so that I wasn't violating her confidence. 
QUESTION: On Mr. Bruton's comment that dangerousness must be physical danger: 
as I read the law, your statement would be an interpretation of the law, but 
not how the law is specifically written. Would you comment on that? 
MR. BRUTON: Granted, it's a statement of opinion. But courts sometimes like 
things drawn in black and white. The drawing is always done in the brilliant 
light of hindsight, and so this is probably the least subjective of the criteria 
that they focus on. 
MR. BARBER: There's a brand new mental health law in the state of Kentucky. I'll 
read to you the definition of danger in the statute: Immediate danger or 
immediate threat of danger to self or others means substantial physical harm or 
immediate threat of substantial physical harm upon self or others, including 
actions which deprive self or others of basic needs of survival, etc. Substantial 
physical harm or substantial threat of physician harm, including actions which 
deprive self or others of basic means of survival, includes a provision for rea-
sonable shelter, food, or clothing. But it does boil down to something physical, 
some act. 
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CIVIL COMMITMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL PATIENT 
William D. Weitzel, H.D. 
Assistant Professor of Psychiatry 
College of Hedicine 
Lexington, Kentucky 
This morning I'd like to review how civil commitment of mentally ill 
patients to hospitals evolved in our country. Then I'd like to talk about the 
current state of things and about developing legal decisions and guidelines which 
I think are going to have a profound impact. I'd like to conclude with some of 
Dr. Alan Stone's ideas on this topic which are different from the way things have 
been and are being done now. 
The history of American psychiatry and law document a struggle between two 
major themes. One involves society's expectations of protection against arbitrary 
and unconstitutional restrictions of freedom of behavior. A tension, it seems to 
me, must exist inevitably between society's need and individual rights. Civil 
commitment of the mentally ill patient involves real life dilemmas in which we 
must balance both desirable goals. 
During our nation's colonial period the only laws concerning violent and 
dangerously insane people dealt with detention under authority of the sovereign's 
police power: those considered dangerous to others were simply arrested. A 
Massachusetts statute of 1696 ordered the selectmen of towns with "darl'gerously 
distracted persons" to take care of them that "they do not damnify others." Not 
until the 1780's, however, did various states enact legislation which explicitly 
provided for the lawful confinement of those who suffered from lunacy or were 
otherwise so furiously mad as to be harmful to others. No specific laws con-
cerning commitment procedure which provided legislative safeguards protecting 
personal liberty and patients' civil rights were enacted until the middle of the 
19th century. 
Prior to the American Civil War, or during the era of what we call moral 
treatment, commitment of patients to hospitals under statutory authority was 
effected quite easily and often merely on the request of a friend or a relative. 
Commitment could even take the form of a hastily scribbled few words on a scrap 
of paper signed by a member of the hospital staff. 
In 1845 a new idea was introduced to this process. In that year Josiah Oaks 
petitioned the Hassachusetts Supreme Court to release him from confinement, claiming 
that his family had committed him to an asylum without justification. The Chief 
Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Court denied this request and endorsed the 
idea that the confinement of a mentally ill patient continue as long as it is 
required for the patient's own safety or for that of others and that this is the 
proper limitation. This decision is reputed to have established the foundation 
for justifying and limiting the extent of confinement of mentally ill patients. 
It was probably the first time that a therapeutic justification for confinement 
was decided in a court in this country. A discernable trend now began toward 
broadening the reasons for commitment of the mentally ill patient to include 
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therapeutic reasons. 
The evolution of involuntary commitment legislation in the United States 
changed further in the 1860's. A woman by the name of Mrs. E. P. Packard was 
committed for a period of about 3 years to a state mental institution in Illinois 
after differing publicly on a religious issue with her husband who happened to be 
a preacher. The preacher won the argument by having her committed. The Illinois 
statute provided that a married woman could be committed on the petition of her 
husband "without even the evidence of insanity or distraction, required in other 
cases." At the time of her discharge in 1863 she claimed that she had been 
victimized by her husband and was quite sane when committed. She launched a 
nationwide campaign after her release for the enactment of protective legislation 
to benefit the insane. Her successful campaign resulted in changes of civil 
commitment laws to include such important safeguards already present in criminal 
law such as notice to the patient that a petition has been filed for commitment, 
a fair hearing on the issue, and finally the right to a jury trial. 
There were no provisions in the United States for voluntary hospitalization 
to public mental institutions until the end of the 19th century. Some of the 
earlier laws limited voluntary admission patients to only those who could pay. 
After emphasis on early diagnosis and treatment of mental illness gained momentum 
in this century, states began to alter their policies and allow~pluntary 
admissions. 
The National Advisory Mental Health Council in 1949 requested the Council 
of State Governments and the United States Public Health Service to develop what 
might be considered a model act with guidelines and suggestions for preventing 
the obvious indignities and humiliations which psychiatric patients were still 
experiencing. The recommendations in this document were transmitted to all state 
governors and used to help modify legislation in many states in this country 
during the next two decades. 
In 1959 the British Mental Health Act was passed with the stated intent of 
protecting psychiatrically ill patients from humiliating pUblicity and deprivation 
of their rights and opening easier access to treatment. According to this Act, 
an insane person may be hospitalized for an indefinite period on the recommendation 
of two private physicians without procedures of a hearing by a court or an admin-
istrative tribunal. In addition, the act authorizes compulsory hospitalization of 
patients afflicted with mental illness, mental subnormality, and a variety of 
psychopathic disorders. However, these concepts are not clearly defined. 
Some authors feel this legislation is a step backward in terms of effective 
protection against indiscriminate detention and involuntary commitment of the 
mentally ill. It is consitent, however, with the trend in recent years toward 
emphasizing the justification of commitment of the mentally ill on the basis of 
therapeutic reasons. Unfortunately, therapeutic good intentions have not always 
squared with reality. In 1961 the Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Mental 
Health published a report in which it was alleged that over 80 percent of the 
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state hospitals in the United States at that time offered no treatment whatsoever 
to patients confined in them. Statistics compiled by the World Health Organiza-
tion indicate that only 10 percent of the psychiatric hospital's in 1955 were on a 
voluntary basis. 
The enormity of the problem can be appreciated when it is remembered that 
it is estimated that one person out of ten in this country will be hospitalized 
at one time or another for treatment of a mental disorder. In 1973 one half of 
the hospital beds in the United States were occupied by mental patients. Over 
308,000 resident patients were in the country'~, 321 state and county mental 
hospitals and one third more were in private hospitals and in the psychiatric 
I 
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wings of general hospitals. In addition, approximately 260,000 of the more than 
6 million mental retardates in the country are now in mental institutions. 
The morality of involuntary hospitalization is now being vigorously chal-
lenged. Outright repeal of all laws of civil commitment is urged by the k~erican 
Association for the Abolition of Involuntary Mental Hospitalization which was 
organized in 1970, and a lot of the leadership in this organization has come from 
another familiar figure in American psychiatry, Dr. Thomas Szasz. The group 
urges members to "oppose currently accepted psychiatric and psychological practices 
that rest on the use of state supported force and fraud." 
A current report suggests that the number of involuntary civi'lI,G~mmitments 
is declining. As of 1972 it appears that the pendulum has swung such that 
voluntary admissions to psychiatric facilities now outnumbe~ involuntary ones. 
However, data also suggests that two out of every five persons admitted to state 
and county mental hospitals during 1972 were there, against their wishes. It's 
difficult to know how many of them chose to enter voluntarily only because of 
threat of commitment. 
Let's talk now about the choices of admission that an identified mental 
patient has. In the 20th century a patient can request an informal voluntary 
admission to a mental hospital. This is with a minimum of formality and the 
patient retains the right to depart the hospital when he chooses. Three separate 
grounds for involuntary civil commitment are usually allowed. These vary from 
state to state but are usually found when the patient presents danger to others, 
danger to himself, and now in Kentucky when his actions would lead to the depri-
vation of the basic means of survival. The first is based on a threat to society 
and the latter two on the concept of parens patriae. The threat to society is 
clearly a strong justification. The right of the state to confine persons 
dangerous to themselves rests on different grounds. In spite of John Stuart Mill's 
maxim from his 1859 essay on liberty, the state has frequently intervened with 
the mentally ill who are considered dangerous to themselves. Mill wrote, you 
remember, that the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over 
any member of a civilized community against his will is to prevent harm to others. 
His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. 
There are at least three types of involuntary commitment or compulsory 
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admission. Commitment is defined here as the legal process whereby at the request 
of a relative or a friend two doctors explain to a court why it is necessary to 
deprive a patient of his freedom. An emergency commitment usually uses a 
, 
simplified form and is the most often used means of effectively getting a patient 
into the hospital with a minimum of delay. This forced hospitalization remains 
valid only for a limited duration. until June 18 in this state it is 48 hours. 
After June 18 it is 72 hours. An American Bar Foundation report notes that 
emergency care commitment is not technically a hospitalization but rather a form 
of detention. During the period under \<7hich_,an emergency hospitalization commit-
ment is in effect, family or friend must petition fo~ a formal judicial commitment 
and two physicians must vouch that it is appropriate as defined by the law. This 
process can be avoided if the patient signs a voluntary admission form during the 
course of the emergency commitment. 
Under a formal judicial commitment a patient may be hospitalized either for 
a prescribed period or for an indeterminate period. until June 18 in this state, 
it is indeterminate. After June 18 it's 60 days or 360 days. So he can be 
hospitalized for a prescribed period without his consent and over his objection 
based on the certificates of two physicians. 
A third type of commitment involves observation. This' procedure is designed 
only to help formulate a diagnosis or determine whether long term ,cC?,mmi tment is 
required. Such a procedure can be used with people who are arrested by police 
and accused of a crime, a vicious sex crime, for example. This kind of an 
individual can be sent to a state hospital--in this state the forensic unit--for 
a period of observation with a report subsequently being sent to the court. 
The following comments are an overview; not all apply specifically to this 
state. 
In a survey of approximately 2,500 commitment proceedings, fewer than 1 
percent were found to be formally contested. The chief reasons for the "no contest" 
is that the patient's psychotic condition makes an organized effort to defend 
himself impossible. In addition, the physician will seldom press for commitment 
in the face of opposition from the family unless the patient is clearly homicidal 
or suicidal. 
I'd like to review for you now the following groups which have been or 
currently still are committable. First of all is the mentally ill person. This 
individual is defined variously as a person who is suffering from an illness 
which so lessens his capacity to use his customary self-control, judgement, 
discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social relations as to make it 
necessary or advisable for him to be under care and supervision, guidance and 
control. The second group is made up of mental defectives, otherwise called 
mentally-retarded persons, mentally-handicapped persons, or feeble-minded persons. 
We also have a new law in this state with respect to these people which takes 
effect in July. This group is now covered, as I mentioned, under special legis-
lation and not under the usual commitment legislation. It was interesting to me 
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that when our legislature acted on this, their coverage was proposed in two 
separate bills with two separate numbers but were dealt with in committee and in 
the voting as if they were one package. 
Another group is made up of epileptic persons. These individuals are 
described in various state mental health laws as "persons suffering from any con-
dition which brings about lapses of consciousness which mayor may not be accom-
panied by convulsive seizures which may become chronic." The epileptic so 
uncontrolled as to be dangerous is subject to commitment. The following remark 
is from Dr. Slovenko's book, Psychiatry and Law. Dr. Slovenko claims that 
according to epilepsy agencies in this country only 20 'percent of the known 
epileptics in the united States are receiving adequate treatment. 
Inebriated persons are defined in various mental health laws as persons 
who are habitually so addicted to the use of alcohol or other intoxicating or 
narcotic substances as to be unwilling or unable without help to stop the 
excessive use of such substances. Judicial commitment is usually resorted to 
only in cases in which the patient is psychotic and needs confinement for tr.eat-
ment of this phase of his illness. 
The so-called sexual psychopath is described as a mentally ill person under 
the broad legal definition of some mental health laws and has been committable in 
some jurisdictions. These laws are increasingly challenged and usually are 
found unconstitutional. 
The aged are committed with greater frequency to public mental hospitals. 
comprise approximately--according to Slovenko--40 percent of many psychiatric 
hospital populations even though not psychotic. 
Probate court has full jurisdiction over neglected or delinquent juveniles 
the age of 17, usually. If a juvenile is committed, the court retains 
custody over him while he is in the institution. 
It seems to me the principal abuse in commitment procedures occurs not at 
time of the initial commitment but rather subsequently when the patient 
be allowed greater freedom or placed in a halfway house or a foster care 
Such facilities are rarely available or have limited capabilities. ~here­
the writ of habeas corpus becomes an important tool. The writ, as you know, 
s for its object speedy release by judicial decree. It may be obtained on the 
f of anyone who claims he is being restrained of his liberty illegally. 
ince involuntary commitment may continue only as long as the patient needs care 
he may at any time petition for the issuance of such a writ on the 
he is now sane and entitled to release. 
I'd like to talk to you now about some procedural developments. In 1972 a 
federal court while reviewing the Wisconsin commitment laws held for the 
time that--imagine now, we're talking about a patient, that's what bothers 
about this--in addition to requiring notice, hearing and right to counsel, the 
ted States Constitution mandated three other procedural protections for persons 
ecting involuntary commitment: (1) beyond a reasonable doubt standard of 
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proof, (2) a Miranda warning to enforce fifth amendment rights against self-
incrimination, and (3) a principle favoring the least restrictive alternative with 
I 
the burden on proponents of hospitalization to prove that necessity. This case, 
Lessard v. Schmidt, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wisc. 1974); vacated 421 U.S. 957 
(1975) f was vacated on a technicality by the united States Supreme Court but is now 
back again for futher consideration. Beyond a reasonable doubt certainty is 
something like 90 percent certainty. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
has recently held in a 1973 case that beyond a reasonable doubt standards must 
apply in commitment cases in that jurisdiction. 
In Bell v. County General Hospital at Eloise 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 
1974), a three judge federal court struck down the ~1ichigan temporary commitment 
law as unconstitutional. These findings are similar to those in the Lessard case 
and I'd like to list them for you. In order to be constitutional the Michigan 
court required the following changes: the law must provide for service of the 
commitment petition itself on the respondent himself sufficiently in advance to 
permit him to evaluate the allegations and prepare his response. The :respondent 
must be notified that he has a right to legal counsel. The statute may not provide 
for a prehearing determination that the respondent's condition is such that he 
ought not to be present at the commitment hearing. The statute mU2t provide for 
notice to the respondent that he has a right to a jury trial, and a balance has 
to be struck between dangerousness to self or others and the patient's amenability 
to treatment as against the curtailment of liberty that commitment represents. 
The law may not permit involuntary detention without a hearing for more than a 
short period, probably for 5 days. The statute may not permit a voluntary 
treatment of a "physically intrusive nature" prior to a final adjudication of 
mental illness except when the patient is presently dangerous to himself or 
others and provided such treatment is necessary to maintain physical health. 
You remember when I talked about admissions procedures I mentioned that 
the emergency commitment is by far the most common legal vehicle for involuntary 
confinement and most often utilized in the management of psychiatric crises. The 
overwhelming majority of our patients within the short period of time--48 to 72 
hours--realize the wisdom of becoming a voluntary patient and accept treatment. 
Ydu understand, though, that what I just read was an attack on that approach in 
Michigan. So it seems to me that these procedural requirements in Lessard v. 
Schmidt and Bell v. Wayne County created a serious practical impediment to the 
effective management of psychiatric emergencies. Of course, we don't know how this 
is going to end up. All these cases remain unresolved in any final way. 
I'd like to talk to you now about the Lanterman-Petris-Short Law, (LPS) , 
the 1969 California law which made the criteria for involuntary commitment more 
stringent and increased the legal rights of committed patients. LPS was the result 
of legislative distrust of the decision-making process in commitment. The major 
provisions of the LPS law are as follows. A person may be detained 72 hours on 
the request of any private person or police officer and a written application by 
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a mental health professional--whatever that is--designated by the county following 
a preliminary screening of the patient. The staff of the psychiatric facility 
may then certify the person for an additional 14 days of treatment and observation. 
After 17 days any further confinement requires judicial review. If the court 
believes the person is suicidal, he can be held for 14 more days and then he must 
be released. If the courts find the person immediately dangerous to others, 
another 90 days of confinement is allowed and if gravely disabled, a conservator-
ship is granted the person detained and his status is periodically reviewed. 
It was anticipated that the flow of mentqJ patients to in-patient facilities 
would be diminished since LPS made screening mandatory Fnd screeners would, of 
course, refer all those suitable to alternatives in out-patient facilities. In 
fact, though, the most important changes have been in the decreased duration 
mandated by law and the locus of hospitalization rather than in the number of 
people hospitalized. The quality of care has not been demonstrated to have 
improved. While some who would formerly have been committed are undergoing out-
patient care, a much greater number have refused referral and found their way 
into the criminal justice system. This resort to criminal processes confirms 
again what I think I see again and again, a widely known phenomenon that the 
penal and mental health system operate presently in an overlapping and reciprocal 
way for the control of deviants. 
I'd like to go on now to some of Dr. Stone's ideas. We've reviewed how we 
got here, what's going on, and what may be coming in terms of further legal guide-
lines. 
Research reports and clinical experience to my mind have produced a growing 
and renewed confidence in traditional diagnostic nomenclature in psychiatry, 
particularly in terms of psychoses. The development derives in part from a variety 
of biological and genetic studies as well as the accepted effectiveness of psy-
chotropic drugs and other somatic treatments that seem to confirm aspects of the 
medical model. As I mentioned, Allen Stone, who is a professor of psychiatry and 
law at Harvard, has suggested that the reliability of psychiatric diagnosis could 
be improved if for the purpose of civil commitment, psychiatrists would confine 
themselves to broad diagnostic categories and in addition only diagnose severe 
conditions. A review of the literature confirms this hypothesis and reveals that 
the more severe the illness the greater the diagnostic agreement. Stone proposes 
a five step procedure which he refers to as the "thank you" theory of commitment. 
The five steps are : (1) reliable diagnosis of a severe mental illness must be 
made, (2) an opinion must be rendered that the person's immediate prognosis 
involves major distress, (3) a conclusion must be reached that the appropriate 
treatment is available, (4) an opinion must be made as to whether the diagnosed 
mental illness impairs the person's ability to accept treatment, and (5) an 
opinion must be made as to whether a reasonable man would reject the treatment 
recommended. All these questions could be addressed at a hearing with counsel 
within a few days of confinement. What the psychiatrist does in this system is 
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first make his diagnosis. If it cannot readily be demonstrated that this is a 
reliable diagnosis of a severe condition, the process would go no further. The 
reliability and severity could be challenged or demonstrated by independent 
psychiatric examination. 
The "thank you" theory of civil commitment asks the psychiatrist to focus 
his inquiry on illness and treatment and asks the legal profession to guarantee 
the treatment before it intervenes in the name of parens patriae. This proposal 
is radical in the sense that it insists that society fulfill its promise of bene-
fit when it infringes on human freedom. Civil commitment is divested of a police 
function. Only someone who is irrational, treatabte, and incidentally dangerous 
would be confined in a mental system. Developing Professional Standards Review 
Organizations should now be able to provide courts with base line perspectives 
with respect to treatment standards for specific diseases. Expectations among 
all participants in this process will be clear. 
It is well known that where mental services have been upgraded and psychia-
trists have become sensitive to legal issues, involuntary commitment can and has 
become a more infrequent event. In communities in which i~provement treatment 
opportunities do not exist, the result is battles over legal standards and proce-
dures for admission. The end result of such activity many times is the freedom 
of mentally ill patients to suffer their illnesses outside aninstititution without 
access to effective medical care. 
I'd like to conclude my remarks with an observation. I have read a lot in 
preparing this paper and I have reviewed a lot of Dr. Stone's work--and if there's 
a spokesman on this issue in American psychiatry today, it's probably he. He 
reflects a growing pessimism when he speaks as a psychiatrist to other psychia-
trists that the hour is very late and that things may have gone too far in terms 
of all the laws, restrictions and regulations that have been written and imposed. 
Of course, what you see happening in this community and nationwide is that there 
are indeed fewer civil commitments. This has aroused fervor in some authors who 
have written such impassioned papers as "Dying with your Rights On" and have 
reported several cases of people who have been allowed to kill themselves or be 
killed or kill someone else while free. 
I wonder sometimes, how much good we do when we write all these rules and 
restrictions. I'd just like to make the observation that for a very seriously 
depressed person, who especially hasn't responded to anti-depressants, EeT really 
works. And you know, there's a state hospital in the neighborhood here where 
they haven't used that procedure in 2 years. Now it's too much for me to believe 
that they don't have sick patients that need it. I asked about that and what 
happened is that the guidelines are so cumbersome and so strict that it doesn't 
happen. 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
MR. BARBER: Dr. Weitzel has a comment on the seeming continuation of a trend with 
respect to commitment procedures. Mental retardates, as usual, are lumped in with 
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people with mental disorders. Retardation is by definition a noncurable condition. 
As far as I'm concerned I see no rationale for using one as a precedent to the 
other in involuntary commitment procedures. Perhaps you do. 
DR. WEITZEL: No, I would agree with you. I don't disagree with you. 
QUESTION: This goes on with the controversy_ I'll give you the case of a 47-
year-old man, a white-collar worker, modest income of $15,000 a year, a very 
stable family man who at the age of 47 had his second episode of manic illness. In 
this illness he developed the idea that it was his duty to influence legislation 
in various parts of the country. To do this h~ began to fly hither and yon in a 
rather wild, impassioned manner. He exhausted the fami~y savings, he took a 
second mortgage on the house, immediately when getting his paycheck he used it to 
buy airline fares and he was discharged from his job after this had gone on 
for approximately 6 weeks. The family then became practically destitute. In the 
interim of the 6 weeks the wife, recognized that her husband, who had previously 
been quite stable and reliable, was mentally ill. If we stick to this idea of 
physical dangerousness the psychiatrist has a very easy task; he simply throws 
up his hands and says, "Don't talk to me, there's nothing I can do about it." 
That's a very easy way to practice psychiatry, but in my opinion it is not a 
very responsible way if one is interested in treating the ment~lly ill. 
MR. PROSSER: We just has a consensus on this side of the table. What,sou do then 
is you go to a conservatorship by going to probate court and having a committee 
or guardian appointed to handle all this man's money so he can't buy an airline 
ticket. I don't know how you gentlemen feel, but I think the legal side would 
say you can't commit this man because he's not dangerous. Would you agree 
gentlemen? 
DR. RUBEN: My opinion is that it obviously depends on the jurisdiction. In 
Connecticut they have just reframed the commitment statutes to include imminently 
dangerous, in the physical sense or gravely disabled, and therefore, I would 
institute the 16 day emergency certificate and put him in the hospital during 
which time he could perhaps get treatment started. Obviously a manic state is 
very treatable. We might be able to get him under control and then into out-
patient treatment and never have to go into a conservator proceeding although 
perhaps he would have to go for a longer term commitment if his manic illness was 
intractible. 
MR. PROSSER: Let us realize something about commitment and safeguards. These 
safeguards are there to protect the innocent just as the criminal law safeguards 
are there to protect the innocent. Everyone in this audience is fully aware of 
the abuses which are inherent in our commitment proceedings. We have someone 
we don't want hanging around so we commit him. If he were rich, he'd be eccentric, 
but he's not. We're uncomfortable, so we commit him. We don't want Uncle Harry 
spending our inheritance which we're going to get when Uncle Harry dies so we 
commit him. These are the reasons we fight so hard for these constitutional 
safeguards. Quite often it appears as though the legal profession is at logger-
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heads with the medical profession. But if you think behind the reasons for our 
fight, I think you can accept the reasons why we are fighting. Another question? 
QUESTION: I would like to know how often you really see'that happen. Does that 
really happen? Is that your data? Have there been studies? I'm talking about 
the 1970's. 
MR. PROSSER: All right. I'm going to ask either Mr. Barber or Mr. Bruton because 
my field is mental retardation not mental illness. I can't ~espond. Do you 
gentlemen want to say anything about tha~~ 
MR. BARBER: Well my field is mental retardation, too, but I suggest that it 
might come not in the form of fighting to keep a patient out but suing the doctor 
that put him in there. There's a lot of law being made in that direction. 
MR. BRUTON: At the risk of blowing a good portion of my speech, I think it's fair 
to say that since the first of October of last year I've had nine different 
individuals come into my legal office in Louisville with stories of having their 
rights violated in treatment in mental institutions, both private and public. Of 
the nine people, and I checked out the story, six of them had really substantial 
deprivation of rights by the standards that I'm going to talk to you about today. 
That's just my personal knowledge within the last 9 months. 
MR. PROSSER: The situation is this. In Fayette County, in Je~;erson County, in 
our major popluation centers, we may not have the problem as seriously as it is 
in these rural counties where if the power structure ~oesn't want someone in 
their county or their community and they cannot find a criminal charge to bring 
against him, they'll say this guy's loony and ship him off to Eastern State 
Hospital. Eastern State will say there's nothing wrong with this man and send 
him back, but he is still taken out of the community and his constitutional rights 
have been violated. We cannot judge Kentucky by Lexington. It happens all the 
time. 
QUESTION: I can give you a more precise illustration than that. I represented 
a lady who had filed a suit for divorce against her husband in eastern Kentucky. 
He had her committed. 
MR. PROSSER: So you see it still happens. The 19th century is still with us in 
a lot of areas. 
QUESTION: Let's hear the rest of this case. Did the physicians at the hospital 
to which this person was committed then conspire in this criminal way with the 
husband or did they behave as responsible people and release the patient when it 
was adjudged that she did not need to be there? 
MR. PROSSER: Do you feel you would have a cause of action against the doctor who 
conspired in this commitment? 
QUESTION: No, No. 
MR. PROSSER: How did the husband proceed in this commitment proceeding? 
QUESTION: He went to the county court and got statements from two doctors which 
was the proceeding under our statutes. So he proceeded legitimately under the 
statutes but the room for abuse was there. 
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HR. PROSSER: All right, the lady was incarcerated for a week; in effect she was 
in jail for a week although the jail was labeled hospital. That's the thing we're 
talking about, fighting these abuses. Is there another question? 
I QUESTION: There were two references to physical evidence. I wonder if we might 
have a definition? 
MR. BARBER: When this mental health statute was written there was a lot of 
reference in this state as to the other case law. In correspondence with the 
Attorney General from the state of Missouri and also the attorneys that are 
involved in the Lessard case up in Wisconsin t~e feeling was generated that you 
would have to have some type of overt threat or some type of overt action on the 
I 
part of the individual before the doctor would be able to say substantial threat 
of immediate danger to self or others as is defined under the statute. The 
courts are not too specific on exactly what would constitute an oyert threat or 
what fact situation would constitute an overt threat or exactly what type of 
physical activity would have to take place. In order to help explore this problem, 
before the mental health law was adopted here in Kentucky in April of this year, 
there was a national conference on mental health law focusing on dangerousness and 
incompetency. We brought in experts for 450 people to listen in the southern 
part on Indiana right across the bridge from Kentucky. We tried to get some type 
of working definition of what type of act and what type of statements would 
implement this type of statute. We simply weren't able to do it. The experts 
that we brought in at that time--including the man that's the head of the center 
for behavioral studies of violence at the University of California at Los Angeles--
basically indicated that you have to go on a case by case basis. I believe that's 
What's being done in the major hospitals in Kentucky at this time. I really feel 
totally incompetent on giving you specific facts or specific statements that would 
have to be made by an individual before you trigger the statute. 
MR. PROSSER: Mr. Barber has admitted incompetence but he's not dangerous. We 
can't commit him this morning. One more question then we'll go on to the next 
speaker. 
QUESTION: Doesn't the decision or opinion on the part of the doctors to commit 
a person depend upon the philosophical outlook of the doctor on the subject. For 
example, you have a close case of dangerousness and one psychiatrist will say 
"Yes, that person should be committed" and another psychiatrist will say no. 
Doesn't it depend on the philosophical outlook in many instances of the doctor? 
DR. WEITZEL: I'd like to make two points in response to that. One, I'm amazed 
at how many of my colleagues are unaware of the details of the commitment law 
under which we operate. I think some of us are uninformed when we react to a 
crisis situation. Two, I think Dr. Ruben has already stated that we as a profes-
sion tend to be overly cautious and when in doubt do what we would consider the 
safest thing. We'll find out later this morning if we'd be more culpable for 
allowing someone whom we thought was likely to commit suicide and. whose family 
brought him in for an evaluaticn to be committed than we could be if we didn't 
act. 
.................. ---------------------
MALPRACTICE HAZARDS IN PSYCHIATRY 
Oliver Grant Bruton Jr., J.D. 
Middleton, Reutlinger and Baird 
Louisville, Kentucky 
There was a time when psychiatrists and psychologists appeared to be 
avoiding the malpractice claim explosion and were high up on the most favored 
list of medical malpractice insured. Various reasons were given for this. My 
private hunch is that there is a very real correlation between doctor-patient 
contact and the willingness of patients to file suit. It's no coincidence that 
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the highest risk category of medical malpractice defendants are those super 
specialists who have very little contact with the patient; anesthesiologists, 
neurosurgeons, and so forth. Almost by definition psychologists and psychiatrists 
establish personal contact with their patients. In spite of this, these prac-
titioners are now finding themselves in court with greater frequency. A study 
of published cases involving psycmatrists was made, and we can see how the 
trend is growing. From 1931 to 1940 three of such cases were found. From 1941 
to 1950, seven. From 1951 to 1961, nine were found. From 1961 to 1970, 25 were 
found. And I would bet that the number of cases will increase in the same pro-
portion in the decade of the '70's. Again, this increase in not surprising when 
one considers that about half of the hospital beds in the entire county are 
occupied by mental patients. One article I read established the number to be 
at about 750,000, but I couldn't determine the source of those figures although 
I gather Dr. Weitzel can confirm that 50 percent figure. 
Compared to the many, many cases involving other types of physicians, 
published cases involving psychiatrists are few and far between. The best col-
lection I've found so far is 99 A.L.R.2d 599. The title of the annotation is 
"Malpractice Liability with respect to Diagnosis and Treatment of Mental Disease." 
I suppose every physician or practitioner will become voluble on the 
subject of why his special-ty is so vulnerable to attack by lawyers. Psychia-
trists are no different. They complain that the legal profession constantly 
requires them to steer between Scylla and Charybdis. For example, there are 
several cases which hold, particularly with respect to voluntary suicidal patients, 
that failure to restrain them may be malpractice. Yet there are other cases 
which hold that improper confinement or supervision can be characterized as 
battery or false imprisonment. Because of this, reams have been written in 
psychiatric journals about the benefits to be obtained from an open door policy 
of returning the patient to the community. Yet when this is done and the patient 
injures himself or injures someone else here come the summonses. 
Every physician and most lawyers are aware of the importance of the 
informed consent of the patient before a course of treatment is begun. Yet in 
many instances the psychiatrist's patient is incapable of giving informed consent, 
and there's no time in emergency situations to go through commitment procedures 
whereby someone else can give a legally binding consent. As we've seen up to 
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now even the commitment procedures themselves are traps for the psychiatrist. 
Keep in mind that all these malpractice cases arise and are tried in the brilliant 
light of hindsight. If, for example, a patient contends tha~ he was falsely 
imprisoned and wants money for it, he can put on an awfully good appearance, con-
vince a jury or a judge that he's very meek and mild, and they can really wonder 
how the doctor concluded that he was dangerous. I submit to you, these recent 
cases we've just discussed to the contrary notwithstanding, that there can be 
no beyond reasonable doubt criteria with respect to diagnosis of whether a pa-
tient is confinable or dangerous, whatever tha~ means. 
In my view some of the reasons for the confused body of law that re-
lates to psychiatrists and psychologists is illustrated by the title of this 
talk., "Malpractice Hazards in Psychiatry." The implication from the word mal-
practice is professional negligence. This is something we lawyers know something 
about. Normally, the precedents, the analogies, and so forth are made by other 
physicians who fail to abide by a standard of care. Unfortunately the psychia-
-tris-ts, and the psychologist' s exposure goes way beyond negligence. Witness all 
these false imprisonment cases, the cases for defamation, the cases for battery. 
Of course, there are also many cases that fit within the classic 
malpractice pattern, but I submit to you, that they'll be falling off in the 
future. These are the electroshock therapy cases, the insulin shock,.cases, and 
wet pact treatment. Electroshock therapy involves a real risk of violent mus-
cular reaction. Bones get broken, people die. Insulin shock cases and wet pack 
treatment cases are similar. But in these type of cases we can and do have the 
usual expert testimony relating to standards of care. I hope these claims will 
be falling off, because I hope with the discovery of new drugs that these types 
of therapy will be used less and less often and, to express a layman's predilection, 
I hope they will go the way of frontal loqotomy. 
Most of the cases that are tried are the ones that result from injuries caused 
by mental patients either to themselves or to others. The usual allegation is that the 
physician is negligent in failing to supervise treatment or to restrain the patient. 
It's in this type of case that the psychiatrist is heard to wail "What do you want from 
me?" It may be determined that it would be a good thing to keep a depressed patient in 
a closed ward, or it might not be good for him. So they put him in an open ward, and 
jumps out the window. It isn't hard to create a jury issue on the subject, and if you 
have a jury issue, you will have laymen hearing conflicting theories of treatment. If 
you have a serious injury, you will have a possibility of a substantial jury verdict. 
Medical malpractice lawyers have noted the weakening of the so-called 
locality rule. The time was when, for the benefit of the practitioners in the 
boondocks, the courts held that a physician would be held to the standard of care 
for his community and not necessarily the more sophisticated standards of care 
in the country. The locality rule is now in disrepute and that protection for the 
under-informed physician is falling away_ However, more often than not a psychia~ 
tristwill want to invoke standards of practice that developed in other communities 
as a rationale for treatment that is unfamiliar to the community. Everyone knows 
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psychiatrists shuffle themselves around the country quite a bit. Mr. Barber and 
I, for example, are taking opposite sides in a case where therapy for drug addicts 
developed in communities other than Louisville is an issue. 'You'd better believe, 
Mr. Barber, that we will invoke national standards of care i~ our proof. 
In addition, there are other precedents which I contend are misapplied 
in the realm of psychiatric malpractice. All of us know that with a little 
application and a little discovery' we can make a jury issue out of failure to 
warn. But what is a psychiatrist supposed to do? Does he tattoQ a warning on 
the patient's head? 
Keep in mind that because of the unjustified stigma which is attached 
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to mental illness, psychiatrists are getting exposed to claims that other 
specialists don't worry about too much. One psychiatrist--to give you another 
example--failed to note when he was writing a report about a pa:t,ient that the 
patient was a junior. A patient with a similar name but who wasn't a junior, 
sued him for defamation. In another case the doctor wrote what was alleged in a 
lawsuit to be a derrogatory letter about a patient's condition. It was used by 
a hostile spouse. The doctor got hit with a libel suit. 
The most tears are shed by psychoanalysts who think they are doing the 
right thing and then are told by a court that they are not. In Hammer v. Rosen, 
165 N.E.2d 756, (N.Y. 1960) Dr. Rosen had achieved considerable sU'cc~ss with 
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schizophrenic patients by the device of lowering himself to their level in 
order to communicate with them. In this case even though the doctor denied it 
not too convincingly, there was evidence that the patient was actually beaten 
by the doctor. The appeals court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the 
malpractice charge and even held that the plaintiff did not need expert testi-
mony in that case. 
Another bad case, in my view, came from England. Landow v. Warner, 
March 7, 1961. There the physician employed the transfer phenomenon, the es-
tablishment of a close personal relationship with his patient, to the extent 
that by most people's definition his patient fell in love with him. This isn't 
.m uncommon in psychiatric practice. However, the doctor made the mistake of 
.n extending this relationship beyond the analyst's couch and had social contact 
h with his patient. The court held him liable for this, failing, in my view, to 
realize that the psychologist's therapy can't always be confined to the office. 
Don't get me wrong. I don't mean to condone cases where a psychiatrist took ad-
vantage of his relationship and seduced the patient. There are several of those. 
In Zipkin v. Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. 1969), for example, it might be said 
that there were sufficient grounds to uphold a jury's award against a psychia-
triist. During therapy the patient realized she felt nothing for her husband or 
her family and transferred her affection to Dr. Freeman. She became more and 
more involved with her doctor, went to parties with him, and tried group 
therapy, including a nude swimming party. On overnight trips Dr. Freeman under-
took to advise her on how to handle an inheritance. He advised her to leave 
her husband and allowed her to move to his farm, part of which was purchased 
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with her money. He finally told her to divorce her husband and told her that 
in order to rid herself of hostility she should break into her husband's home 
and steal a desk and two beds and take them to the doctor's home. Later she 
stole some suits and a television~ set for the doctor. Unfortunately, Dr. Freeman's 
therapy didn't work. By the time of the trial Mrs. Zipkin still had the head-
aches she complained of when the therapy began and she still rejected people and 
she still had guilt feelings. I don't think anyone will weep too many tears 
for Dr. Freeman although, as I'll point out a little later on, you might weep 
a few tears for his malpractice insuror because it wound up having to pay the 
judgment. 
So pity the poor practitioner. Not only is he exposed to the classic 
type of malpractice claim, but he also has to answer for defamation, false im-
prisonment, libel, failure to warn, and quite often superhuman powers of pre-
diction are being required of him after the patient injures himself or injures 
someone else. In addition, there are many different standards of care and 
conduct and to add to the psychiatrist's woes, the claims that are made are 
usually so bizarre that the insurance companies get skittish and start looking 
at the policy in an effort to avoid liability. Unfortunately, the policies 
are written for other types of physicians. The usual policy has a hospital 
professional liability language and obligate the insurance company-to pay and 
defend suits for "damages because of injuries of any person arising out of 
the rendering of or failure to render during the policy period the following 
professional services: medical, surgical, dental, or nursing treatment, fur-
nishing or dispensing of drugs, etc. That doesn't quite fit. I was looking 
at one file the other day and I saw this under exclusions: "liability of an 
insured for his personal acts or omissions of a professional nature." This 
appears to me to unravel in the exclusions paragraph what the coverage of the 
paragraph was supposed to omit. Most insurance agents will as a matter of 
course strike that exclusion. But if they don't, it makes you wonder what 
premiums are paid for. 
Additional problems arise when the policy is written, as it usually 
is, in conjunction with the general premises coverage. Any of us who deal in 
insurance know that nowadays for premises coverage, or for automobile coverage 
for that matter, the insured event is an occurrance and an occurrence is defined 
in terms of an accident neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of 
the insured. This clause was put in to exclude coverage for a conscious, will-
ful act. I had occasion to examine the history of that clause in Continental 
Insurance Co. v. Hancock, 507 S.W. 146 (Ky. 1974). The general idea of this 
clause was to give expression to strong public policy often announced that a 
person should not be allowed to insure against a willful tort unless the language 
is very plain. Unfortunately, the language isn't very plain in some of these 
insurance contracts that are purchased for psychiatrists. For example, unlike 
the surgeon who didn't mean to leave the sponge in his patient's abdomen, many 
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claims are made against psychiatrists and psychologists with the allegation that 
there was an injury or there was an occurrence based on a conscious course of con-
duct, and that the psychiatrist meant this to happen. Punitive damages are asked, 
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and that's when the insurors start getting nervous. They remember the first 
opinion in Hancock where the Court of Appeals adopted the rule that punitive 
damages are not covered under an ordinary insurance policy. They now hold, how-
ever, that you are covered for punitive damages if those punitive damages arise 
as a result of gross negligence. There is a big question now as to whether you 
are covered for punitive damages if it is all~ged and proved .that the damages 
were the result of a willful act. Many claims that I'~e seen made against a 
psychiatrist usually include a punitive damage count, and therefore you usually 
get a letter of noncoverage fromyourinsuror. Just as a practical matter I ad-
vise you psychiatrists and psychologists to make it plain to your insurance 
agents that you want coverage tailor-made to your profession and not pieced to-
gether from coverages for other types of activities. 
Finally on the subject of insurance most mental health services in 
our state are rendered by agencies of the commonwealth. As we all know, the 
commonwealth is protected by soverign immunity, but individual physicians, 
administrators, etc., cannot draw the cloak of sovereign immunity around them, 
and our enlightened state government still does not buy insurance for.~hem. I 
consider this to be shocking. However, despite all these gloomy insurance prob-
lems I might remind you of Zipkin v. Freeman. That case wap not a review of 
the judgment that I knew Ms. Zipkin obtained against Dr. Freeman. It was gar-
nishment proceedings where they attached his insurance policy. Fortunately 
for Dr. Freeman his policy covered him for claims based "on professional ser-
vices rendered by the insured." Over a rather vigorous dissent the Supreme 
Court of Missouri decided that Dr. Freeman was covered because there was some 
relationship with what he said was "professional services." 
Having hung the crepe, let me assure you as a practical matter that 
psychiatrists make poor targets in a lawsuit. It's still fact that it's awfully 
hard as a practical matter for a plaintiff to make a case against a psychiatrist 
and psychologist. There are many practical reasons why these cases are so few 
and far between. Often a claimant is ashamed to bare his soul in court. It's 
awfully difficult to show very real emotional damages in a way that the jury 
will believe it. The plaintiffs themselves are not very attractive people. 
They're crazy, they're junkies, or they have some other stigma justified or un-
justified. But assuming the plaintiff takes the bit in his teeth and files 
a suit, he still has a hard way to go. To begin with there is a lack of de-
finitive standards by which the courts can tell the jury they can find one way 
or the others that rights were violated. This is particularly true with respect to 
standards for diagnostic negligence. For example, in Baker v. U.S., 226 F.Supp. 129 
(S.D. Iowa, 1964), a known suicidal was assigned to an open ward and he jumped 
out the window. The court held in effect that assigning him to an open ward 
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was a calculated risk which the doctor as a matter of law is entitled to take. 
A directed verdict was entered. 
Another problem is the problem of privileged communication. In Kentucky, 
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communications between a psychologist and a patient are absolutely privileged. 
They got that in when they put in their psychologists' review law. But when I 
tried to get a similar privilege for a patient and a psychiatrist, the legis-
lature wouldn't go along, so communications between a psychiatrist and a patient 
are only conditionally privileged. In any event, the plaintiff has an awfully 
hard time trying to find willing witnesses and finding records which will sub-
stantiate his side of the case. 
On, the other hand the defendant can and usually does find a convincing 
witness that will solemnly testify that just about any course of conduct including 
beatings and wet pack treatments, has the approval of some school of thought or 
another in the profession, and they can usually sound pretty convincing about it. 
Another hurdle that's hard for a plaintiff to jump is proving that some 
bizarre act on the part of the patient was proximately caused by the malpractice 
of the physician. In other words, you have to show not only malpractice but 
you have to show that it was the cause of the injury. If the injury was suf-
fered by the patient himself, our legal concept of volenti non fit injuria--that 
you won't be heard to complain about something you've done to yours.elf--is as 
deeply ingrained in our juries as it is in our courts. If there is some sug-
gestion that a disturbed patient hurt himself, it's awfully hard to hang it on 
the psychiatrist. I don't particularly appreciate that because I think it's rather 
ironic that after many, many years the Court of Appeals of Kentucky finally set 
up guidelines for measuring the standard of conduct of a minor. In other words, 
they gave you guidelines whereby you can gauge whether or not a minor who was 
making a claim was contributorily negligent or not. But I don't know of any 
court that's attempted to give a similar guideline with respect of contributory 
negligence of a patient. In addition, it's well known that psychiatrists are 
not liable if injury results from an error in judgment. They can always come in 
and claim error in judgment. The most extreme case I was able to find involved 
a child who was assaulted by a prematurely released mental patient and the error 
in judgment rationale absolved the defendant. That's Taig v. State, 241 N.Y.S. 
2d 495. (App. Div. 1963). Now the plaintiff's old friend, ~ ipsa loquitur--
the thing speaks for itself,is seldom ever available in this type of case. 
Hammer v. Rosen was the only case I could find, and there are many cases holding 
that things do not speak for themselves in a psychiatric malpractice case. In 
one case in Kentucky, Wilson v. Lehman, 379 S.W.2d 478 (Ky. 1964), the Kentucky 
Court stretched a bit to find there was consent when it was obtained from the 
spouse of the patient and not the patient himself. 
We've heard a lot about commitment. I won't go into it in detail ex-
cept to point out that now commitment has become a quasi-judicial procedure at 
least in Kentucky, and there are cases which grant immunity to psychiatrists if 
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they are acting in the capacity of an official participant to commitment procedures. 
As I said, psychiatrists are not an easy target. I think this is unfortunate de-
spite the horrendous effect that malpractice claims have on the cost of medicine, 
I 
because the threat of malpractice does tend to keep all types of practitioners, 
our own profession included, in line. At least one psychiatrist agrees with me. 
Dr. Hamilton, writing in the Maryland State Medical Journal in an article entitled 
"Malpractice from the Private Practice and Institutional Psychiatric Viewpoint" 
said this~ "the psychiatric practitioner may be tempted to become,lackadaisical 
and cursory in his application of standards aQ~ generally acc~pted medical and 
physical principles to the psychiatric and medical emer~ency which occurs in an 
area for which he is responsible or to a patient in his care." Most psychiatric 
hospitals provide proper medical specialty care by qualified consultants, even 
full time staff members. These persons are not always at hand to. manage emer-
gencies. The fact that one is, being a psychiatrist does not relieve one of 
general medical responsibility as long as one is a licensed practicing physician, 
especially when an emergency situation arises. 
I'd like to conclude with a little commercial or editorial comment. 
In any state in the country, and certainly Kentucky, more money is spent on 
prisoners in correctional institutions than is spent on mental 'patients. Civil 
rights of prisoners in correctional institutions is a developing field~of law 
but development of civil rights of mental patients is lagging far behind. The 
development of rights of mental retardation patients is even behind that. As I 
mentioned, mental retardation is by definition an incurable condition,and yet 
mental retardates are always lumped together with mentally ill patients and their 
programs almost are invariably administered by persons trained to administer to 
the mentally ill, some of whom in my opinion are capable of making the distinction. 
There are several cases imposing liability for the acts of a prematurely 
released patient, but usually these cases arise when the patient has harmed some-
one else. Nowadays hospital administrators make a big thing of returning the 
patient to the community. Often as not in a tort case much expert testimony can 
be marshalled to say that it's a good thing they returned the patient to his family. 
But I think legislative attention ought to be paid to release procedures. I 
think we should be sure that there are community services available for the patient 
before he's released simply to make the hospital statistics look good. I think 
some attention ought to be paid to the welfare of the patient in addition 
to the welfare of the people harmed by the patient prematurely released. Inciden-
tally, there's a good annotation on the liability of a person releasing an insti-
tutionalized patient for the harm he causes to others at 38 A.L.R. 3d 699. 
One or two cases have held that a submissible jury issue was made be-
cause a doctor sent a patient to the wrong hospital. I'd like to see more of 
those cases. Many of our mental institutions are no more than human warehouses. 
If some liability is attached to the sending of people to these places, there 
might be some pressure to upgrade these institutions. It's interesting to note, 
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for example, that the Somerset Institution for Mental Retardation was specifically 
designed to prevent crowding more and more patients in. I think that the pres-
sure or fear perhaps of malpractice suits just might be ?ne way of upgrading these 
warehouses that we've seen like the Frankfort State Hospital. 
With respect to psychiatrists and analysts, I think some attention ought 
to be paid to imposing a fiduciary standard of care on them and not a standard 
made for negligent surgeons and anesthesiologists. While it's been said that 
physicians have a license to commit manslaughter and lawyers'have a license to 
steal, psychiatrists have a license to cOn\rni-t battery and false imprisonment if 
that line of thought be followed. Now the law iSlputting constitutional con-
straints on this license. 
I think it's not without significance that in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 
a damage case with a verdict of $38,500 compensatory damage and $10,000 punitive 
damages was rendered despite the state official's dissent that he was acting in 
good faith reliance on state law when he confined a nondangerous mental 
patient and gave him no treatment. I think the significance of O'Connor v. 
Donaldson is that it is based on a so-called patient's constitutional right to 
liberty. The verdict was reversed, by the way, on the very narrow issue of the 
quasi-immunity of a state official. The fallout from O'Connor may be more damage 
suits such as Whitevee v. State, 290 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Ct. Cl. 1968) .. where a $300,000 
award for illegally confining a patient for 90 percent of 14 years was af-
firmed. I think it should have been. But on the whole I think the fallout will 
be healthy. It was one impetus that caused Kentucky to rewrite its commitment 
act. I would take slight issue with Dr. Ruben. He said he would overpredict. 
I would suggest to you psychiatrists that perhaps if you would err why not err 
on the side of liberty. But I think we all agree, particularly when we still 
use danger as a criterion, that we've got a lot to work on as far as commitment 
is concerned and maybe in time we'll bring our two professions a little closer 
together as was done in Durham v. U.S. when we finally had a workable definition 
of insanity in a criminal case. So I'd like to see more attention paid to the 
constitutional rights of patients to live decentlyonc£they are confined. Will 
it take more damage suits to accomplish this? I hope not. It's an expensive 
way to make the law. Claims are growing in their variety and their volume. 
I hope psychiatrists, psychologists, and lawyers will get some fixed frame of 
reference out of it and maybe some definitive standard of care and treatment. 
MR. PROSSER: The lawyers have problems in the field of malpractice too. Let 
me tell you this about malpractice actions.- It is the responsibility of a res-
ponsible attorney to filter out medical malpractice cases. The fact there are 
attorneys sitting in this audience today I think is indicative of the fact that 
the legal profession is concerned about the increase in medical malpractice 
actions. Over the past 3 years I've had some 50 cases come into my office of 
people wanting to sue a doctor. Out of those 50 cases I've filed 2 lawsuits. 
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One was against a doctor for performing an abortion and one was against an or-
thopedic surgeon. Just yesterday I wrote a man a letter telling him that after 
some month and a half of investigation and analysis of his meaical records we 
cannot represent him in a medical malpractice suit because we' found no mal-
practice. I sent that letter certified return receipt requested because I don't 
want him coming after me claiming that I didn't do a good job either. In ad-
dition, over in Louisville there is a case in which a doctor is suing a lawyer 
because the attorney took on a client who fell out of a hospital ¥indow and he 
sued the doctor. The case was dismissed when_~iscovery disclosed that the pa-
tient had been on a furlough, came back to the hospital drunk, and then fell out 
, 
the window. This to me is probably an indication of' irresponsibility on the 
lawyer's part since he didn't do the appropriate discovery before he filed 
suit. Sometimes someone will walk in and say, "I've got this great medical 
malpractice suit. Tomorrow is the last day of the statute of limitations." If 
someone came into my office like that, I'd tell them,well they'd better spend 
the rest of the afternoon finding another lawyer. Attorneys are working on 
the filtering process. You in the medical profession I'm sure are not aware of 
statistics. None have ever been kept as to the number of people who go run-
ning out convinced that they've got a problem that is medical malpractice and 
the legal profession precludes a suit because they refuse to file it,.. We'll 
take a little time for questioning now. 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
QUESTION: I'd like to respond to a couple of remarks you made. It troubles me 
when you indicate that maybe one of the ways to improve our state hospital sys-
tem is to threaten the psychiatrist with more suits. I'm reminded of Wyatt v. 
Stickney, I believe, or Wyatt v. Alderholt. A number of these class action suits 
started out with the psychiatrist administrators going along with them. I guess 
they were called sweetheart suits or something like that. Then things suddenly 
started to go wrong. The psychiatrist became the scapegoat it seemed to me. 
I remember in the Alabama case, Judge Johnson found in favor of upgrading the 
facilities and wrote some standards after getting a lot of input from various 
people nationwide, and Governo~ Wallace then refused to give them the money. 
I mean it was not the psychiatrist, it was the state government. Then, of course, 
Judge Johnson threatened to take Alabama state lands and sell them, if I remember 
correctly. On Donaldson v. O'Connor I think the rest of your story is that the 
damage suits were reversed because the criteria was stated that a doctor couldn't 
be held accountable for standards that would take effect in the future. I think 
it was something like that. But I want to make the point that psychiatrists 
work in a social context. In a way we can only do as much as we're allowed. You 
made the remark earlier,Mr. Prosser,about the bell and salivating. I think it 
also works in terms of batting you head up against a wall. I think a awful lot 
of people who work in the state mental hospital find themselves repeatedly stymied 
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in implementing new and improved programs if in no other way in terms of funding. 
My final remark will be in terms of your law, Mr. Barber, which was re-
cently passed. I thought there were an awful lot of important changes. I was 
, 
very interested in it. But there didn't seem to be many other people interested. 
There was nothing in our Lexington paper about it. I really feel that the people 
we're talking about today are really the disenfranchised minority or one of the 
important ones in our society. Not very many people speak up too often for the 
mentally ill people. So that law went through and I felt there was a lot of 
yawning going on. Most people didn't care.' 
MR. PROSSER: The fact is that it isn't very newswo~thy. I was in the journalism 
profession and frankly a murder trial seems much more interesting than what's going 
on here today although what I s going on here today is going to have a .much more far 
reaching effect than whe·ther or not the jury comes back with a guilty verdict. 
DR. RUBEN: I have several comments. By and large I agree with the remarks that 
you made, Mr. Bruton. One thing I would like to clarify is my comment about over-
prediction. When I overpredict, it doesn't necessarily mean I involuntarily 
hospitalize. I too am quite concerned about the patient's right to liberty, but 
in terms of overpredicting, the dangerousness of the clinical state of the patient 
is also important and as long as I'm concerned and sensitive to the fact that the 
patient may be dangerous, then I think that I won't be perhaps rnis::;ing dangerous 
people and letting them slip through and not taking appropriate action which might 
lead to hospitalization, but surely not necessarily. 
One of the other comments that I would like to make in relation to your 
mention of ECT, wet packs, and insulin shock therapy is your statement that you 
will be glad when they're no longer in use. This is quite an unfortunate sit-
uation. As Dr. Weitzel mentioned,ECT is appropriate in certain emergency psy-
chiatric situations. There's no question that ECT has been overused to some 
degree in the past and there have been times when people perhaps have been in-
jured because of the use of ECT. What this led to ultimately was the Cali-
fornia legislature last year passing laws that said that you could not do ECT 
without some sort of review board and setting up very stringent guidelines so 
that it's virtually impossible to have ECT performed in the state of California, 
in spite of the fact that there's good medical evidence that for certain specific 
illnesses such as the most severely depressed and catatonic excitement, for in-
stance, that you would use ECT. Wet packs are putting the patient in cool wet 
sheets, wrapping them up and letting them be in cool wet sheets. At Yale 
Psychiatric Institute, for instance, which is a long term hospitalization fa-
cili ty for the most severely psychotic individuals, wet packs are s·till used on oc-
casion when we have people who are recalcitrant to drug treatment. Obviously we 
use psychotropic medication when possible, but there are times when the patient 
cannot tolerate the drugs for medical reasons and wet packs are used. I've never 
known of a patient to suffer from wet packs. With ECT it's true that in the past 
a number of people suffered physical injuries such as fractures. Currently when 
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ECT is administered, muscle relaxants are given so that the patient doesn't have 
the severe violent seizure that they used to have before the advent of the muscle 
relaxant usage. So I think the physical injuries under ECT are quite rare now. 
I do agree that at times it's overused and it has been overused in the past. But 
I think its judicious use is still called for in certain instances. 
MR. BRUTON: I didn't mean to intrude on your profession and to rule them out. I 
know they are still being used, but i~ for example, Congress can mandate that tech-
nology arise that will make automobiles burn cleaner, should not t~ere be that 
kind of an emphasis to find other less danger~~s physiological drugs for treat-
ment than electric shock therapy. 
DR. RUBEN: Obviously I agree, and I think it is not a procedure without risk, but 
I think that there are times that are quite appropriate for ECT and other types of 
treatment. The problem in what's happened is just what you're alluding to: that 
we take from one area, consumer protection, and decide. that consumer protection 
then applies to medical treatment. I don't like having to deal with people where I 
don't understand what's going on in relation to my car or my t.v. set, and I'd like 
protection. I think by the same token medical patients deserve protection. But I 
think it's gone too far when you have to go to a judicial review body in California 
to see whether or not a certain medical treatment is indicated. 
There are two more comments that I wanted to bring up. One was a proB-
lem that you alluded to, situations in which the insurance ~ompany decides to 
settle a matter out of court when in fact the physician believes that he has not 
committed any negligent act, would be willing to go to court, and feels quite 
certain that he would be able to prove his innocence. But unfortunately the 
insurance company settles. I've seen that this is an increasing problem re-
cently. 
MR. BRUTON: Most medical malpractice policies have a clause in them that settle-
ment cannot be achieved without the consent of the insured. But we lawyers are 
pragmatists, and we know that a jury can't always understand the fine issues, so 
sometimes we advise a settlement. 
DR. RUBEN: Just one other issue, too. I wanted to ask a question. The 1972 
Social Security amendments that established the PSRO, the Professional Standards 
Review Organizations, also had a civil immunity clause in them that I'm sure you're 
aware of and that I know has been hotly debated. I wonder what your opinion is 
about this civil immunity clause as it might pertain to malpractice suits in the 
future. 
MR. BRUTON: In Kentucky you cannot have this type of civil immunity; it must be 
a federal mandate solely. It might tend to decrease the cost of medicine, and 
that's the only reason I'm in favor of that provision. On the other hand, I am 
firmly convinced that the threat of suits is something that should be kept in the 
background to keep all our professions honest. 
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PROTECTED RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS 
Oliver H. Barber, Jr., J.D. 
Gittleman, Charney and Fitzgerald 
Louisville, Kentucky 
When Dr. Weitzel and I set up this program, I suggested that I go last 
because I felt that by that time, between Mr. Bruton and Dr. Weitzel, I would have 
enough rebuttal to keep me going. Fortunately, I agree with most of what Dr. 
Weitzel says. Although Mr. Bruton is a mean old defense attorney 'most of the 
time and I am attempting to become a mean old plaintiff's attorney, we agree on 
some of the things that he had to say this morning. Whj3,t I would try to do is 
focus on that which I know best, the patient's rights when individual patients 
i ',: 
are inv~lved in psychiatric settings. As the program indicated and as was 
dutifully read to you by Mr. Prosser, I was staff attorney for a forensic 
psychiatric unit here in the state of Kentucky. Translated that means that I'm 
one of the very few attorneys I know who was paid to spend ti'me inside a mental 
In 1973 at the time I was on that staff, I was part of the treatment 
team actively involved in the treatment process as a staff attorney and patient's 
advocate. I spent a full year in that capacity. 
I try to divide patient's rights into two areas. The first area is commibnent 
and the rights of individuals as they face the commitment procee,dings. I'll 
little bit about that because that hasn't been touched on this morning. 
also spend some time talking about the second area, the rights of individuals 
are in institutions. 
If my 4 years in the Army in The Judge Advocate General's corps as an active 
anything at all, it taught me that when giving a speech the 
is best: you tell them what you are going to tell them, tell them, and 
them what you told them. Following that rule I'll tell you that I have 
one sentence that if I can get across to you I think will sum up what I 
say. Each individual who's involved in the psychiatric-legal process has 
rights that you and I have no matter what has happened to him or what 
of psychosis or what degree of bizarre behavior he was involved in. He 
has the full panoply of every right that you think is accorded to you, 
to him. Only after procedural process rights have been established and 
may certain things be taken away from an individual patient. Primarily 
are concerned with the freedom of movement and the freedom to harm someone 
In the state of Kentucky the seminal decision that generated the institu-
the new mental health law that we have was a decision by Judge Alan, 
v. True, decided in February of 1975. In this case a man named Terry 
felt that his wife was acting very bizarrely. He claimed that she was 
around in the park in the wee morning hours without any clothes on, that 
being hostile, and wasn't taking care of their baby. He took out a mental 
warrant to have her committed for 60 days to River Ridge Hospital in 
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Louisville, Kentucky. In talking with her defense attorney, Curtis Stuckey, at 
legal aid in Louisville, I discovered that Mr. Stuckey's theory is that what Terry 
Kendall was doing was projecting his particular aberations on his wife. Mrs· Kendall 
went down, got herself a legal aid attorney, and went into court to contest the 
whole civil commitment procedure. During the course of contesting the procedure 
one section of the statute was thrown out because it didn't have the rights of 
confrontation, the right to have a hearing before the 60 days were initiated, and 
also because in the judge's opinion it didn't have a standard for dangerousness 
built into the statute. As a result of that Elecision there .have been quite a few 
changes in the procedural due process rights here in ~entucky which I think are 
mirroring the procedural due process rights all across the United States. For 
example, in order to commit someone in Kentucky for longer than 72 hours, there 
has to be a full court hearing. When I say a full court hearing,I mean you have 
to have an attorney present representing the individual patient, and you have to 
have the doctor or doctors present and testifying unless that is waived by the 
individual and his or her attorney. You also have to have a final and full 
de-termination of -the case by the judge. By that I mean that the court would have 
to determine in accordance with the statute upon completion of the hearing that 
the individual is (a) mentally ill, (b) because of his or her illness presents an 
immediate threat of danger to self or others--and we've already had .some discussion 
to that-- (c) that the least restrictive alternative mode of threatment requires 
hospitalization, and (d) that the treatment which can reasonably benefit the 
respondent is available in the hospital. 
Breaking that down a little bit, some of the changes that have been brought 
this law came from Lessard v. Schmidt 379 F.Supp. 1379 (E.D. Wisc. 1974); vacated 
421 U.S. 957 (1975), or at least some of those concepts did. One of -the concepts 
in there and also in Kendall v. True is that the patient has a right to be in the 
courtroom and has the right to confront his or her accuser. I have heard the 
argument time and time again that you should not take the patient into the court-
room because most of the time it is detrimental to the individual's mental condition. 
I do not buy that argument. At the time that I went to work for the forensic 
psychiatric unit there was that requirement in the Kentucky law, but it could be 
waived by the doctor through certain magic language such as "it's not in his best 
interest." At that time approximately 30 patients a month were going throught the 
civil commitment process from the forensic psychiatric unit. None of them were 
ever given an opportunity to confront the doctors or the accusers or to under-
stand 1i17hat the judge had to say. The staff was plagued by innumerable questions 
of why am I here, nobody has ever taken me to court, nobody has ever ruled on me, 
my rights are being violated. We changed it all around. In the past 2 years 
there has only been one patient that the doctors have said was so psychotic, so 
disoriented, or so ill, that it would be harmful to that patient to take him into 
the courtroom. Consistently, it has proven to be beneficial to the patients to 
know what is going on with their case. 
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Another facet of the rights that are protected under our statute and which are 
accorded in all the state statutes or at least should be is that each individual 
at any stage of civil commitment beyond 30 days, 72 hours, 3 days, or 48 hours 
, 
should have an attorney. I was just commenting to Dr. Ruben that one of my major 
theses is that the biggest problem that I see in the civil commitment process 
other than the situation where two doctors agree that an individual should be 
hospitalized without ever seeing him is that most of the time there is not an 
articulate, well-informed counsel willing to represent the individual rights of 
a patient at the hearing. It is well known that mental health law does not 
pay. It was stated here this morning that no one was i~terested in the passage 
of the Kentucky mental health law of 1976. It's further felt that these people 
are basically disenfranchised. I believe that after the emergency commitment 
of 72 hours when you come to the hearing, if at the hearing you have the patient, 
you have a patient's attorney who is reasonably well-informed on psychiatric 
jargon, reasonably well-informed on what is going on with the patient, and is 
willing to act as the patient's attorney--not just accept what the doctor says--
and you have two psychiatrists who are willing to testify as to their opinion 
based upon observable facts that they had seen or read in the file, and a reason-
ably competent judge who is willing to make the decision, then from there on 
many of the problems that you would have on habeas corpus actions or"v..tolations 
of rights actions would fade. I further contend that if you follow this concept 
and work together on the front end as doctors and as lawyers for well-informed 
members of the bar, for a well-informed physician and a well-informed judiciary 
and put this money on the front end, that it would save a lot of money in the long 
run. Money would not be expended for lawsuits, money would not be expended for 
treatment that doesn't work because the patients are recalcitrant, hostile, upset, 
and staff time would also be saved. 
One of the things that I think it is necessary to understand concerning 
patient's rights is some of the history of the patient's rights concept. You've 
heard a rather chilling narrative, at least from my standpoint, from Dr. Weitzel 
this morning concerning the evolution of the civil commitment laws in the United 
States. Initially the individual who was "insane" in old England was made a ward 
of the King. I think you'll find, however, if you read some recitations of how 
this worked that only those individuals who had some land and who "went berserk" 
or weren't able to care for themselves or their land came under the king's wing. 
This concept come down through the law and through the medical profession and was 
translated into something called parens patriae here in the United States. 
At the same time that he was writing this article in 1960 or a few years 
thereafter a man named Kenneth Donaldson had some kind of falling out with his 
father, and he was hospitalized at the state hospital at Chattahoochee, Florida, 
which is a huge place. It is, if you'll pardon my statement, one of the largest 
mental hospitals in the world outside the Soviet Union. At the Chattahoochee 
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Hospital he was placed on the forensic psychiatric ward. As you read his account 
of his trials and tribulations, which was in the Fifth Circuit opinion, you'll find 
that he says that he spend every night before he went to bed praying that some of 
the crazy people in there who were charged with very serious crimes would leave 
him alone so that he would be able to wake up in the morning. He was a Christian 
Scientist and he refused their medication. He told them that he would partake of 
individual counseling, that he wanted occupational therapy, and that he wanted 
grounds privileges so that he would have an opportunity to pursue what he thought 
were reasonable means to show the individua~~ that he could. live in society. He 
was denied all of these things for a number of years., For example, one of the 
statements in the Fifth Circuit opinion was that over a 10 year period one of the 
staff physicians may have treated him only for approximately 8 hours during this 
10 year period. That doesn't translate to very many minutes per year. 
Evidently, as Mr. Bruton has told you, the jury believed the man and 
after Dr. Morton Birnbaum and the National Mental Health Law Project took the 
case and brought the damages suit, he was released. They dropped the class action 
and he recovered in damages. Then the case went on up through the Fifth Circuit 
where it was affirmed and a constitutional right to treatment was delineated. 
Just as in the Kendall case, Chief Judge Wisdom indicated that parens patriae is 
dead. 
I suggest to you that after the decision was rendered by the Supreme Court 
in Donaldson v. O'Connor 422 U.S. 563 (1975), what you have is a statement that you 
may not simply incarcerate or warehouse a patient in a mental hospital without 
treatment unless there is a showing that that patient is dangerous. Donaldson v. 
O'Connor would take mental hospitals in the state of Kentucky and empty out of 
them every single patient who is not dangerous and whom it cannot be shown is 
receiving adequate treatment for their type of mental illness carried to its logical 
extreme. I further contend that if you take Kendall v. True, apply the precepts 
of the Fifth Circuit opinion--whidh has been overruled to a certain extent--and 
the logical extension of the Donaldson case, then even the dangerous people, if 
they are committed, have to be treated. If you don't do these things, what you 
really have is some kind of preventive detention which has been stricken in court 
decisions in the District of Columbia and elsewhere. 
One of the factors that you have to consider in the treatment concept is 
what type of treatment is good treatment. As has been indicated this morning, 
there are many psychiatrists who would be willing to support various theories, 
behavior modification programs, chemotherapy, and all of the other types of pro-
grams. If you go to ~att v. Stickney you will see listed reams and reams of 
ideas on what are the basic proper treatments, patient staff ratios, what type of 
program should be available to the individual patients and concepts and ideas on 
how to implement those programs. That case had a very interesting genesis. There 
was a new director of the state mental hospital system down in Alabama in 1972, 
Dr. Stonewall Stickney. Dr. Stickney was interested in finding a way to balance 
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his budget. He took a look at the system and said, "What am I paying the most for?" 
He says, "I'm paying the most fOli salary, as in any mental hospital situation. I'm 
obviously not paying the most for the food and the housing of the patients; it's 
for the salaries of my staff. Who makes the most money? The' people that make 
the most money are the psychologists and the psychiatrists and the social workers, 
not bhe aides." He looked at his situation and he said, "I can't fire a whole bunch 
of aides in order to save money because if I do that I'll have nobody to take care 
of the patients. ,I'll have somebody to counsel them and perhaps treat them but 
I'll have nobody to take care of them." So he~ired 150 professionals, social 
workers, psychologists, psychiatrists. When he did th~t,then the professionals 
said, "By George, he's hurting these people's individual treatment programs. We're 
the only treatment programs that the hospital has." In particular this was the 
cry of the psychologists because at that time there was quite a controversy be-
tween the psychologists at the University of Alabama at Tuscaloosa and the psychi-
atrists who were running the hospital. They found a very flamboyant attorney 
from Alabama to come in and bring a lawsuit in the name of Ricky Wyatt. So the 
genesis of this particular lawsuit was not some parading civil rights attorney 
st-rolling through the south looking for wrongs to be r1ghted,but a very simple 
economic issue on the part of the professionals who'd been fired. 
you had those standards that are put forth in Wyatt v. Stickney. 
As a result 
Some of the concepts that we have heard concerning the rights of patients 
have been embodied in recent litigation. Some of the litig~tion would be the 
Lessard case, for example. Those concepts all start with one basic assumption, 
that each patient should be entitled to humane care and treatment to the extent 
that the facilities, equipment, and personnel are available in accordance with 
standards accepted in medical practices. I believe that the quote from the 
Wyatt case is that each patient should receive care or treatment which would give 
them a reasonable opportunity to improve his or her condition. If you start with 
that basic assumption, you start with the concept from the very outset that the 
patient knows he's going into the hospital. Then the patient should be consulted 
immediately concerning the treatment program that he or she is going to be involved 
in. The patient should be adequately and duly informed of what's going to happen 
to him and should be asked to make suggestions in terms of his or her own treat-
ment. It is my contention--and I'm stepping into the realm where Dr. weitzel and 
Dr. Ruben can really get in some licks--that the great majority of people who are 
admitted on a court order to a mental hospital are disoriented, and psychotic, 
seriously disturbed, or whatever you want to call it in only a certain area of 
their ability to see and hear and understand. Most of the people that I've seen 
are not so totally out of it that they can't give you some kind of interaction on 
their program. Those people are the individuals to which this statement applies. 
Thereafter there should be a treatment program drawn which will give some 
type of realistic opportunity to cure or improve the individual patient's health. 
This goes back to the original statement that I made to you concerning the four 
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things that the judge has to find before he decides to commit someone to a hos-
pital. He has to find on medical testimony given in court that the patient can 
reasonably benefit from that hospitalization. There's a h09ker in this state-
ment. The hooker is that in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual you'll find a 
listing of antisocial behavior. It's not called psychopath or sociopath any 
longer. It's antisocial behavior, and it has its own little number like all those 
things in the DSM. 
The individual patient has to be able to be treated to a' certain extent. 
What does that mean? Does that mean that f:l:--'the diagnosis 'is antisocial behavior 
that the individual patient does not belong in a hospital, that where he belongs 
is in the jailor he belongs in prison? That's a very interesting question 
because one of the jobs that I had when I was with the forensic unit was to assist 
the doctors in figuring out a way of releasing a very dangerous individual whom 
they had made a final determination after 6 years was not psychotic, was no longer 
schizophrenic and did not have an organic brain syndrome, but all he was was mean; 
antisocial personality was the final diagnosis. They came to me and said they 
would release this man. I said that under the definition of the statute, the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual would list that as a mental disorder and if it 
lists it as a mental disorder and we release him, you might be violating the 
statute. If you violate the statute, you're going to be in real 'tEouble if he 
kills someone. 
I went to him and I said, "Let's talk about this.'" We talked about it for a 
while. He said he wanted out and didn't care what they called him and that he 
was going to get an attorney to get out. I said that's beautiful. I went back 
to the doctors and said now look, are you reasonably certain that this man is going 
to harm someone else if he's released? They said they were as reasonably certain 
as they could be based on a long history of violent assaultive behavior both 
inside and outside. I was able to find an attorney to represent him and we had 
a habeas corpus hearing. I was able to get enough information on the record to 
protect my doctors. The individual attorney was able to get enough information 
on the record to get his patient out. The patient went out. We got him a room-
mate. He stayed with the male roommate for 2 days, stole a suit of clothes, 
wound up in prison, and I've lost track of him. 
Another aspect of patient's rights inside of a mental institution is that 
I believe that each patient has the right to refuse the treatment program accorded 
to him. That has a caveat on it. If you take Dangerous Joe and put him in the 
hospital and Dangerous Joe goes over and sits down in a chair and starts communing 
with God and God tells him do not take any of this medicine because it is going 
to poison his mind, and Dangerous Joe on the outside assualted all four members 
of his family and was threatening to kill half a dozen neighbors with a gun, but 
he's inside the mental setting and he's not doing anything that's dangerous, simply 
because he's inside that setting, do you have the right against his will to give 
him the thorizene which would help him? 
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In this situation when the staff came to me I said, "Let's work with him for a 
while." They said, "It's a pain; we can't spend all this time with him." I said, 
"Look, it's a whole lot more pain for me going to court and have the judge throw me 
out when I come in because it's not in the statutes to have him order this man to 
take this medication." So they worked with him for 2 weeks and came back to me 
and said you're going to have to go into court. So I got all my petition 
prepared, and I went into court and I submitted it to the judge. I was 
prepared to make my argument and the judge looked at me and said, ,"I'm a Christian 
Scientist, I can't order this." That actually .... happened. He said, "I'll lay it 
over 2 weeks." I said "Judge, it really shouldn't make any difference." He said, 
"I'm a Christian Scientist; I can't handle this." So I went back to my staff and 
said you have to work with him for 2 more weeks because there's nothing I can do. 
The judge won't even listen to me. So I went back 2 days later an,d we sat down and 
I said, "What's the thing that he likes best in the whole world?" They said he liked 
two things best in the whole world, playing bingo with the little girls that come 
over from St. Agnes Parish on Wednesday nights and smoking cigarettes. I said, 
O.K. "Who's providing him the money to buy the cigarettes?" They said "We are." 
I said, "I don't see that the man has a constitutional right to require you to 
give him money to buy cigarettes." So one of the staff members went over to him 
and said that if God tells you you shouldn't take medication then we,'.r~ telling 
you that we're not going to give you any more cigarette money. And furthermore 
you can't play bingo on Wednesday night because that's what,we call an extra 
added attraction. He took it for 2 days then came over and told the staff that 
God had changed his mind. He took the medication, and I didn't have to go back 
into court. 
The object of this story is that in 90 percent of the cases--and that's 
purely my figure, I can't document it except by my own personal experience--there's 
a way to talk the individual into taking the medication or cooperating with the 
treatment program. In 10 percent of the situations where that is not available, 
then hopefully your hospital, be it state or private, will have a responsible" 
aggressive attorney who will try to figure out a way under the present statutes 
or under some type of theory to go into court and try to get the medication order. 
Dr. Weitzel and I discussed this type of fact situation before and there's dis-
agreement on my theory here. One of the countervailing theories is that if you 
place someone in a hospital by a court order who's dangerous, the quid pro quo 
is that you're going to treat them so that they are no longer dangerous. There-
fore you should be required by the original court order to give them the medication 
if that's what it will take. I argue that's stretching it too far. 
One of the aspects of the new mental health law which is not included that 
was included in the Lessard case was the Miranda warning right. I didn't put 
that in there and no one else saw fit to put it in there either, because it was 
my intention that when an individual is admitted to a psychiatric unit, it doesn't 
really make any difference whether or not the psychiatrist spends a lot of time 
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talking to him. If the psychiatrist and/or the treatment team does an adequate 
workup based on information they can get from the outside and spends a significant 
amount of time watching the individual behavior on this particular unit, most of 
, 
the time they should be able to come to some type of feel or some type of informed 
opinion on the case. I've been told this; I've also been told that that's 
ridiculous. 
There's been a particularly aggravating aspect of this problem that just 
occurred here in the state of Kentucky. There was a woman--and all this is in the public 
record--named Charlotte Edwards who was just~ried for murder in Louisville, Ky. 
It appears that she'd had long term psychiatric problems and had been hospitalized 
quite recently. I guess she was hospitalized in the early part of September or 
October. In November or December or so she went out to a local shopping center 
and without having much cause and no connection at all with the individual, she 
shot a Major from Ft. Knox to death. One of the aspects of that case that is 
really tragic from the standpoint of Charlotte Edwards only--I know it was a great 
tragedy to the family of the Major but from her standpoint--she was placed at the 
forensic unit for diagnosis and evaluation. She was extremely paranoid and refused 
to talk with the psychiatrists. She refused to cooperate with them in any way. 
She said she would not cooperate unless her attorney told her to do so. Her 
attorney chose not to do so. One of the contributing factors to her,,_ conviction, 
and what is going to be her subsequent long term incarceration unless there's a 
successful appeal, is the fact that nobody took evidence of the counselors and 
the individual aides at the psychiatric unit concerning her behavior while she 
was on the unit. The psychiatrist took the stand and testified that he, during 
the course of her care there, did not personally observe any psychotic behavior 
or indicia of symptoms of psychosis. That was accurate. And he was not allowed 
to testify concerning other things that other people had seen. I'm not convinced, 
as wild as I may be about patient rights, that the Miranda warning is a good thing. 
I think by and large most of the people who are going to be committed to a 
hospital are going to have the opportunity to talk to someone and they're going 
to do it and I don't think it's really necessary to warn them that whatever they 
say may be used in civil commitment procedure or some other types of civil action 
against them that pertains to their staying in the hospital. 
In conclusion, I want to go back to what I originally stated. Except for 
certain strictures of protecting individuals inside and outside the hospital setting 
from violent behavior by a person and except for certain strictures on movement, 
every single right that you have is reserved to the individual mental patient. 
If you can focus on that concept, I think you'll find that if you apply that con-
cept, you'll have better treatment programs, you'll have more work or individual 
therapy perhaps, but in the long run it'll be a lot less expensive than having to 
deal with me or people like me who are coming from a background of horrendous 
decisions and horrendous fact situations in mental health law who feel it 
necessary -to get involved in litigation in this area. 
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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
MR. PROSSER: Let's open up the questions to the entire panel in case anything has 
come to you. 
MR. BRUTON: When I listened to you talk about all these new ~ights that need to 
be r.espected, I have two responses: (1) Who's going to pay for it? I say that in 
a real way because the way the present system is staffed and funded has to bear 
the brunt of these new agendas. You're going to have even more good people leave 
the system rather than be bogged down in it. I understand, for e~ample, in terms 
of the treatment plan, the development of whi~~ our commited .patients under this 
new law are going to be able to participate, that the Department of Human Resources 
I 
is floating the current idea that within 3 days the patient will be provided 
with the written report of the assessment and the problems in the proposed treat-
ment plan and that the patient at least once a month will be giv~n a written 
progress report which the patient will be able to discuss with the physician. It 
seems an awful lot of new bureaucratic work; I'm afraid there isn't new money 
to pay for that and it discourages me a great deal. 
DR. WEITZEL: Let me answer that new money business. I consider this to be a cop-
out. It's a cop-out that we've heard excusing a multitude of sins and a multitude 
of violations of civil rights. There is a case that I consider to be in point. 
The state of Iowa was sued in district court and the state legislatur.~~ was ordered 
to raise sufficient tax money to provide pupils in special education with the 
type of education to which they were constitutionally entit~ed. So the short 
answer to your question is that the state legislature should pay for it. To say 
we don't have the funds is a cop-out. 
DR. RUBEN: May I comment please? I agree with what you're saying, Mr. Bruton, 
but I also agree with Dr. Weitzel. I myself am quite pessimistic about the current 
political situation in relation to some of these issues. That doesn't mean that 
I'm throwing in the towel or copping-out. For instance, in relation to what Mr. 
Barber just said, I agree with him totally about the problems in the current 
commitment procedures. I think that what he outlined as reasonable procedure I 
too agree is reasonable, but I'm afraid that I see it pessimistically as pie in 
the sky. I don't want it to be that way, and I want to do anything that I can to 
help change it. But the current situation is that in my own experience a great 
number of judges who deal with these matters don't understand enough about psy-
chiatry to understand what the issues are. As you point out, a number of the 
attorneys don't and unfortunately a number of the psychiatrists who come into 
court don't know what they're talking about either. The reason I say that is 
that coming into court is a very unpleasant experience for anyone, and especially for 
a psychiatrist who's supposed to know what he's talking about and yet is dealing 
in intangibles, is dealing in matters of opinion where very frequently you can 
get another psychiatrist who has a different opinion and rightfully so. Most of 
the cases that come in about commitment are coming in from state hospitals. The 
worst of the mental health system unfortunately most of the time shows up in the 
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state hospitals. That's not always the case, but more ~oreigntrained physicians 
who don't speak English adequately--and you know this and I know this,end up in 
the state hospital system--physicians as we've said here, who really don't have 
, 
any idea what our commitment laws are, physicians who don't understand the legal 
issues., Good doctors unfortunately--and I hate to use that term--but I think that 
the most competent physicians are unwilling to go into court a lot of the time. 
In this past month I spent 3 hours in jail interviewing one patient for the public 
defender in New Haven and then I spent about 3 hours writing a report. The 
state of Connecticut only wants to pay $75 for -a psychiatric evaluation, I submitted 
a bill to the public defender for what my time was wor,th, which was far more than 
$75. I don't know whether I'll get paid. The problem is that good psychiatric 
expert testimony is hard to come by and it's expensive. I spent another 16 hours 
this month in court in a conservator proceedings where a very competent attorney 
is trying to protect a large estate and rightfully so. I was the defendant's 
witness. The problem is that it's possible to spend a lot of time and money in 
a situation where the judge really didn't understand what was going on and there 
were a lot of medical issues that I was there trying to explain that hopefully 
will allow this patient to protect her own rights. Other attorneys, the plaintiff's 
attorney, didn't understand either, from my medical perspective, and a big case 
was made out of something which needn't have been that way. The prol?lem is, I 
think, that the whole system needs to be reformed, and I think it calls for 
legislative reform at the highest level. I think that's going to take a lot of 
money, and I'm quite pessimistic because I see the current administration cutting 
back on money for different types of mental health reform and underwriting dif--
ferent types of research, the sorts of things that the criminal justice and the 
legal system will need to be able to come up with the right kinds of answers. 
I surely don't have an answer myself, but I'm very concerned because I don't see 
the right kinds of reforms coming. 
I just want to comment on two other things, the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual which you poke fun at Ollie, is an inadequate system and is currently being 
revised. It's an offshoot of the international classification of disease that's 
been set up by the World Health Organization and other people, and it's necessary 
for statistical purposes and research purposes and also unfortunately for purposes 
of third party reimbursement because there are payments available from insurance 
companies for different types of illness. You have to classify people; as psychi-
atrists we don't like to classify people, but we're constrained to do that. 
There is also in the DSM,category number 318 which is no psychiatric disease found, 
so that you wouldn't necessarily have to classify everyone as having a psychiatric 
illness. 
A lot of the time, in my experience, we're able to get people who are 
gravely disabled to accept voluntary hospitalization and a lot of that has to do 
with the type of relationship that the professional sets up with the patient the 
minute the patient walks into the office. Someone can drag a patient in saying 
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you have to lock this person up, and there's a lot of heated feelings between the 
patient and the family, and the patient is dead set that they're never going to 
go into the hospital, especially since mother or father is telling them they've 
got to. But a lot of times if I can get that family member o~t of the picture 
and sit down and talk to the patient about what's going on and what's been happening 
to him and discuss wi.th him why hospitalization will be appropriate and one of 
the things is to get them away from the spouse or parent who's driving them crazy, 
I've had a lot of success getting people to accept voluntary hospitalization. 
So even when someone wants us to involuntarilyj1ospitalize in. many of the cases, and 
again this is impressionistic--I don't have any hard da,ta--a large percentage will 
accept voluntary hospitalization. 
MR. BARBER: I think that's true. It's an excellent point. I should have alluded 
to it, and I think a classic example of how that can be done, and .. this is a stroke 
for you Dr. Ruben, is the four cases that you cited this morning. A lot of 
psychiatrists in all four of those cases would have gone for civil commitment and 
to your credit you were able to work it out in the first three without having to 
resort to that. 
QUESTION: I think the issue of separating hospitalization and treatment as two 
separate categories is absolute nonsense. Hospitals and physicians have rights, 
too. One of their rights is not to have to act as a detention center~ There are 
much less expensive places where this can be done. In my opinion any judge whom 
I would respect would not be willing to take a list of proposed psychiatric treat-
ments which are recommended and say" "All right give that one." A sensible judge 
would realize that this is not his area of expertise. 
QUESTION: In the new laws did they make a provision to pay the attorneys for 
representing these people in court? In other words, the court appoints a lawyer 
to represent the person charged with incompetency. Did they make provisions in 
the new law to pay the attorneys for their time and effort. 
MR. BARBER: When I wrote the law I wrote it so that a public defender could be 
appointed to do that. I've been told in conversations that I've had with the public 
defender that no funds were provided to accomplish that objective. I don't know 
whether that's true or not because I have faithfully requested from the legislative 
research commission copies of the bill, and they have so far not seen fit to send 
it to me. Mr. Bruton has had exactly the same problem. 
MR. BRUTON: I have a copy of the bill. I've read it, and I haven't seen anything 
about monies for it. 
MR. BARBER: I thtnk that might be included in another bill that I requested which 
would be the new bill that was passed concerning just public defender~. 
DR. RUBEN: I wanted to make one comment in relation to this gentleman's comment 
about separating treatment and hospitalization. I'm not sure if I understood your 
comment totally, and I'm not sure who you were addressing your comment to either, 
but I had some feelings about it. I know that Mr. Barber said something about 
having various treatments that could be recommended. I think in terms of a major 
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revamping of the commitment system and the question of monies, if the law stipulated 
that the attorneys for the defense and the plaintiff's attorney, whatever, depend-
ing on the matter, would be paid a certain fee and if the experts were to be paid 
, 
a certain fee and if the expert testimony would come in to help the judge under-
stand rather than trying to discredit/the experts perhaps might agree on different 
types of treatment that might be appropriate. Rather than the judge sentencing 
or remanding for treatment, a specific treatment at least could be decided upon. 
If there were a certain range of treatment that might be appropriate, the judge 
would be in a better position to decide that treatment was appropriate and, given 
the least restrictive alternative doctrine, whether th~t treatment needed to be 
offered in a hospital or on some sort of out-patient basis. 
MR. PROSSER: There is a provision in the statute and in the civil rules for an 
expert to be appointed in the defense of a person whether it's in a criminal 
case or a commitment case. I had occasion in a criminal case recently to seek 
a forensic pathologist in a case for which I was not receiving a fee although it 
was not a legal aid case. The judge said "Mr. Prosser, I'll be more than happy 
to appoint a forensic pathologist for you if you can find one and if you can 
find the money, because the rule specifically says the court may appoint someone 
and pay them out of available funds. But the funds aren't available." The point 
is the money isn't there, and we in this room are not the people who~re going to 
get the money. Unfortunately it's going to have to be courts that are going to 
have to order us to sell public lands or raise taxes or do something else to do 
what the legislators should be doing in the first place. 
QUESTION: I have one brief comment perhaps on the money situation. There was a 
case from the District of Columbia which relied on an earlier Supreme Court case, 
Goldburg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) to hold that in a case of mentally retarded 
children, the money had to be divided equitably between retarded children and those 
who were not handicapped. Although the state had a legitimate right to preserve 
its funds, it had to do so in an equitable manner so that all people in society 
would benefit equally from it. Of course, saying that in a decision and implement-
ing it are two different things. 
I want to direct a question first to Ollie Barber. You mentioned that under 
the new law if there's going to be a commitmen-t for greater than 72 hours, there 
has to be a full court hearing, and the court must find those four separate elements 
that you menbioned. I want to know what standard of proof is required? Does 
the court have to decide by a preponderance of the evidence or beyond a reasonable 
doubt? 
MR. BARBER: I wrote it to put beyond a reasonable doubt, but that was taken out. 
I don't remember that there is any standard of evidence specifically delineated 
in this statute. 
QUESTION: Secondly, Mr. Bruton mentioned, by way of opinion I think rather than 
by reference to any particular legal precedent, that it would be impossible to 
have a beyond a reasonable doubt standard in a commitment hearing. I'd sort of 
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like to throw this up to the panel both through a legal and a medical side to 
discuss what kind of standards, practically speaking, you can expect in order to 
preserve the rights of the patient and still not totally foul 'up the system 
where people do need help. 
iffi. BRUTON: You're perfectly correct. That was my opinion, but it's based on 
pragmatism. How can you have something that is so sUbjective. How can you prove 
something that is beyond a reasonable doubt? It's just an unworkable criterion. 
You're going to get all kinds of opinions. It's a matter of opin~on. You cannot 
prove opinion evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. I submit to you that it's an 
- --' 
unrealistic criterion to impose on an area where there aren't any standards any-
way. 
QUESTION: However, there is precedent for it. 
MR. BURTON: That's right, there is a precedent for it, and I don't have to accept 
all precedents either. 
QUESTION: I'd like to address this comment or question either to Dr. Ruben or Mr. 
Barber. Yesterday we went into some depth on arbitration and malpractice which 
is a pet project of mine even from years ago when it was unpopular. Is there 
some place for this in the commitment proceedings or in the rights of patients 
in the absence of judges who understand or is there legislation that would be 
appropriate? 
~ 
MR. BARBER: As far as I know, and Mr. Bruton just read for us my feeling on it, 
there's no particular statutory language that would lead to that arbitration 
proceeding. I'll tell you that I have a particular case now where a young lady 
claims that she was improperly kept in a private hospital in one of the major 
cities in Kentucky. What we're interested in is not a lawsuit. We just want to 
find a vehicle to sit down and discuss the procedures of the hospital with the 
physicians so that this type of thing doesn't happen again. I think even though 
the statute doesn't provide for it, arbitration and mutual discussion is very, 
very important. 
DR. RUBEN: I'd go a step further to say that I think you're making an excellent 
suggestion and perhaps that's really what's needed rather than adversary proceed-
ings of some sort, arbitration proceedings that would allow the parties to sit 
down and try and make a determination. 
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As part of the seminar on Law and Medicine the simulated examination and 
cross-examination of an expert medical witness was conducted. Because the most 
valuable aspect of this part of the seminar was its actual performance, it has 
not been reproduced. Participants in the examination were Judge L.T. Grant, of 
the Fayette Circuit Court; Dr. William G. Winter, Assistant Professor of Orthopedic 
Surgery of the College of Medicine, Robert J. Turley, of Turley, Savage and 
Moore of Lexington for the Plaintiff, William D. Grubbs of Woodward, Hobson and 
Fulton of Louisville for the Defense; and Charles Landrum, Jr. Landrum, Patterson 
and Dickey of Lexington, for the Defense. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS OF THE CASE 
MR. SAVAGE: If you'll look in the seminar outline, you'll see a synopsis of facts of 
this hypothetical trial. We have styled the case Mickey Green, an infant suing 
by and through his father and next friend Ed Green, against the defendants Torn 
Dunn and Acme Motor Express, Inc. 
This is a suit for personal injuries by this young boy against the driver 
of a truck and the company that owns the truck. The boy received the injuries 
when, as he alleges, he was walking along a narrow strip of grass next to the 
street. The truck carne to an intersection on that street and made a turn. Its 
trailer wheels tracked inside, carne across onto the grass, struck the child, and 
knocked him into a culvert. The defendant's allegation is that the young boy ran 
out to the street to chase the rear wheels of the truck and became entangled in 
them. 
The part of the trial that we want to stage this afternoon includes the 
medical testimony of the treating doctor, Dr. Spring. Dr. Spring treated this 
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young boy from the first and helped him through his initial injuries. He has 
opinions, and will express these opinions to you, as to what the future holds 
for this young boy, Mickey Green. 
I 
It's important before we start to explain to you how the case has reached 
the point where the treating physician is ready to take the stand. Of course, 
the young boy and his father went to see counsel and the attorney agreed to 
represent them in the case. The Acme Motor Express, Inc. and its driver, Tom 
Dunn, retained counsel and that defense firm is present. The case has proceeded 
through the usual filing of the complaint and~he answer, and the pleadings were 
then completed. 
Next, discovery proceedings have taken place so that each side knows what 
the other has in the way of facts. In the process of that discovery, for example, 
counsel for the defense has taken the deposition of Dr. Spring and basically knows 
what the doctor is going to say at the trial. 
In the course of preparing for trial, the defendant's counsel also had 
the opportunity to have this child examined by a physician of his own choosing. 
That examination was performed by a hypothetical orthopedic surgeon by the name 
of Dr. Daniel. The plaintiff's counsel then had an opportunity to take the 
deposition of Dr. Daniel, which was done in this instance. 
That brings us to the trial. In reality, we would have st'arted this trial 
this morning. The plaintiff's counsel would have made an opening statement out-
lining the theory of the case and what the plaintiff expected to prove. That 
would have been followed by the defense counsel's opening remarks. Then the 
plaintiff would present evidence to try to prove the case. The first witness 
would have probably been either the little boy or his mother or father. That 
would be followed by an eyewitness to the accident, or other liability-oriented 
witnesses. Now we've had our recess for lunch and we're ready to continue the 
trial and the next witness will be Dr. Spring. 
PANEL DISCUSSION 
MR. SAVAGE: In this discussion I'll call upon each of the participants in the 
trial, beginning with the judge and then the witness and then the attorneys, to 
ask for their comments. Then let I s throw it open to questions and see what's on 
your mind. 
I think in this trial we see one of the problems of the law of evidence in 
Kentucky. That problem concerns how certain a physician must be of his opinion 
before he is allowed to give it, on a question about the future course of a 
particular patient. That leads us into a discussion of "reasonable medical cer-
tainty," as it was phrased. 
The key on this is Rogers v. Sullivan, 410 S.W.2d 624 (1966). The real 
issue arises after you've established that there's negligence, causation, and an 
injury. You then begin asking the doctor what's going to happen in the future to 
this boy, because after all this is his only day in court. The jury has to give 
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him an award that will be fair for the rest of his life. Must the doctor talk 
in terms of certainty? May the doctor talk in terms of probabilities? How are 
probabilities defined? Mr. Turley says it means more likely than not. I've heard 
some lawyers say 51 percent. 
The Rogers case brought all this up. It was a shoulder case. The lawyer 
asked the question this way. "Based on the fact that it has now been some 16 months 
subsequent to the time he sustained his injury, and that there is presence of 
atrophy, what would you say his possibilities are for complete recovery?" 
Judge Palmore overruled existing case l~w that said the question has to be 
answered in terms of medical certainty. He said that the phrase "reasonable 
probability" is the preferred expression. But in the, opinion he never: really 
defined what probability meant. The clue is that he said that in any case where 
you're trying to prove damages, the plaintiff has to take the issue out of the 
area of speculation. An analysis of the facts and holdings of the cases supports 
the conclusion that courts have used the term "certainty" to mean only that the 
fact of damages must be taken out of the area of speculation. So I think that 
test is really whether the doctor is speculating or not. 
Let me now ask Judge Grant for his opinion with respect to the trial as 
observed it. 
JUDGE GRANT: When you get into the area of probability versus certainty, I think 
have to consider what we're dealing with. We're dealing with an expert witness 
the medical field. Some standard, I suppose, would have to be set in order 
him not to testify on matters of speculation. Our Supreme Court has defined 
standard to be probability, but the definition of probability is a very 
Mr. Turley during the trial attempted to get into some specula-
on how this injury would affect other people, not from a probability stand-
but from a possibility standpoint. But we need some standard, I think in 
for the medical expert to testify. 
One of the doctors posited, for instance, that if you deal in percentages, 
51 percent. What about a man whose doctor says he has a 40 
chance of dying? Is that probability? I feel that if a case gets to the 
Court with a set of extreme facts like that, perhaps they might define 
as such. 
For the physicians in the audience, I'll comment that I share a 
concern about what the whole area of litigation--not just malpractice--
doing to our society for a host of reasons. One is that I seem to see some of 
physician friends spending more and more time concerned with litigation. It 
to me we'd all be better off if somehow we were again able to focus on 
vity more progressively. 
As far as today's mock trial goes, I'll just add one further question. If 
someone with eight or nine injuries--and that is a regular part of my 
tice--and there is a 20 percent chance of residual injury here and a 30 per-
t chance there, then we're really playing the numbers game. We could add 
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them all up and come out with a total possibility of just one of those things 
going wrong for the patient. That happens, too. It's obvious that the law can 
distort reality for whatever necessary purpose. As far as I~m concerned, all I 
can do is do my damndest not to distort reality. 
The two areas that cause the most problems here are when I'm in the embarras-
ing situation of having to admit holes in my knowledge and when there are limita-
tions to medical knowledge. All you can do is come up with the best opinion you 
can and then document it by the best facts that you have. 
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f: MR. SAVAGE: We'll now let Mr. Landrum give us his comments. ~; 
MR. LANDRUM: I want to say two things. First, in a ca'se like this where a child f 
is hurt as badly as this child was, when you are a defendant's lawyer, you want ~ 
to minimize the injury as much as possible. A defendant's lawyer should never ~ 
ask a question unless he knows what the answer is going to be. I asked one question on ~ 
'I' 
which we got a speech from the good doctor. I should not have asked it,but I did ~ 
0' 
anyhow. I did that to demonstrate how a lawyer can literally be gutted by a doctor 
by opening the door, giving him the opportunity to make a speach. 
I w1.sh to make another comment in response to Judge Grant. He stated that 
we are dealing with expert witnesses. I differ with Judge Gr~nt. I do not 
believe that a doctor who is an attending physician is an expert witness any more 
than an eyewitness to an accident is an expert witness. The doctor who attends 
that patient owes an obligation to testify as to what facts he found as attending 
physician the same as the eyewitness to an accident is required to testify as to 
what facts he saw. That's a realm that doctors and lawyers have been differing 
about for a long time, but that's my opinion. I think he's a factual witness, 
not an expert witness. Until he is asked what his opinion is as to the future 
of that patient, he is not an expert witness. I believe that is the point where 
a defendant's lawyer may, if he can, properly attack the doctor's judgment by 
showing that it is a matter of expert opinion upon which learned men disagree. 
MR. SAVAGE: I'll now call on Mr. Grubbs for some comments. 
MR. GRUBBS: When defense is cross-examining a physician who is as knowledgeable 
and as capable as Dr. Winter is, he should get on and off as quickly as he can. 
I prefer, where there is a real difference of opinion, to present it through my 
own medical witness. Unless I feel that he has taken a position that I can 
clearly dispute with many case studies, I won't go after the witness. That's just 
my own approach. I prefer a low-key cross-examination. In the cross-examination 
today, I tried to take what I thought was our weakest area, namely the nonunion 
of the fourth metatarsal, because I wanted to bury it in the middle of his testi-
mony. I wanted to end with some points where the doctor was agreeing with me. 
I also took the plaintiff's exhibit, and where it had been marked in red to show 
a fracture, I took a blue marking pen to show that those areas had healed. Again, 
that's just a little thing that will sometimes make an impression on the jury. 
MR. SAVAGE: I might add that one of the things the audience mayor may not have 
observed is that the key to any successful practicing of a case is through pre-
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paration. This keeps the doctor, in a sense, consistent with his colleagues in 
any particular area. If a doctor departs from the standards of the profession, 
a well-prepared lawyer can bring him up short and make him explain why he holds 
, 
a different view than most of his colleagues. Mr. Turley, give me the closing 
remarks from the plaintiff's counsel. 
MR. TURLEY: First, I think the key to the direct examination of any expert wit-
ness is a pretrial conference with that witness in which the lawyer sits down 
with the doctor and explains to him just exactly what is expected, of a physician 
when he's called to testify--what parameters ~De law provides with respect to 
expert testimony beyond the scope of which the physici~n is not permitted to go. 
The lawyer should also tell him what he proposes to ask on direct examination. 
Obviously, the pretrial conference is used for other purposes as well. 
The second point I would like to make arises from what Dr. Winter said. 
He said that physicians have become more and more concerned with litigation. 
That, of course, is true. For the benefit of the physicians, let me say this in 
defense of my profession. Law simply means an authoritative verbalization of 
society's minimal values. It's no more than that. The purpose of jurisprudence 
is to adjust, in as satisfactory a manner as can be done, the differences that 
develop between people in any sort of a society or a community: So the law and 
the lawyer have as their purposes in society to serve as the lubrican~by which 
people can live together and at the same time as the cement by which the society 
can be held together. 
Most often the choices are not between what's right and what's wrong; the 
choices are between the rights of one citizen and the rights of another. The 
choices become even more difficult when they involve some forecast of the future. 
This is the reason we get into opinions. At one time the old Court of Appeals 
talked about the requirement of proving future damages with reasonable certainty. 
This led to the use of the phrase "reasonable certainty" in interrogating doctors. 
And doctors, as explained by Dr. -Winter on the stand, have a different notion of 
certainty than lawyers. 
Lawyers are more pragmatic in that they know we can't solve disputes unless 
we can talk in terms of something less than certainty. So the law has come to the 
point where we talk in terms of reasonable probabilities. That has become the 
code phrase in interrogating an expert as to his opinions about the future. 
We tried to point up today the next choice that we think the courts will 
have to make. I join Judge Grant in believing that if the right case is taken 
to the Supreme Court, we'll have a decision which will deal with this problem: 
that is, how one can show a jury, assuming evidence of a permanent condition 
resulting from an accident or an injury exists, that no one knows what will hap-
pen, but that there are many complications, none of which occur more than 50 per-
cent of the time so that the doctor can't predict anything definite. There may 
be six different complications, the incidence of which may run from 5 percent to 
30 percent. Bearing in mind that the plaintiff is in court only this one day, 
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isn't it fair that the jury be able to consider in some fashion the incidence 
of possible complications of his condition? We're casting about for a method 
by which that can be shown. 
, 
MR. SAVAGE: We'd like to entertain questions from the audience if we could do 
so now. 
QUESTION: Mr. Landrum, is it not possible to call a doctor as an expert or as an 
ordinary witness, and can you examine him under the rules of both? 
MR. LANDRUM: A doctor is subject to subpoena the same as any other person. There 
is a misconception in Kentucky that a doctor; doesn I t have .to go to court if he 
doesn't want to. That's not so. 
QUESTION: Do you subpoena him as an expert? 
MR. LANDRUM: Either as an expert or as a factual witness. It depends on whether 
he's a factual witness--if he's an attending physician to testify to the facts 
that he found when he examined and treated the patient. Where he leaves the realm 
of a factual witness and becomes an expert and you ask him what the extent of 
residual injuries are, then he becomes an expert because he's expressing an 
opinion. I~t might be a very expensive one, depending on where he's from. 
QUESTION: Could you ask him to give an expert opinion if he were called as an 
eyewitness? 
MR. LANDRUM: No. Whether he's an expert or not depends upon hisq1:lalifications. 
If he's a gynecologist and comes upon the scene of an accident and attends a broken 
leg, he would not be an expert orthopedic surgeon; he was a factual witness in 
that he found a man with a broken leg lying on the side of the road. 
DR. WINTER: Does a physician in a situation like that have the right to decline 
the mantle of expertise if it's offered to him by an attorney? 
MR. LANDRUM: Yes. 
QUESTION: Mr. Grubbs, you had a book ready to bring out against the so-called 
Dr. Spring if he didn't agree with what you could find in the literature. Is 
this fair? I presume it's legal. 
MR. GRUBBS: The distinction has always been that an accepted treatise can be 
used for purposes of cross-examination if the witness accepts it as a generally 
recognized treatise. Even though it's a generally recognized treatise, the wit-
ness still may say that he disagrees with a certain portion of it. By saying 
it's generally recognized, he's not undertaking to vouch for the accuracy of 
every page. The law is in flux right now on that. Our state Supreme Court 
recently handed down an opinion which indicates that an accepted text can be used 
as substantive evidence and not just for impeachment. The interesting thing is 
that the book that I had didn't have anything to do with the proper way of 
measuring leg shortening under 1/2 inch. That was just something I'd run into 
in another case recently. The book that I had dealt with standard criteria for 
evaluating disability. What I did have but didn't get a chance to use, simply 
because the doctor was very candid and stuck to the script, was the deposition. 
That's where the physician must often becomes tripped up. He expresses an opinion 
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in his deposition that is slightly different from what he expresses at the trial. 
Then the deposition is used for purposes of impeachment. 
QUESTION: Judge Grant, I'm speaking about the plaintiff's schematic exhibit. 
Were the predesignations which located areas of alleged injuries on plaintiff's 
exhibit drawn prior to its introduction. 
JUDGE GRANT: This particular diagram was used in an actual trial and that's the 
reason the red marks were on there when it was introduced. Ordinarily, my 
opinion would be that the diagram ought to be introduced with notbing on it. 
QUESTION: Thank you, Judge. Bob Turley, cou~g you have prevented defense counsel 
from drawing on your exhibit his self-serving comments? That exhibit might ac-
I 
company members of the jury to the jury room. 
MR. TURLEY: In a trial, had I objected to his having marked "healed" on my 
exhibit, I might have been sustained, but that would simply have .attracted more 
attention to his having done so. 
QUESTION: Could you not have gone to the judge and asked him out of the jury's 
audience to direct defense counsel not to do that? The jury might possibly feel 
he would have no right to mark up the exhibit anyhow. 
MR. LANDRUM: Well, it's matter of judgment in a particular instance. If he tried 
to stop me from writing on it, I'd say, "Well, he has healed hasn't he?" 
JUDGE GRANT: One way to get around the obj ection would be to have· th.e doctor 
himself come down and mark the areas that have been healed. 
MR. SAVAGE: Do we have any other questions? 
QUESTION: I've been in Dr. Winter's situation where plaintiff's attorney did not 
tell the doctor in the pretrial conference about the second expert's opinion. I 
think the expert witness used by the plaintiff's attorney should always know what 
the defense medical witness is going to say. In this trial, Dr. Winter's position 
was weakened when the defense attorney read Dr. Daniel's statement which did, of 
course, contradict Dr. Winter's opinion. The second question is, this was a damage 
suit, right? How long are you allowed to bring a damage suit for a minor? 
MR. SAVAGE: Until the 19th birthday. We have a one year statute of limitations 
in personal injury actions, and it does not run out on a minor until he reaches 18. 
QUESTION: I ask the plaintiff's attorney, since the probability of future damage 
to this child is somewhat in doubt as demonstrated by this trial, would it have 
been better to advise the plaintiff not to bring this case until the child became 
of age? Maybe this child would have had symptoms of arthritis by the time he was 
18 or 19, in his hip and almost certainly in his foot. Then plaintiff would have 
solid grounds for a higher settlement. 
MR. TURLEY: A agcee. Bear in mind that in a case like this, one must prove 
liability as well as damages. Witnesses move away. They die, they forget. There 
is a risk that you'd lose on the liability even if you did have better evidence 
as to the residual injuries. 
QUESTION: I'm afraid this may be a trivial question, but since the facts of the 
case initially revolved around whether the little boy was on the grass or on the 
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street, why didn't anyone ask the expert witness if grass was found in the wound? 
That might have solved the whole thing right there. 
MR. LANDRUM: Dr. Winter said he found grass, rocks, mud, and pirt in the wound. 
QUESTION: Aha! Grass was there. Doesn't that prove something? 
MR. LANDRUM: No. Because he was thrown from the wheel into the grass. That's 
where they found him. 
MR. SAVAGE: We lost that case once. It's very painful to bring that up again! 
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PROFESSIONAL ETHICS & ADVERTISING 
Leslie G. Whitmer, J.D. 
Director, Kentucky Bar Association 
I. The history of the ethic prohibiting advertising by the legal and medical 
professions. 
The word "professionar is hard to define, but it has, as a vital element, 
the interest of the public above personal gain. Robert N. Wilkins, in his 1938 
book entitled, The Spirit of the Legal Profession, made a statement about profes-
sions that is particularly significant today iri relation to members of the legal 
medical professions advertising their services. Mr~ Wilkins stated: 
The professional spirit sets its seal against self-seeking and 
self-aggrandizement. It awakens a social consciousness and 
conscience. It tends to inspire men with the zeal of the 
scientist, the devotion of the saint. It teaches that by the 
advancement of men wise and good all men prosper. 
"Advertising" has always been a bad word among lawyers and physicians. 
of ethics for the medical and legal professions have always contained strict 
against advertising, as we commonly think of that term. The rules have 
In that they have spared both from the excesses often 
tted in the name of advertising. The negative connotations to the word 
vertising," however, should not overshadow the duty of the professional to 
t informative communications about his services with the public he serves. 
to the public's advantage to receive information from the professions in 
person can make an intelligent selection of a physician or lawyer. 
While both physicians and lawyers are professionals and have a common 
rest in ethical prohibitions against advertising, it must be realized that the 
professions have one great dissimilarity--Iawyers are officers of the court. 
are officers charged with the administration of justice within the third 
of a free, independent democracy. This distinction may, in future litiga-
in the area of advertising restrictions. 
Professional codes of ethics are receiving intense review in the field of 
sing prohibitions. The pressures for change are mounting at an alarming 
If the customs of the past are healthy, they will survive. If they are 
they will fall. 
rohibition inst advertis 
wave of consumerism is challenging prohibitions against advertising on 
as evidenced by federal court suits in some five states against bar 
The first ground for litigation in both the 
nd medical professions is that the prohibitions serve as a restraint on 
the provisions of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 
ground for litigation is that the prohibition inhibits first amendment 
the u.S. Constitution, as applied to the states through the fourteenth 
t, concerning the right of free speech, press and assembly. It is even 
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being argued in the legal clinic of Jacoby and :Heyers in California that the 
prohibition cuts the consumer from receiving information through the news media 
from a lawyer--one of the most fundamental. guarantees in the' constitution, it is 
alleged. The suits challenge the validity of Canon 2 and DR 2-101, 102 and 103 
of the code ofProfesional Responsibility. 
Canon 2 imposes a duty on lawyers to assist the legal profession in ful-
filling its duty to make legal counsel available. The duty includes facilitating 
the process of intelligent selection of lawyess. 
The American Bar Foundation and the American Bar Association special com-
I 
mitteeto survey legal needs will soon publish a final report showing what the 
committee's chairman, Randolph Thrower, stated is the long-suspected fact that 
tens of millions of Americans of moderate means, who have legal problems and 
know it, do not seek legal counsel because they do not know how to find a lawyer 
and they are afraid that they cannot afford one. As far as the legal profession 
goes, an argument can be made that consumers must have more information about 
lawyers. 
What then are the legal implications of prohibitions against the market 
place type of advertising by physicians and lawyers? 
III. Advertising prohibitions may violated Sherman Act. 
Consumer groups consider the Goldfarb case the first opening of the door 
to expose the professions to all customs of the open mark,et place, including un-
limited right of the "professional" to advertise his services. 
Before we talk about Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 95 S. CEo 2004 (1975), 
however, we should refer to Northern Pacific Railroad V. United States, 356 U.S. 
1, 4 (1958). In that opinion, Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the court, stated: 
" [T]he unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allo-
cation of economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality, and the 
greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment con-
ducive to the preservation of our democratic, political and social institutions." 
With that general philosophy in mind, the Supreme Court considered the Goldfarb 
fact situation. It was a flagrant one. Some 20 lawyers were contacted by the 
Goldfarbs in an effort to obtain a fee quotation to do a title search. The same 
fee was quoted by all 20 lawyers and some stated that they clearly would not 
charge less because of the minimum fee schedule of the Fairfax County Bar 
Association. The local fee schedule was not in any way adopted by the state bar, 
which is an agency of the Supreme Court of Virginia just like ours in Kentucky. 
Still the Virginia State Bar has issued ethics opinions, the same ones that we 
issued, saying that if a lawyer habitually charged under the minimum he would be 
subject to disciplinary action. The Goldfarbs maintained in their lawsuit that 
there had been a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act; in other 
words, price fixing. They asked for an injunction against the use of the fee 
schedule in joining both the state and local bars and also asking for damages. 
The Federal District Court found for the Goldfarbs. In doing that they dismissed 
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the state bar as a party on the state action theory; that is, where a governmental 
agency restrains trade, it is exempt from the Act. The court did hold the local 
bar liable, however, the case went to the Court of Appeals and it reversed the 
district court except as to the state bar portion of the opinion. It agreed that 
the state bar was covered by the state action exemption and said further that the 
local bar was not engaged in interstate commerce because the practice of law did 
not involve interstate commerce. It also held that bar schedules had insufficient 
effect on interstate commerce to come under the act. The Supreme Court went along 
with the district court and held the local bar liable and also held the state bar 
I 
liable. It reversed on four grounds. I think it is essential that we toOk at 
each one of those grounds and analyze each of them because together they ilay the 
foundation for federal court intervention into state regulation of all professions, 
just the legal profession. 
The first of the four grounds was price fixing. The Court said that 
Goldfarb was a classic illustration of price fixing, that the fee schedule was 
not advisory, and that it was not fee information on past standards, but was 
rather a standard for the charging of fees in the future. It found that a rigid 
price floor was established. The Court also found that local bar associations 
and the state bar had enforced the fee schedule at least through its ,et~ics 
not through direct disciplinary action. Second, the Court found that 
fee schedule had an effect on interstate commerce. It was found that 
on most residential property, money came from outside of Virginia 
interstate commerce was involved. Third, the Court said that there is no 
profession exemption" under the ,antitrust act. The Court said that 
gress did not intend a sweeping exclusion and in fact there was a presumption 
ainst application of the exemption. It was held that the nature of the 
of practicing law and the public service involved, the lawyer being 
of the court was immaterial. The opinion said that there was, in fact, 
commerical intercourse in any competitive activity that may exert a 
on trade involved in the fact situation. Finally, they said that 
imum fee schedules are not state action. In the Goldfarb case there clearly 
no state action as such. There was no statute, and there was not court 
e approving a fee schedule. The same condi~ion existed in Kentucky. In fact, 
Supreme Court of Virginia, like the Supreme Court of Kentucky, had adopted 
American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility that stated 
the fee provision that the fee schedule was one of some eight items to be 
determining a fee. So that was probably the weakest defense that 
had. 
The decision went on to say, however, that it was very limited in its 
in regard to professions. The opinion said that the decision intended no 
of the authority of the state to regulate its professions, to set 
and to police itself. 
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Again, consumer groups, and even the American Bar Association, are of the 
firm belief that the Goldfarb case places the heretofore "untouchable professions" 
in the commercial market place to the extent that present advertising restrictions 
, 
serve as a restraint on trade. 
On December 19, 1975, the Federal Trade Commission filed a complaint against 
the American Medical Association, the Connecticut State Medical Society, and the 
New Haven County Medical Association. The complaint alleged violations of section 
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and that the proceeding was in the public 
interest, specifically, the commission charged. that the respondents were engaged 
in business and through the publication and enforceme~t of the AMA Principles of 
Medical Ethics, had entered into an agreement to prevent or hinder competition 
among medical doctors in that it prevented members from: 
1. Soliciting business, by advertising or otherwise, 
2. Engaging in price competition, and 
3. Otherwise engaging in competitive practices. 
It is further stated in the complaint that these acts and practices had 
the following results: 
1. Prices of physician services were stablized, fixed, or otherwise 
interfered with; 
2. Competition between medical doctors in the provision of such 
services was hindered, restrained, foreclosed and frusti~ted; and 
3. Consumers were deprived of information pertinent to the selection 
of a physician and of the benefits of competition. 
The case is scheduled for an October 1976 hearing before an administrative 
law judge. 
The position of the Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice, 
on advertising by lawyers is clear. Deputy Assistant Attorney General Bruce Wilson, 
in an address before the Philadelphia Bar Association early this year, stated: 
Advertising by the legal profession has "traditionally been limited 
to law lists. I suggested, last June, that perhaps this was un-
wise, and perhaps, if pursuant to an agreement, illegal. I sug-
gested that some forms of advertising might indeed be beneficial. 
IV. Advertising prohibitions may be unconstitutional. 
It has been traditionally held that the constitutional protection of free 
speech does not extend to delivery of legal, medical, or financial services by 
persons not licensed to render those services. It has always been held that the 
states, under their health, welfare and police powers, have the right to control 
the practice of professions and place reasonable restrictions on their activities. 
The prohibitions against advertising by a profession came to the United States 
Supreme Court in 1934, in the leading case of Semler v. Oregon State Board of 
Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608. In this case, Oregon, in regulating the practice 
of dentistry, enacted a statute banning the advertising of professional service, 
the performance of professional service in a superior manner, advertising prices 
or fees, employing or making use of advertising solicitors, the use of certain 
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types of signs, etc. Semler attacked the statute as overbroad, and repugnant 
to the due process and equal protection clauses of the 14th amendment. ,He stated 
in his complaint, that he had advertised his practice in newsp,apers and period...,. 
icals, stating the prices he would charge and represented he had a high degree of 
efficiency and was able to perform his services in a superior manner. Of course, 
he alleged that his advertisements were truthful and made in good faith. Further, 
he claimed that by these methods he had developed a large and lucrative practice, 
and thereby he had been able to standardize his office practice, and so establish 
a uniform scale of charges for the majority of lIis operations., The latter argument 
is being advanced in courts today. By advertising thein services and fees in 
newspapers and the media, it is argued, practitioners ,will be able to feach the 
poor and middle classes who are now disadvantaged, because they cannot afford 
expensive legal costs and do not know how to reach competent lawyers. Thus, 
they will thereby increase their volume of business, so they can use more para-
professional employees, thereby lowering the cost of legal services and serving 
a great portion of the unrepresented public. The Supreme Court answered this 
argument by saying: 
The legislature was not dealing with traders in commodities, 
different standards of conduct from those which are traditional 
in the competition of the market place. The community is con -" 
cerned with the maintenance of professional standards which 
will insure not only competency in individual practitioners, but 
protection against those who would prey upon a public peculiarly 
susceptible to imposition through alluring promises of physical 
relief. And the community is concerned in providing safeguards 
not only against deception, but against practices which would 
tend to demoralize the profession by forcing its members into an 
unseemly rivalry which would enlarge the opportunities of the 
least scrupulous. What is generally called the "ethics" of the 
profession is but the consensus of expert opinion as to the 
necessity of such standards. It is no answer to say, as regards 
appellant's claim of right to advertise his "professional super-
iority" or his "performance of professional services in a super-
ior manner", that he is telling the truth. 
Lawyers, physicians, and dentists are subject to control and regulation by 
legislature and the courts. The courts have uniformly held lawyers subject 
their control, in their admission to the Bar, in discipline and the standards 
conduct by which they must abide. With the formulation by the American Bar 
the Code of Professional Responsibility and its adoption by the courts, 
except as narrowly permitted by the code, has been proscribed. 
In determining the effect of the 1st amendment on advertising, the Supreme 
carefully distinguished between commercial and noncommercial advertising. 
lentine v. Chrestensen 316 U.S. 53, it held commercial advertising is not 
ted by the free speech and press clauses, and noncommercial advertising 
tected. 
In Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, 413 
the Pittsburgh Press used an advertising system in its daily newspaper 
by job opportunities were published under headings designating job performances 
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by sex. Upon an appeal from a cease and desist order of the Pittsburgh Human 
Relations Commission that such classification of ads was violative of the city 
ordinance against sex discrimination, the Court in a 5 t04 decision, held the 
, 
ordinance valid and not a violation of the freedom of the press, because the 
advertising was commercial. 
It is plain that the advertising proposed by the plaintiffs in the various 
cases pending in the courts is one way of soliciting business. The question is 
whether such advertising is commerical and therefore not prot~cted as free speech 
under the 14th amendment. In NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, the court had before 
it for consideration the validity of a Virginia st~tute forbidding soliciting of 
litigation. 
The NAACP engaged in a program of sOliciting for persons to become plain-
tiffs in school desegregation cases. The NAACP maintains a legal staff for this 
purpose. Typically, in school desegregation cases, a staff lawyer will address 
a meeting of parents and children to explain the legal steps necessary to achieve 
desegregation. He will bring to the meeting printed forms authorizing him and 
other NAACP or defense fund attorneys to represent the signers in legal proceed-
ings to achieve desegregation. 
Virginia has had statutory regulation of unethical and non-professional 
conduct by attorneys since 1849. These provisions outlaw, among other things, 
solicitation of legal business in the form of "running" or "capping." The 
statute was amended to include as "capper" or "runner"" an agent of an individual 
or organization which retains a lawyer in connection with an action to which it 
is not a party or has no pecuniary right or liability. 
The Virginia Court of Appeals upheld the statute as a reasonable regulation 
of the legal profession and was located to strengthen the existing statute to 
control the evils of soliciting legal business. Upon writ of certiorari, the 
Supreme Court, by a 5 to 4 decision, reversed, holding the statute violated the 
1st and 14th amendments, of free speech and assemby. 
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, stated: 
We meet at the outset the contention that "solicitation" is wholly 
outside the area of freedoms protected by the first amendment. 
To this contention there are two answers. The first is that a 
state cannot foreclose the exercise of constitutional rights by 
mere labels. The second is that abstract discussion is not the 
only species of communication which the cons·ti tution protects; 
the first amendment also protects vigorous advocacy, certainly 
of lawful ends, against governmental intrusion. The decisions 
of this court have consistently held that only a compelling 
state interest in the regulation of a subject within the state's 
constitutional power of regulation can justify limiting first 
amendment freedoms. Thus it is no answer to the constitutional 
claims asserted by petitioner to say, as the Virginia Supreme 
Court of Appeals has said, that the purpose of these regulations 
were merely to insure high professional standards and not to 
curtail free expression. For a state may not, under the guise 
of prohibiting professional misconduct, ignore constitutional 
rights. 
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The rationale of the opinion is that NAACP and the defense fund, in solicit-
ing for people to start suits in desegregation cases, engaged in a political 
activity protected by the 1st and 14th amendments. 
The court concluded: 
Although the petitioner has amply shown that its activities fall 
within the first amendment's protections, the state has failed to 
advance any substantial regulatory interest, in the form of 
substantive evils flowing from petitioners'activities, which can 
justify the broad prohibitions which it has imposed. 
Justices Harlan, Clark, and Stewart diss~nted, holding.the statute was a 
permissible regulation having its origins in the long standing common law prohi-
bitions of champerty, maintenance, and barratry and the canons of ethics against 
soliciting, stating that the state's felt need for regulation of professional 
conduct may reasonablly extend beyond mere "ambulance chasing." 
Three cases followed NAACP which are important in two respects. They further 
chipped away at the canons of ethics and showed the concern of the Court toward 
attorney's fees. In these cases the majority opinions relied on Button's appli-
cation of the 1st and 14th amendments. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen 
v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, and United Transportation union v. State Bar of Michigan, 
401 U.S. 576, involved the same union under different names. In order to assist 
the prosecution of claims by railroad workers injured or killed on'th~ job, the 
union maintained a department of legal aid counsel. Under its operation the union 
selected lawyers to represent claimants in railroad personal injury cases. When 
a worker was injured or killed, the secretary of the local contacted him or his 
widow, recommended against the claim being settled without first seeing a lawyer, 
and advised consulting the lawyer selected by the union. The State Bar of 
Virginia sought an injunction restraining the union activity as a violation of the 
solicitor rule. In a 6 to 2 opinion by Justice Black, the Supreme Court reversed 
a decree of the Virginia Supreme Court barring the union's practices. In his 
opinion, Justice Black relying on Button, reiterated that a state cannot foreclose 
exercise of constitutional rights by labels, and then stated, what "Virginia 
sought to halt is not commercialization of the legal profession which might threaten 
the moral and ethical fabric of the administration of justice." 
In dissenting opinions, two justices stated that the court by this opinion 
overthrows state regulation of the legal profession and relegates the practice of 
law to the level of a commercial enterprise. 
In the Michigan transportation case, after the Virginia court amended its 
decree in accordance with the court's decision, the Michigan Supreme Court entered 
a decree similar to that of Virginia. This decree was also reversed in a 5 to 4 
decision by Justice Black, with the observation, "The state bar's complaint 
appears to be a plea for court protection of unlimited legal fees." 
The third of this trio of cases is united Mine Workers v. Illinois State 
Bar Association, 389 U.S. 217. This case involved the right of the union to hire 
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a lawyer on a salary basis to handle workmen's compensation cases for its 
members. The Illinois court enjoined the union's activity as constituting the 
unauthorized practice of law. The Illinois Supreme Court af,firmed, overriding the 
contention that the union's activity was protected under the free speech and 
assembly rights of the 1st amendment. Consistently, Justice Harlan wrote a strong 
dissent against the erosion of the state's power to regulate in the maintenance 
of the high standards within the legal profession. 
In summary, the court's earlier holdings that commerc~al'advertising is 
not protected by the 1st and 14th amendments~has been modified, so that some 
commercial advertising is protected depending on the 'nature and purpose of the 
advertisement. Whether a statute or ethical canon proscribing certain conduct 
and activities, including members of the bar, will be violative of the 1st and 
14th amendments will be subject to the balancing principle expressed in Button 
and the subsequent cases. 
In Cohen v. Harley, 366 u.S. 117, a disciplinary action for soliciting, 
Justice Harlan said: 
It is no less true than trite that lawyers j\1st operate in a three-fold 
capacity, as self-employed businessmen as it were, as trusted agents 
of their clients, and as assistants to the court in search of a just 
solution to disputes. It is certainly not beyond the re~lm of permis-
sible state concerns to conclude that too much attention to-~he business 
of getting clients may be incompatible with a sufficient devotion to 
duties which a lawyer owes to the court, or that the "payment of awards 
to persons bringing in legal business" is inconsistent with the person-
ally disinterested position a lawyer should maintain. 
In Goldfarb, Chief Justice Burger stated that it is relevent in determining 
if a particular restraint violates the Sherman Act, whether the restraint operates 
upon a professional as distinguished from a business. In the concluding para-
graph, the court stated: 
We recognize that the states have a compelling interest in the 
practice of professions within their boundaries, and that as a 
part of their power to protect the public health, safety, and 
other valid interests they have broad power to establish standards 
for licensing practitioners and regulating the practice of profes-
sions. We also recognize that in some instances the state may 
decide that "forms of competition usual in the business world 
may be demoralizing tb the ethical standards of a profession." 
[Citing Semler v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners] * * * 
T.he interest of the state in regulating lawyers is especially 
great since lawyers are essential to the primary governmental 
function of administering justice, and have historically been 
"officers of the courts." * * * In holding that certain anti-
competitive conduct by lawyers is within the reach of the Sherman 
Act we intend no diminution of the authority of the state to 
regulate its professions. 
In Bigelow v. Virginia, 44 L. Ed.2d 600, a case in which Bigelow published 
an ad for abortions in New York, he was convicted of violation of a Virginia 
statute making it amisdemeanor by the sale or circulation of any publications 
encouraging or prompting the procurring of an abortion. Justice Blackmun in a 
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7 to 2 opinion said: 
We conclude, therefore, that the Virginia courts erred in their 
assumption that advertising as such was entitled to no' first 
amendment protection and that appellant Bigelow had no legitimate 
first amendment interest * * * ' 
To the extend that cbmmercial activity is subject to regulation, 
the relationship of speech to that activity may be one factor, 
among others, to be considered in weighing the first amend-
ment interest against the governmental interest alleged. Adver-
tising is not thereby stripped of all first amendment pro~ection. 
The relationship of speech to the market place of products or of 
services does not make it valueless in~he market place of ideas. 
The U.S. Supreme Court just decided the case of'Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council v. State Board of Pharmacy involving a state statute prohibiting 
prescription drug prices. It stated that advertising is protected under the first 
amendment although it may be regulated under different standards than noncommer-
cial activities. The Court specifically stated its decision did not limit the 
rights of the states to license and regulate to ensure professional conduct. The 
court specifically stated the decision did not apply to the medical and legal 
professions,which may require consideration of different standards. 
V. The position of the American Bar Association on Advertisiq~. 
Under the 1969 ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, still effective in 
Kentucky under the provisions of RAP 3.130, lawyers can only place their names, 
the fact that they are a lawyer, addresses,and telephone numbers in telephone 
directories and yellow pages in geographic areas where the lawyer resides and/or 
practices. A lawyer may place biographical data and areas of concentration or 
limited practice in ABA approved law lists. Of course, law lists are not readily 
available to the public at large. 
The ABA Ethics Committee, earlier this year, caused an uproar in the legal 
profession by recommending to that Body's House of Delegates that lawyers be 
permitted to engage in any type of advertising as long as it is not "false, 
fraudulent, misleading or deceptive." Enforcing such a provision with discipline 
would be impossible because of its ambiguity. Fortunately, the ABA Committee on 
professional discipline skillfully amended the proposal only to permit lawyers to 
put information into law lists, legal directories, directories published by bar 
associations,and the yellow pages. In addition to the essentially biographical 
information now permitted under the 1969 code, an attorney may, under ABA guide-
lines, list: 1) a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation; 2) avail-
ability of a written schedule of fees or an estimate for a specific service; 3) 
whether credit cards or other credit arrangements are permissible; and 4) office 
and other hours of availability. 
The form and language of any published information must be the same for 
all lawyers in any given state. 
Justin A. Stanley, ABA President-elect, has stated that he is "opposed to 
commercial advertising by lawyers beyond that now permitted by our code (after 
131 
the February amendments).If 
Each state must adopt or reject the ABA amendments adopted at its February 
1976 meeting. The Virginia State Bar Association, an agency of the Supreme Court 
of Virginia, in view of being sued by a consumer union unde'r the 1969 code, pro-
hibits publication of lawyers' fees and specialties in law lists, recommended to 
its state's supreme court the adoption of the new ABA amendments. The state 
supreme court rejected the recommendation. 
The Michigan State Bar Association is taking a middle grpund in its recom-
mendations. Its proposal will limit the numper of items permitted for publication 
to: 
(1) Name, name of law firm, if any, and legally related public 
office held, if any; 
(2) Business address and telephone number; 
(3) Whether or not available for private practice (if not, no 
further information to be given); 
(4) Extraordinary office hours, if any; 
(5) Age and date of admission to practice in Michigan; 
(6) College degrees other than law degree and where earned; 
(7) Where law degree received; 
(8) Areas of concentration in practice of law if and when 
certification or selection thereof is approved by state 
bar assembly; 
(9) Whether or not each lawyer will consult for the initial 
conference on any matter at the limited fee or not more 
than $10 for the first half hour; 
(10) Fluency in any foreign language. 
VI. The position of the American Medical Association on Advertising. 
A statement on advertising and solicitation by physicians, reaffirming 
longstanding policy, was adopted by the AMA judicial council at its meeting in 
San Francisco in April. The council said the AMA's Principles of Medical Ethics 
"are intended to discourage abusive practices which exploit patients and the 
public and interfere with freedom in making an informed choice of physicians and 
free competition among physicians." 
In its statement, the judicial council points out that "the principles do 
not proscribe advertising; they proscribe the solicitation of patients." Physicians 
may furnish information to the public through "the accepted local media of adver-
tising or communication which are open to all physicians on like conditions," the 
council stated. As examples it gave office signs, professional cards, dignified 
announcements, telephone directory listings and reputable directories. The council 
said the information could include the physician's name, type of practice, office 
location, office hours, and other information "that will enable people to make a 
more informed choice of physician." If the physician chooses to supply fee in-
formation to a reputable directory, the council stated, the "data may include his 
charge for a standard office visit or his fee or range of fees for specific types 
of services, provided disclosure is made of the variable and other pertinent factors 
affecting the amount of the fee." 
The council defines "solicitation" in the principles as "the attempt to 
obtain patients by persuasion or influence using statements or claims which (1) 
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contain testimonials; (2) are intended or likely to create inflated or unjustified 
expectations or favorable results; (3) are self-laudatory and imply that the 
physician has skills superior to other physicians; or (4) contain incorrect or 
incomplete facts, or representations or implications that are likely to cause 
the average person to misunderstand or be deceived." The Kent'Ucky Hedical Associa-
tion adopts the position of the Judicial Council of the National Association. 
VII. The position of the Kentucky Bar Association. 
At its regular board meeting on January 16, 1976 the board of governors of 
the association adopted a resolution in opposition to the proposed rules of the 
ABA Ethics Committee and any other action by the ABA to commercialize the prac-
tice of law and inserting a commercial interest-' into the client-attorney relation-
ship. The resolution supports other possible means to 'provide useful information 
to the public to assist the public in finding appropriate counsel including a 
statewide lawyer referral service. The KBA has a committee studying the ABA code 
amendments relating to advertising. The committee should report to the Board of 
Governors at its July meeting. The Board will make such recommendations to the 
Supr,eme Court of Kentucky as it deems appropriate. 
VIII. Benefits of communication and evils of advertising. 
The evils of professionals advertising are reflected in the humor of Art 
Buchwald when he wrote an ad for "Ivladman Dr. Kelly" announcing the greatest 
surgery bargain in history to the first 100 people who showed up at his Wesley 
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Heights clinic on George Washington's birthday. The lucky patients were to be 
given a complete operation, including anesthesia and post-operative care, for 
only $2. Other bicentennial bargains offered by Dr. Kelly included a brain 
operation for $14.95, a kidney transplant for $29.50,and a complete blood trans-
fusion for $3.95. 
This was not an example of a communication to assist the public in 
obtaining competent services, of course, it was an advertisement. It was unprofes-
sional. It clearly had a solicitation goal. 
A communication designed to inform a member of the public of qualified 
professionals to meet either their legal or medical needs is beneficial. Perhaps 
our respective professions should be more careful in their deliberations to use 
the word "communication" rather than "advertising." 
IX. The future. 
The advertising issue will be decided by the courts. There may be a 
distinction made between the right of a physician to advertise and the lawyer's 
right. Lawyers are government officials in that they are officers of the court 
on which the administration of justice depends. I believe that the KBA will be 
slow to recommend changes in the Code of Brofessional Responsibility; however, 
it may be more diligent in discovering methods to inform the public of the avail-
ability of competent counsel through a program of legal specialization and perhaps 
a statewide lawyer referral service. Ultimately, I believe the U.S. Supreme 
Court will hold that the legal and medical professions are not businesses; there-
fore, advertising, as we know it in the business world, is not a right protected 
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by the 1st and 14th amendments. From the antitrust position I believe the Court 
will not permit commercial advertising by lawyers or physicians. Such findings 
would seem to be in the best interest of the public we work to serve. 
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PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION--PROS AND CONS 
Robert E. Rich, J.D. 
Taft, Stettinius and Hollister 
Cincinnati, Ohio 
The subject of professional corporations and whether a practice should be 
incorporated are subjects that are receiving a lot of attention these days. The 
basic choices involved in incorporation are the .same for lawyers and doctors. It 
eventually boils down to the question of how the professional is going to manage 
and invest the income from his practice. I tliInk every professional in this day 
and age will have to consider whether or not to incorpcirate his practice. If he's 
already incorporated, he must consider what to do with this monster that he may 
have on his hands. 
There are no automatic formulas for incorporation. Not all physicians and 
not all lawyers should be incorporated. But there are many who should, depending 
on the facts and circumstances that surround their practice, their lifestyle, and 
their age. Age is a very important consideration. 
I'll give you one word of warning at the beginning: you should beware of 
advisors who come to you with a set, established program. Not all doctors should 
be incorporated, but some doctors should not get by without incorpor~ting. 
There are a number of problems that can be encountered in professional 
incorporation. The mere mention of the words "accumulated earnings problem" or 
the "unreasonable compensation problem," sound horrible. They can be pretty bad, 
even for technicians and tax lawyers. I could make your hair stand up with stories 
about those problems. But I don't think you should shy away from the subject just 
because those technical problems are there. Most, if not all, these problems can 
be solved by proper planning. 
There's a great deal of literature on the subject of professional incorpo-
ration. Back in the middle 1960's the articles were all saying not to incorporate 
because the Internal Revenue Service was against it and there were potential prob-
lemssuch as unreasonable compensation and personal holding company status. In 
about 1969, however, the IRS decided they weren't going to be against it because 
they lost six or seven cases in a row. Then the articles began to say that perhaps 
incorporation was the thing to do. There was a great rush then for professional 
incorporation. I think some people incorporated who should not have. 
Now I'm seeing articles in publications such as Medical Economics and even 
our professional law journals to the effect that as a result of the changes in the 
Keogh Plan by the Pension Reform Act of 1974 maybe incorporation is not such a 
good thing anymore. However, I don't think that you can leave your financial 
future up to the article writers who attempt to generalize about a problem which 
really involves analysis of specific facts and circumstances. I'd like to try in 
the time that I have to discuss some of those facts and circumstances which would 
be taken into consideration in deciding whether or not to incorporate your prac-
tice. Then I'd like to discuss some of the requirements for the proper operation 
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of a professional corporation so that you can avoid some of the pitfalls which 
you may experience if you're not careful. 
First of all, it would certainly be foolish for anyo~e to incorporate their 
practice and thereby cause additional problems. It should be established and 
operated so as to run more or less automatically. It will take some initial 
adjustments to get the corporation established, but you should be able to get 
into the routine of practicing your profession in the corporate form quickly. 
The primary objective of a professioEal corporation is to obtain the same 
tax shelter benefits that the executives of large corporations get--retirement 
plans or deferred comRensation--whichreally are not' available to professionals in 
a similar degree unless they incorporate. A qualified retirement Blan is really 
a form of a savings program. It's a system whereby you save part of the money 
you earn from your practice each year. The benefit of a qualified plan is that 
you can make the savings before paying taxes on the money. You get a deferral 
on your tax bill. There are in many cases great advantages to being able to 
defer the payment of the tax because you are able to contribute money to a qual-
ified pension or profit-sharingplan, take a tax deduction for it, and use the 
government's money to build up a fund over 15, 20, or 30 ¥ears. At the end, 
you'll have a great deal more than you would have if you had put your money in 
savings or investment after paying tax on it. Certainly, the kind of savings 
program we're talking about here should be approached as a conserva~ve invest-
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ment, however. This is not going to be like an oil well in Texas. This should 
be viewed as something that you're going to have when you get to be 65, 70, or 80 
years old. 
One of the basic considerations in deciding whether to incorporate is 
whether you will be able to save any money after incorporation. The establish-
ment of a qualified corporate retirement plan is not going to enable you to have 
more money to spend. Unless you have been saving some part of your earnings, you 
will have to reduce spendable income with incorporation. On the other hand, if 
you're in the 50 percent tax bracket, which for joint taxpayers starts at about 
$44,000 of taxable income, and you incorporate, anything that you put into a 
qualified retirement plan--or anything that you put into a Keogh plan if you 
don't incorporate--is money that you would otherwise have had to pay 50 percent 
of to the government. So even though you have to reduce your spending somewhat 
to build up a savings program, you only have to reduce it by one half of what 
you're able to save. 
The. decision to incorporate would also involve analysis by each of you of 
your personal living habits. How much money do you have available to set aside? 
Can you change your habits and be able to save money? Can your wife or husband 
change her or his habits and be able to save money? How much money are you going 
to have to spend in the next few years for the college education of children? If 
you are 45 or 50 years old and you have six kids in college, then incorporation 
is probably not for you at this time. If you have elderly parents whom you're 
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obligated to support, then again a professional corporation possibly should be post-
poned, depending on your other financial circumstances. 
We have a general rule of thumb that a professional should not incorporate 
unless the net income from his practice is at least $50,000 or maybe even $60,000 
to $70,000. You know that you can contribute 15 percent of your taxable income 
or self-employment earnings to a Keogh Plan with a maximum contribution of $7500. 
At $50,000 the 15 percent mark is $7500, and that's how I get tO,the breaking 
point. 
It is possible in a professional corpo~ation to gain additional tax deduc-
tions that are not available to the unincorporated. Those tax deductions, aside 
from the qualified retirement plans, include disability insurance and ciedical and 
dental care expenses, medical care expenses to an individual, but only if they 
exceed 3 percent of his adjusted gross income. In most cases the medical expenses 
are less than that, but they are still very real. If you have a corporation, you 
can deduct medical expenses from dollar one, in effect, and not be affected by the 
3 percent limitations. 
There's a certain type of life insurance which your corporation can buy, 
the premiums for which it can deduct. This special insurance is group-term life 
insurance under section 79 of the Internal Revenue Code, for which a~ individual 
would normally get no tax deduction. 
There is some discussion of the idea that if you're not able to save much 
money now, then incorporate. Go to all the trouble to get the lawyer, the 
insurance man, and the bank trust officer involved and get yourself obligated to 
a larger number of people. Then when you get all this paper structure set up, 
you will then be forced to save money that you otherwise wouldn't save. I have 
always been skeptical of that approach. I know a lot of life insurance has been 
sold on that basis, but I would think that a professional should be able to con-
trol and not need the prodding of the forced savings concept. 
There are still some advantages to a corporate retirement plan over a 
plan which requires no incorporation. The limitation on contributions to 
a Keogh plan has been raised from 10 percent of earnings or $2500 to 15 percent 
of earnings or $7500. However, if you're able to save more than $7500 in a year, 
then incorporation should be looked int~because with qualified defined benefit 
corporate plans/you can put aside 25 percent of your earnings or $26,825, which-
is less. 
Many of the articles which I mentioned had condemned corporate plans focused 
taxes. If you have the Keogh plan, you have a much smaller plan; therfore, 
the money out in a lump sum, your taxes will be less than with a 
,~r\~'~A~ate plan. In these articles, it always comes out that in the corporate 
you wind up with more money in hand, but not as much as the initial sum that 
u build up would indicate. However, those articles and that approach make many 
as to when the money is going to be taken out, how it's going to be 
down, and how that money that's not put into the corporate retirement plan 
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is going to be kept after taxes and invested in some other form of tax-exempt 
investment such as municipal bonds. I'm not at all sure that it's good to be 
forced to invest in tax-exempt municipal bonds, especially with the experience 
in New York. 
There are still some differences in the eligibility requirements between 
the Keogh and the corporate plans. In Keogh you must include all employees who 
have 3 years of service with your partnership or sole proprietorship. If you 
have a corporate plan, you can exclude employees until they reach age 25. A 
person who's reached age 25 must come in afteL at least 1 year of service, how-
ever. 
The treatment of Social Security is also different in the two plans. It's 
impractical to integrate a Keogh plan with Social Security. You could do so, but 
two-thirds of the contributions of the plan must be allocated among the lower 
paid employees. A sole practitioner or partnership certainly would not want to 
establish a plan in which two-thirds of the contributions of the plan are allocated 
to lower paid employees. Integration of Social Security into the corporate plan, 
on the other hand, means that you contribute from 5 to 7 percent less on the 
compensation of lower paid employees as you do for yourself. You could put a full 
25 percent away for yourself and maybe only 18 or 19 percent for lower paid 
employees. It reduces your costs. 
The federal estate tax exclusion for distributions from a qualified retire-
ment plan established by a corporation is still available, but there is no such 
* exclusion for distribution from a Keogh plan. This also applies to the Kentucky 
inheritance tax. There is no justification that I can see for this difference. 
It can mean a significant savings, because while the estate tax rate is only at 
3 percent above $60,000, it can go all the way up to 77 percent on $10,000,000. 
On an average estate for professionals, which might be between $100,000 and 
$250,000, the federal estate tax rate is 30 percent. 
There are, of course, no loans permitted from the Keogh plan, but with a 
corporate profit-sharing plan it is possible for a participant to borrow money from 
it in cases of unusual need or emergency. There's a lot of question as to what 
an unusual need or emergency is, but we have taken the position that unusual 
medical expenses would be a justification for borrowing money from the plan. 
If education expenses come along for children in college, and there's no other 
way to get the money, it could be borrowed from your corporate profit-sharing plan. 
The retirement plans and the entire corporate arrangement should be as 
flexible as possible since we don't know what the future holds for us. That's not 
possible with the Keogh plan. No distributions can be made from the Keogh plan 
*This distribution was eliminated by section 2009(cl of the Tax Reform Act of 
1976. Effective January 1, 1977, amounts receivable from a corporate or Keogh 
plan and paid in a manner other than lump-sum will be excluded from the decedent-
participant'sestate. An annuity or installments over a period of at least 36 
months are methods of distribution qualifying for the exclusion. 
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without paying a penalty tax until 6 months before the professional reaches age 
60. On the other hand, distributions must begin 6 months before the professional 
reaches age 71. 
corporate plan. 
Those required distribution times do not apply in a qualified 
A Keogh plan is a<lse less flexible in that if it covers an owner-employee--
that's an employee who owns at least 10 percent of the stock or a 10 percent 
interest in the partnership or is sole proprietor--then even a profit-sharing plan 
must provide a definite contribution formula, IRC §40l(d) (2) (B). In other words, 
you must agree to contribute a fixed amount each year. That's not true with a 
-, 
corporate profit-sharing plan. If you have a bad year, or if you've taken 6 
months off to go to Europe and you don't have money to put into the corporate 
profit-sharing plan, you can skip the contribution for that year without affecting 
the status of your plan at all. Contributions to corporate profit-sharing plans 
are completely flexible. You can put nothing in each year or you can contribute 
up to 15 percent of your compensation in each year. That flexibility always seems 
to be one of the advantages of a professional corporate plan. 
There also remains an unusual difference in the voluntary contributions 
that can be made to a corporate plan as compared to a Keogh plan. If you should 
be fortunate enough, after you have put money into the retirement plans to the 
full extent, to still have money around to invest, you can make voluntary contri-
butions to both a Keogh and a corporate plan. There are no current deductions 
on those contributions, but the earnings on those contributions will be tax-free 
until you take them out at the end. However, voluntary contributions to a Keogh 
plan are limited to $2500 per year. The limitation on voluntary contributions to 
a corporate plan is an amount equal to 10 percent of compensation received during 
all years of participation. But keep in the back of your mind that the voluntary 
contributions you make to a corporate plan, after the Tax Reform Act, will count 
as annual additions to the plan to the extent that they exceed 6 percent of your 
compensation for the year. But that still can very often be more than $2500 dol-
lars. 
There are other fringe benefit plans which a professional corporation can 
adopt other than the qualified retirement plan. You're not going to get a tremen-
dous amount of tax savings from those other plans, like the medical expense plan 
or the deductions for disability insurance or the group term life insurance plan. 
If a sole proprietor incorporated and the tax savings from all these plans put 
together was $500 or $1000, that would be unusually good. The big tax saving 
comes from the qualified retirement plan. 
There are some non-tax considerations to incorporation of your practice. 
One is that there are some limitations on liability. Under most state laws and 
the common law, you are liable for the acts of your partner to the full extent 
of your personal assets if you are not incorporated. If you have a corporation, 
that joint liability ends. If a shareholder of a professional corporation commits 
malpractice, of course, he's liable to the full extent of his assets under the 
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state laws, but the other shareholders in the corporation are not liable. The 
corporation itself would have liability, but in most cases we try to keep the 
assets of the corporation small so that if the liability should ever happen to 
attach, not much would be lost. 
There are some organizational advantages to incorporation. It can aid 
efficiency to get defined lines of authority--to have a board of directors, a 
president, a treasurer. There are some advantages to operating in the corporate 
form just because it gives a certainty of form of operation. 
Another advantage which I'm not so sure about is that young doctors may 
feel very impressed when they find that the persons who may hire them have 
incorporated their practice and have all of ±hese retirement plans and fringe 
benefit programs established. It makes you look a 19t more like you have the 
latest in the practice of medicine or law. 
There are some aspects that you've probably heard about that I don't feel 
are beneficial to the corporation. One of those is the ownership of an automobile 
by the corporation. It can be actually a detriment. If there's more than one 
doctor, and one drives a Volkswagen and the other drives a Mercedes Benz, you may 
have a cause for friction right there if the corporation owns both those autos. 
Additionally, the ownership of automobiles by a professional corporation can 
cause a tax problem. If the Internal Revenue Service audits the corporation and 
decides that the automobile is not entirely for use in the business, it will treat 
the use of the automobile by the doctor as a dividend and deny a dec3.uction to the 
corporation. The result is that the corporation pays tax on the disallowed 
deduction at the corporate tax rate, which is 20 percent, and then the doctor pays 
a tax on the use of the automobile at his normal, personal mdividual tax rate as 
a dividend. If the doctor owned the auto and claimed the deduction on his 
individual return, there would not be the double tax risk. 
There's another advantage which I want to talk about. In many cases a 
doctor or lawyer will own his own office building. One way to avoid paying taxes 
on it is to transfer the rents from your office building to your children in trust. 
The courts have uniformly held that this is a sham transaction, and that the rentals 
are not proper business deductions. However, if you have a corporation which is 
operated properly, that gives you a legitimate business reason to pay rent, because 
your corporation must pay rent since it is a separate legal entity from the doctor 
or lawyer. That rent should be and will be deductible by the corporation when the 
payments go from the corporation to the trust. The income in the trust can be 
accumulated for the benefit of the children to pay for their education. The rent 
payments as they are earned by the trust will be subject to tax from either the 
trust or the child, if the distribution is made from the trust for his benefit. 
There are some problems to watch for in this situation. If the trust pays 
any of the support obligations of the parent, then the parent will have to pay 
income tax on such amounts that go into the trust. The way to alleviate that 
problem is simply to have the trustee accumulate the money in the trust for the 
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benefit of the children to pay for their education. The rent payments as they are 
earned by the trust will be subject to tax from either the trust or the child, if 
the distribution is made from the trust for his benefit. 
There are some problems to watch for in this situation~ If the trust pays 
any of the support obligations of the parent, then the parent will have to pay 
income tax on such amounts that go into the trust. The way to alleviate that 
problem is simply to have the trustee accumulate the money in the trust for the 
benefit of the children and not pay it out to them until they reach age 18, when 
the legal support obligation ceases. This jus~ happens to be, at about the time 
that they're going into college, when the big expenses ,come. 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
QUESTION: Did you say that with the Keogh plan, you must make a contribution every 
year once you've established the plan? 
MR. RICH: Yes, if you're a sole proprietor or if you're a 10 percent partner or 
more. Furthermore, you can't vary the amount of percentage that you pay. 
QUESTION: In a corporation, how do you go about determining salaries? We have a 
partnership in our law firm, but we have wide ranges of income. It appears to 
me that the form of written contracts for the distribut'ion of income varies in proportion 
to the amount that was earned. If one partner, because of his'productivity or 
efficiency, makes more money and puts more accounts receivable on the,pooks of the 
corporation, those differences could be reflected in the compensation formula that 
a corporation adopts, just as it can be done with a partnership. 
It is, of course, a question with a corporation as to whether compensation 
paid by it is deductible. Should the professional corporation pay dividends? We 
feel that it should. The dividends should be based on the capital investment that 
the former partners--now shareholders--have made in the corporation. There are 
two cas~s dealing with this subject: McCandless Tile Service, 422 F.2d 1336 (Ct. 
Cl.,1970), and Barton-Gillet Co., 29 TCM 679 (1970), which were both bad Gases for 
the taxpayers and good cases for the Internal Revenue Service. We advise most of 
our professional corporations to payout some dividends because the brunt of the 
argument is that there should be some return on invested capital to the shareholders. 
Of course, you can cite many cases of corporations that don't pay dividends--
American Airlines doesn't pay dividends and they have a lot of capital--but in your 
planning you should attempt to head off the problem by paying a dividend to help 
counter the unreasonable compensation argument. 
We have many cases--and none have been successfully challenged--where com-
pensation is based on productivity. It was a wonderful thing to have during the 
wage-price freeze. Many advisors at that time said that you couldn't raise 
salaries because of the wage-freeze portion of the Economic Stabilization Act, 
but with a formula for compensation you weren't subject to that. So that's some 
more flexibility that you might consider with regard to professional corporations. 
QUESTION: If all partners receive completely equal compensation after a term of 
indenture, could th~ corporation be worked so that the wage-price freeze would 
not adversely affect that situation? 
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MR. RICH: Yes. Again, I would suggest that a clause in the compensation section 
of your employment contract--and it's very important to have an employment con-
tract--state that the intention is to. distribute to professional employee Doctor 
, 
X an amount in total compensation that's equal to the billing that he has gen-
erated. We had no particular problems with sustaining increases in compensation 
which were caused by an increase in productivity and efficiency, so long as the 
corporation had not raised its fees for professional services. 
To return to the body of the lecture, you should be aware that there are a 
lot of beginning expenses, including attorney;'s fees, filing fees, additional fees 
to your accountant, fees for expenses in changing yoqr signs, billhead, phone 
listings, and things of that sort. We would judge that for a one-man corporation, 
those expenses might be as much as $2,000 or $3,000. Basically that's a one-
shot charge just to get the corporation set up. There are some annual recurring 
expenses which you'll also want to consider. There will be extra expenses because 
of legal and accounting fees, and if you have a paid trustee, you'll have trustee's 
fees. Those totals shouldn't amount to more than $200 or $300. If you have a 
defined benefit plan, you'll have to hire an actuary. They charge anywhere from 
$500 to $1,000 a year for making the computation necessary to calculate the 
contributions of the plan. 
One of the big costs of incorporating arises from the need"t~ include other 
employees in the plan. If you have a Keogh plan, of course, you're already doing 
that. By having a corporate plan you can lessen the cost of including the other 
employees by taking advantage of integration with Social Security and by providing 
in the plan for deferred vesting, which I didn't mention, but which you can't 
have in the Keogh plan. 
There are additional costs for Social Security coverage. You'll have to 
cover yourself if you're in a corporation, and so, of course, you'll have to pay 
Social Security tax on yourself and an employee. However, the difference is not 
very great between the self-employed person rate, which is 7.9 percent, and the 
joint rate for the corporation and the employee. Since the employer's portion of 
the Social Security tax is also a tax deduction, the effective rates which you 
should compare are 7.9 percent for the self-employed rate compared with 8.7 or 
8.8 if you have a corporation and pay the tax both on yourself and on the corpo-
ration. 
In Indiana there is a gross income tax which increases the costs of operating 
as a corporation. There's no way to avoid that. In most cases, we attempt to 
have our corporate client payout most of its earnings in some tax-deductible form, 
either in the form of compensation to the professionals or contributions to 
qualified plans or, if necessary, a bonus to the professionals. Then there is a 
small dividend each year. But in Indiana with its gross income tax there is a 
cost of a little over 1 percent. 
There are some formalities of corporate operation. There are only two cases 
which the Internal Revenue Service has won in challenging corporate status. Of 
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course the IRS picks good cases to litigate. One was the Roubik case, 53 T.C. 
365 (1969), which was decided in the Tax Court. That was the case where four 
radiologists incorporated and then proceeded in all respects, to act as though 
they had no corporation. The individuals in the corporation received payments 
from hOGpital personally and then endorsed the checks over to the corporation. 
Theydidn't hold themselves out to the public as a corporation. The hospitals 
weren't even informed that these four radiologists had incorporated. They worked 
at four different hospitals, and there was very little interchange of work among 
them. There was really no unity of operation.-, One of the doctors continued to 
participate as a partner in another professional venture. He received money 
outside the corporation framework from that work, but that was professional 
practice income. Each doctor had a contract in his individual name with the 
hospital at which he performed services. If you're going to have a professional 
corporation, your contracts and formal legal documents should be in the corporate 
name. 
Each of the individual doctors supervised his own personnel. There wasn't 
any corporate management. They sent bills out in their individual names. It 
was just a horrendous case, a case that the government had to win. The case tells 
you the minimum things you should do to act like a corporation. If you aren't 
careful, the status of your corporation is in jeopardy. You reallydGn't lose 
a great deal, but you don't gain the benefits of incorporation either. 
There are some professional management consultants around who will advise 
you that in order to eliminate the cost of including other employees in a qualified 
corporate plan, you should have all of your employees put on the management con-
sultant firm's payroll. That's flying right in the face of the ruling in Roubik. 
That corporation didn't own any equipment; it didn't hire anyone except the 
doctors. 
If you're going to have a legitimate professional corporation, it must 
perform some business function. You should use the corporate name in your 
advertising and your phone listing. You should list it on your stationery; it 
should be on your bills, your contracts, your insurance policies, and your checks. 
If you're going to make a good case for establishing the separate existence of 
your corporation, you shouldn't be ashamed to use your corporate name. 
The other case that was lost by a professional corporation had the same 
sort of ridiculous facts. Epperson v. U.S., 74-1 USTC 4f9284. 
Some of the other formal requirements, such as articles of incorporation, 
by-laws and officers, are fairly standard things. One danger for lawyers, and 
you should be careful with this, is treating a professional corporation just the 
same as any other corporation. You shouldn't. They're different. They're 
different because they're a strictly personal service corporation. There is a set 
of different principles that apply, and you should be careful to recognize those. 
As I told you, the employment contract is a key document. There should be 
a clause in the employment contract to the effect that the doctor-employee is 
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devoting his exclusive services and loyalty to the corporation. In a one-man 
corporation, it is a very self-serving document, but it still should be there. 
It's important that these trappings be present, but they shoulqn't be burdensome 
to you. They should become automatic. 
You might also ada to your employment contract provisions tnat tne corporation 
expects the employees to have an automobile available for use, to subscribe to 
professional publications, and to attend meetings like this one in order to con-
tinue their professional education. By having that in the employment contract as 
a requirement of employment, it gives the doctor whose tax return is audited after 
he takes deductions for his trip to Bermuda for a confer,ence, or to Lexington, 
Kentucky for a conference, or to Cincinnati, Ohio for a conference, something to 
point to in saying that the expenses were required by his employer, the profes-
sional service corporation. 
It's fallacious to assume that having the corporation automatically legi ti-
mizes deductions for trips and conventions which are not really exclusively for 
business. If you're going to go on such trips and take such deductions, it's 
better that you do it on your personal return, not on the corporation's return, 
because of the double-tax problem I mentioned earlier in connection w:Lth automobiles. 
I won't go into some of the technical tax questions that I allude to in 
my outline about how to transfer your assets from your individual pracj:ice to the 
corporation. One thing to keep in mind in so doing is that it should be a tax-
free transfer. You should transfer accounts receivable to the corporation; it 
pays the taxes on them as it collects them. 
You should not transfer liabilities in excess of the value of the assets 
that you transfer. That would trigger a tax on you personally. In other words, 
if in your practice you borrow money, and you incorporate and transfer assets 
worth $1,000 plus loan obligations worth $2,000, then you individually as a 
result of that transfer have received, as far as the tax people are concerned, 
$1,000 worth of boot. That means that you have to pay tax on that $1,000 net 
difference. So make sure in your transfer to the professional corporation that 
the assets always exceed the liabilities. If necessary, keep the liabilities in 
your own name and pay them off personally rather than transfer them to the corpo-
ration. 
I mentioned the dividend ques.tion. I told you that you could payout on 
the basis of a formula. It's very important that you consider this and that you 
have a basis for the formula. However, I'm not as worried about the unreasonable 
compensation problem as other people are. We've had no bad experience with put-
ting the compensation formula in employment contracts. I think it should be done. 
Now let's talk about qualified retirement plans, pension plans, and profit-
sharing plans. If you're going to have just one plan, we recommend that you have 
a profit-sharing plan because it's the most most flexible. You don't have to 
contribute anything to it if you don't want to; you can put in up to 15 percent 
of the compensation paid to participants. 
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If you can save more than 15 percent, then you should consider using a 
money purchase pension plan too. That's just like a profit-sharing plan in that 
it doesn't guarantee any fixed benefit. However, it enables you to contribute 
an additional 10 percent. 
There may be advantages to very high income physicians in a defined benefit 
pension plan. A defined benefit plan is a kind of plan that provides a guaranteed 
monthly or annual income after you reach retirement age. You can put more money 
into a plan like that than you can with the two plans I've mentioned because it's a 
fixed end-benefit plan. The maximum benefit~der the new law, with the inflation 
adjustment is now $80,475 a year. To find out how much you have to contribute in 
I 
order to get that end benefit, you go to an actuary. He makes some calculations and 
assumptions and tells you how much you must put in each year. The amount that you put 
into such a plan is currently deductible to you or your professional corporation. 
I've done some rough calculations on this. If you're age 40, that means 
you have 25 years until you're 65. You could put $13,988 a year into it to fund 
an end benefit of $80,000. That assumes a 5 percent growth rate, a 5 percent 
interest rate, and that you pay in the same amount each year. It's called a level 
annual premium. If you're age 50, you would contribute, and deduct, $30,000 a 
year. But then you're talking about well over $100,000 in compensation to fund 
such a plan. 
You might be satisfied with a $26,825 limitation on annual contributions to 
your account in defined contribution plans. If you find that uncomfortable to 
live with,take a higher tax deduction than the $26,825 limit, you can do so by 
adding a defined benefit plan. 
That's because there's a special 140 percent rule for computing the limita-
tions on benefits when defined benefit and defined contribution plans are combined. 
For example, assume you have a defined contribution plan like profit-sharing, and 
fund that to the maximum percent, putting $26,825 into it. That would require 
income of $178,000. But after you put the 15 percent into that plan, you're 
entitled to have a separate defined-benefit plan, which will provide a maximum 
benefit of 40 percent of the benefit otherwise allowed by the law for defined 
benefit plans. The maximum plan is $80,000 and 40 percent of that is $32,000. To 
fund that, if you're age 55, costs $21,000 a year. So instead of being limited 
to the $26,000 limit that the new pension law provides, a doctor in that situation 
can put aside $47,000 ~ubject to the overall 25 percent deduction limiti. This is 
not for the average earner. This is certainly for the physician or lawyer with 
earnings of more than $150,000 per year. 
I think you should look into integrating any retirement plan you have as 
this can cut down the cost of including other employees. If you have two plans, 
you can only integrate one. Keep that in mind. You should also consider deferred 
vesting in all plans. The basic rule for small professional corporations is 
that you must have 100 percent vesting after 10 years of participation in the 
plan or 10 years of service with the corporation. The Internal Revenue Service 
is currently taking the position that an employee must have a vested interest of 
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40 percent in your plan after four years of service. That interpretation is sub-
ject to challenge. If you do have deferred vesting in your plan, it encourages 
an employee to stay longer, which is what you want. It also has the benefit that 
if they don't stay as long as you want them to, the benefit of their forfeitures 
will partly go to you. In a profit-sharing plan, the forfeitures are reallocated 
among the accounts of the existing participants on the basis of the relative 
sizes of their accounts, which means you would get most of them into your account. 
If it's a pension plan, the forfeiture is used to reduce the next year's contri-
butions to the plan. 
One thing I wanted to mention is insurance in a qualified plan. You will 
be beseiged, if you haven't already been if you've incorporated, by insurance men 
who encourage you to invest part of your plan assets in insurance. They will 
assure you that the tax laws permit 50 percent of your plan assets to be invested 
in insurance. I personally have doubts as to whether insurance is a good invest-
ment in a plan. If you need the death benefit protection, then possibly you 
should consider it. But just as a pure investment, insurance can usually be beat 
with some other form of investment. Even a savings and loan investment is better. 
So you should look very carefully at it. 
I'm not sure whether you know this or not, but if you 'do invest in life 
insurance in a qualified retirement plan, a portion of what goes intp the plan 
is taxed to the individual on whose life the insurance is purchased. By buying 
insurance in a qualified plan, it actually detracts from the tax savings that 
would otherwise be available. 
If you have a Keogh plan, the best advice as to what to do with it if 
you incorporate is to freeze it. It is possible to have it transferred, but in 
my opinion is more trouble than it's worth. The only advantage you gain is 
having all your eggs in one basket, with the same trustee investing both funds. 
The Keogh rules and restrictions continue to apply to the Keogh funds in any 
case. 
QUESTION: How do you go about getting your plan approved by the Internal Revenue 
Service? 
MR. RICH: I'm glad you mentioned that. I've run into some cases where people 
have not submitted plans to the Internal Revenue Service for qualification deter-
mination. That should be a standard step. You do that after you adopt your plan. 
It will be submittedto Louisville if you're in Kentucky. In Indiana it goes to 
the Indianapolis office. In Ohio it goes to the Cincinnati office or the Cleveland 
office. You send along forms which give summary descriptions of the plan, and then 
the Internal Revenue Service works with you in changing your plan, if necessary, 
to make it conform to their latest requirements. They have special requirements 
for professional corporations. Just because you have a plan that satisfies the 
guidelines of the law doesn't mean that it will be approved. For instance, if 
it's a professional corporation, the IRS doesn't accept a very long vesting term. 
It doesn't like a 10-year vesting period. It prefers percentage vesting as each 
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year passes. For a vesting schedule to be approved, it must not discriminate in 
favor of higher-paid employees. Usually this is just a formal matter. You submit 
the plan to the IRS and they readily approve it. 
QUESTION: If you want to know more about this subject, is th~re a place that you 
can take short course on pension law or professional service corporations or what-
ever? 
MR. RICH: Yes. It seems like or there have been, in the past at least, a lot of 
conferences like this where the whole program is devoted to professional service 
corporations. Maybe you could have one here, ~ohn. 
MR. HICKEY: We had a day-and-a-half program on the Pension Reform Act when it 
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first carne out. There are quite a few by the American Bar Association, the 
American Law Institute, and other national groups on this currently. I don't 
know of any local ones that are immediately available. 
MR. RICH: But there are people around who specialize in professional corporations. 
Maybe you could just bend their ear for a while. 
MR. HICKEY: I think Professor Whiteside has a comment on something you just said. 
MR. WHITESIDE: Will a plan go through the IRS for approval as easily where a 
practitioner makes himself the trustee of hjs own plan? 
MR. RICH: There should be no problem to obtain qualification determination from 
IRS if the professional is his own trustee. There are some legal ques:!:ions. If 
the doctor is trustee and he's also on the advisory committee and he's also the 
only beneficiary, then we have the doctrine of merger of tr~st estates which 
could apply. The IRS has raised that question to our firm. We wrote a legal 
memorandum in reply, telling them why the doctrine of merger doesn't apply. It 
is a technical legal question, and if for some reason there are not other bene-
ficiaries beside the doctor, he should have his wife or a bank as trustee along 
with him. In most cases during the early years, a doctor could serve as trustee 
himself. But when the funds get to be in amounts which you need professional 
advice on how to invest and you don't have time to do it yourself, you might as 
well go to a professional trustee like a bank. 
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I'm going to talk to you about a subject in which you do not have an election 
like you do in choosing a professional service corporation. I'm going to talk to 
you about a subject which is as sure to happen to you as you are sitting in this 
room, because I'm going to talk to you about dea~h and taxes. I'm going to break 
this into two parts. First, we shall discuss what your estate consists of and what 
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the death taxes based on your estate consist of. Second, we shall discuss tax 
planning and economic planning for your family. In this lecture, I'm also going 
to talk about some major misconceptions that some doctors and lawyers have when 
it comes to estate planning. I am going to discuss estate planning for profes-
sionals like you, but much of what I'm going to say applies to other types of 
professionals as well as businessmen. 
One basic point about estate planning is that it is very similar to finger-
prints in that there are no two alike. What you own is probably not going to be 
similar to what the man sitting next to you owns. Your individual family situation 
is going to be different from the family situation of your neighbor. 
Let's first talk about what your estate consists of. What's included in 
your taxable estate for death tax purposes? The first item I usually think of in 
this area--and one of the most elective items--is life insurance. Life insurance 
should normally be one of the major assets in your estate. Why? Because over the 
years of our practice, in trying to increase the standard of living for ourselves 
and our family, it's important for us to take stock of what will happen to this 
standard of living upon our death. Life insurance gives immediate large benefits 
in the event we die. 
Let me talk to you about a problem that I see in many estates. In 24 of 25 
estate plans that I get involved in, I find it necessary to change the beneficiary 
of the life insurance policy. Think about your life insurance and about who the 
beneficiary is in your life insurance policy. If you"-re fairly typical of most 
people who take out life insurance, your wife is probably the primary beneficiary 
and your children are the secondary beneficiaries or maybe you don't even have a 
secondary beneficiary. Well, let me tell you about one important salient fact. 
Life insurance does not pass by willi it passes by contract. It doesn't make 
any difference what you state in that will. You can have a great marital deduc-
tion trust and a great residuary trust protecting your children until they become 
25 or 30, but if you don't change the beneficiary of the life insurance policies, 
those funds are going to be taxable and they're going to be distributed in accor-
IThis lecture was given before the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 and does 
not cover the changes reflected in that Act. 
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dance with that contract. So as a general practice, I effect the changes of 
beneficiaries to tie in with what the client wants in his will. 
Now let's talk about taxability of life insurance, because this involves 
, 
another great misconception. You have to take into consideration the two basic 
death tax laws--the federal estate and state inheritance tax laws. Life insurance 
proceeds paid at death are fully taxable for federal estate tax purposes if the 
decedent owned the policy at his death. Ownership rights of a life insurance 
policy cover a number of rights, such as the right to change beneficiary, the 
right to borrow on the policy, and the right to pledge the policy as security. 
In Kentucky, life insurance left to a named benefic,iary, to a testamentary trust, 
or to an inter vivos trust is nontaxable even though the decedent kept the owner-
ship rights. But if the estate is the beneficiary of a life insurance policy, it's 
fully taxable in Kentucky for Kentucky inheritance tax purposes. 
I'm not going to talk any more about qualified plans, because that was well 
covered by the previous speaker, but I do want to emphasize one thing about the 
qualified plan beneficiary. If you are incorporated and have a qualified plan, 
and if it's left to a named beneficiary, there are no federal estate taxes on it. 2 
However, if it's left to your estate, it is fully taxable for federal estate tax 
purposes. 
Now let me talk to you about another misconception; that's .. how title to real 
estate should be held. Real estate and personal property in joint survivorship 
are treated differently for federal estate tax purposes than for Kentucky inheri-
tance tax purposes. For federal estate tax purposes, if you have a piece of 
property in joint survivorship with your wife or anyone else, the full value of 
that real estate will be taxed upon your death in your estate, unless the other 
party can prove that he or she made an economic contribution to that property. 
That fact sometimes is very difficult to prove. It's very difficult to explain 
to a widow that she does not have any legal interest that we can keep out of her 
husband's estate because she didn't make any financial contribution to it, when 
she might have raised the kids and done all the housework. Therefore, I quite 
often find that joint survivorship is one of the worst ways for property to be 
held. I normally make an exception to this rule when it comes to the home 
because joint survivorship of a home allows the wife to get the residence imme-
diately upon your death. Remember that joint survivorship property does not pass 
by will. 
Let me tell yo:u about a case I had about 5 years ago to illustrate the 
dangers of joint survivorship property. I had a client who came in for some 
estate planning. The first two things I discuss with all my clients are about 
2Since my talk, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 now states that a lump sum distribution 
from a qualified plan is taxable for federal estate tax purposes regardless of 
who is the beneficiary. 
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their family situation and what their estate consists of and how property is held. 
This man had been married previously and had three children, his wife had been 
married previously and also had three children, and they had one child together. 
, 
It was my client's desire to provide first for his wife's financial security with 
his total estate to be divided equally among the seven children later. Then 
I got into the second phase of our conference. This gentleman had assets of 
$1,600,000. All but $100,000 was in real estate. My next question to him was 
how was the title to the real estate held. He answered that all h1s real estate 
was in joint survivorship with his wife. I toJ,Jj him I could write a will with 
a marital deduction and set it up in a trust that would I eventually pass half of 
the property to his seven children. But then I said that nothing would pass by 
his will because joint survivorship means it's immediately going to pass to your 
wife when you die. I explained that if she dies one minute after you do and 
doesn't have a will, the three children by your prior marriage--under Kentucky 
law--are going to get nothing because her property will go by descent and distri-
bution to the ahildren by her previous marriage and to your one child. Then I 
presented the following additional contingencies. Let's say that a few years 
later your widow gets married and decides the best way for all the real estate 
to be held is in joint survivorship with her new husband. Then 'she dies. Her 
second husband might end up with $1,500,000 worth of property less taxe@., and 
all seven children could be left out in the cold. Believe me, at this point in 
the conversation, he's beginning to squirm. As another example, if your wife 
should decide later that she wants to leave the real estate differently from how 
you stated you wanted it in your will, all of the real estate will be left as 
she desires. 
Then I said, let's say that she leaves all of this property to the seven 
children in equal shares, with a similar trust as you will establish in your will 
and thus she carries out your wishes on all of the property that she's inherited 
from you. Your seven children are going to receive approximately $225,000 less 
and the taxing authorities are going to receive that much more because you over-
funded the marital deducti:on. In all probability, all the property you leave at 
your death is going to be taxed again at your wife's death. Now in joint 
survivorship real property between husband and wife, there is an escape valve for 
gift tax purposes. If the spouse contributed solely to the purchase of the 
property, you can transfer that portion back into the spouse's sole name without 
any gift tax consequences. Serious consideration should be given when you buy 
property to determine how the title to the property is to be held, and normally 
joint survivorship is not the best method to take title. 
Next, I would like to discuss with you professional partnerships and pro-
fessional corporations. What provision have you made for getting some funds out 
of this corporation as compensation, for example, for past services? What value 
do you have on that stock or on that partnership interest? Who's in the position 
to best determine what the value of your stock in the corporation or your partner-
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ship interest is? It's you! When you're healthy and your partners are healthy 
or your fellow stockholders are healthy, you can work out a reasonable agreement 
at arms length to protect the value of your interest as far as your estate is con-
cerned. 
If you own coin collections, stamp collections or other similar type 
property of value, take special care of them. If you are the executor or the 
attorney for an estate that has this type of property,you should put them in a 
safety deposit box immediately because they're like cash. These type properties 
are hard to evaluate and usually require the-use of experts. Sometimes it is 
necessary, where the value of the collection is high" to get experts from New York, 
Chicago,or Los Angeles who will come in and appraise and sometimes buy them. 
Everything you own is included in your estate. I've found that in 96 of 
100 cases, when my client sits down and takes a financial inventory of his estate, 
including face value of life insurance and fair market value of his real estate, 
he is surprised at the total value of his estate. If you haven't taken such an 
inventory, you should; it's later than you think. Anyone with an estate greater 
than $60,000 has an estate tax problem. Federal estate taxes affect everyone in 
this room. 
with the federal death tax you start off with the gross estate, which is 
the fair market value of everything you own. If you have real esta~e, don't 
think of it in terms of what you paid for it. Think of it in terms of what it's 
worth now because the taxing authorities will, and it can make a tremendous 
difference. You subtract from that the funeral expenses, debts, administrative 
expenses, mortgages, and that leaves you with an adjusted gross estate. You can 
leave one-half of the adjusted gross estate to your spouse tax-free. Charitable 
bequests or devises are also completely deductible. These can be made in specific 
bequests to your church or other charity, or you can do it in such a way that the 
charitable institution gets the remainder interest of a trust. But if you do it 
the latter way, remember that there are only three ways under the law to do it. 
You must either have a uni-trust, annuity trust, or pooled income trust. If there 
is an individual that you want to have the benefits of a trust for his or her life-
time and then leave the balance to a charity, you should work it out in accordance 
with one of the three above type trusts or you're not going to get the estate tax 
deduction for the remainder interest. 
Every estate has a $60,000 exemption. After that's taken off, you've 
arrived at the net taxable part of your estate. The rates on this start off very 
low. On $100,000, you take out $4,800; on $200,000, you take out over $31,000; 
on $500,000 you take out over $100,000 and on $1,000,000 you take out almost 
$300,000. 
There are a couple of instances where, if you have a closely-held corpora-
tion or real hardship situation, it can be paid over a period of years, but the 
interest is 7 percent. Two years ago when it was 4 percent, we were using this 
installment pay method whenever available. 
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There are federal tax credits 
You automatically get credit 
certain percentage which is contained on 
tion of Florida, the state death taxes 
credit you get for the federal death tax.·· 
It is important to analyze whether 
from another estate within the last 10 years'_ 
tax. for part of the estate previously taxed. 
might get you a credit for that gift 
into the estate. 
The Kentucky inheritance tax is 
Most state inheritance taxes are based on 
ship of the beneficiary to the decedent. 
by who gets it, with the exception of the marital 
to remember. 
to a 
suates, with the excep-
the 
proceeds 
against the 
were paid 
is brought back 
the relation-
changed 
tax free by 
the spouse. In Kentucky, a wife and minor children t class; it 
means that they get larger exemptions and the tax rates are dif~E3.~ent. In Kentucky 
now either spouse gets a $20,000 credit. Up until this change in the law, by the 
1976 Legislature, a wife got $10,000 credit, a husband $5,000. Life insurance is 
treated differently in Kentucky and so is jointly owned property. Only one-half 
of jointly owned property is taxed in Kentucky, regardless of who contributed to 
the property. So you see, when you get into small estates, sometimes it's better 
the have joint survivorship property, but only with estates of less than $100,000. 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
QUESTION: In the situation where a bank account is in a joint name between mother 
and daughter but the daughter didn't make any contribution to it, can the estate 
recover that money when the daughter takes it out of the bank? 
MR. ROTHSCHILD: After the mother's death, the property automatically passes to the 
daughter. It doesn't pass through the executor; it passes outright to the joint 
owner. It would all be taxable in the mother's estate for federal estate tax 
purposes on the basis of your example, however. 
QUESTION: Do you mean personal property and real property all pass at the same 
time? 
MR. ROTHSCHILD: If it's in joint survivorship or if the bank account is on an 
"or" basis, yes sir. In Kentucky that's the law. 
I presume from what you said that it makes no difference about the 
wording on a bank account--if there are two names, that indicates survivorship. 
If it's named in "or." In other words, just because someone has 
a right to withdraw funds from the bank account under power of attorney does 
not necessarily make it joint survivorship property. 
In the example where the man had $1,500,000 in real estate, if he and 
present wife made a joint will that it go to the seven children, would that 
be a contract which the wife could not break after his death? 
ROTHSCHILD: From his tax standpoint, that would be a disaster. 
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QUESTION: But from a legal consequence, would not the joint will be an unbreak-
able will? 
MR. ROTHSCHILD: If it was a joint will, it does become a contract. However, if 
, 
the property passed by deed, I don't think the contract would be applicable. The 
will would only apply to those assets that pass by that contract. If they agreed 
that all joint survivorship property had to be included in this contract--if they 
clarified it to that extent~~then you might have a valid contract. 
QUESTION: What would be the effect of a subsequent marriage on dower interest, 
assuming this contract exists? 
MR. ROTHSCHILD: That's a good question. I'm not sure what the situation would be 
if the second husband came in and claimed his dower,or curtesy right~. What I 
emphasize to my clients in that kind of a situation is that it usually is not 
feasible to write a joint will. I stay away from them like the plague. The ones 
I've seen are disasterous. 
QUESTION: Assume that it's not a $1,500,000 estate but rather a $50,000 estate. 
The husband wants to give the property entirely to the wife, and the only contri-
bution she had really made has been raising the kids and maybe having a job at one 
time. Would there be any gift tax consequences on that transfer? 
MR. ROTHSCHILD: Do you mean at death? 
QUESTION: Well, at any time, would there be a gift tax consequence! 
MR. ROTHSCHILD: Certainly in his lifetime, if he transferred real estate, he's 
made a gift. 
QUESTION: Because she hasn't made a contribution? 
MR. ROTHSCHILD: Yes, sir. 
QUESTION: In other words, her raising the family and things like that would not 
be a contribution to the purchase price under gift tax law? 
MR. ROTHSCHILD: No way. But under gift tax law they'd have some split gifts. 
You have a marital deduction in gift taxes as well as in estate taxes, but from 
the standpoint of a taxable gift, it would be considered as a gift for gift tax 
purposes. There's one exception to that. That is if at the time real property 
is first put in joint survivorship between husband and wife, if the parties agree 
that at that point they're going to treat it as if it's sold for $100,000 and he 
gives her $50,000, she'll receive no taxable gift. That's one option that you 
have when you put something in joint survivorship in real estate between spouses. 
QUESTION: I've heard that Kentucky was the worst place in the country to die and 
leave anything. I wonder if you have an opinion on that from your experience. A 
related question is whether circumstances are so different in every state that if 
you construct a proper package for an individual in Kentucky, and he moves away, 
does he have to go through the whole thing allover again? 
MR. ROTHSCHILD: There is no comparison, as an example, between the death taxes in 
California and those in Kentucky. California does not recognize the deduction of 
federal estate taxes on the California inheritance tax return. I have a California 
estate in which the federal death taxes were $200,000. On the California inheri-
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tance tax return we could not deduct it, and the California inheritance tax was 
almost $100,000. Their rates are higher and they don't give you the exemptions 
that you get in Kentucky. 
QUESTION: What about the question of moving from one state to the next? Are 
they so different that you almost have to totally revise the program? 
MR. ROTHSCHILD: Not necessarily, but you should review it in any case. In 
Kentucky, life .insurance left to named beneficiaries is not taxable, but this 
isn't true in a lot of states. Joint survivorship property? Check the state 
law. Kentucky doesn't care who contributed to _.,the property. . Joint survivorship 
property will be taxed at a 50 percent rate in Kentucky, unless given within 3 
years of death. 
I'm going to talk to you now about what I consider to be one of the most 
important tax shelters that exists and it's probably one of the cheapest. That 
is the proper preparation of a will. When you discuss a man's will with him, 
there are two things you should kn0w before you even, start discussing how he wants 
his property to be left. First, what is his family situation and second, what 
properties does he own? Often, you have to ask some personal and sometimes 
unpleasant questions in order to get to the facts. For instance, you start off 
with the basics. Is your wife healthy? How old are your children? Are they 
healthy? I wrote 16 or 18 wills last year where the clients had childl;'en with 
either~ a major mental or physical defect. When you start talking about that type 
of problem, you have to give serious consideration to setting up a trust under 
the will for the lifetime of the disabled child. 
What properties become a part of the estate? First, you discuss life 
insurance beneficiary designations and how title to real estate is held. Then 
you're ready to start the progressive steps down through the will. 
I normally have a separate specific bequest of furniture and personal 
effects primarily for more flexible income tax savings. As you know, at death 
you have a new income tax payer--the estate. Treat it with respect, because 
when you are writing a will, you should not only be planning the man's present 
estate, but also his estate post death planning as well. Specific bequests will 
not be considered a distribution of taxable income for fiduciary income tax 
purposes. Furniture and fixture clauses can sometimes cause problems among heirs. 
Everyone wants Aunt Susie's breakfront in the dining room. But these are things 
you have to discuss with your client to determine how she wants to leave certain 
items of personal property. 
If you're married and your estate is worth $120,000 or more, you should 
give serious consideration to the maximum marital deduction. The maximum marital 
deduction can actually be left in 3 ways. You can leave it outright, or you can 
leave it in two types of trust -- an estate trust, which means simply at the wife's 
death, the property passes to her estate-- or a power of appointment trust. It 
has to be left under certain specific conditions or it won't qualify for the 
marital deduction. In the power of appointment trust, the wife has to get the 
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income at least annually. If she doesn't or if anyone else controls that income, 
the trust won't qualify for the marital deduction. At death, the spouse has to 
have the right to elect in his or her will where that prorerty goes. If the 
spouse is a good financial manager, it might not be necessary to set up a marital 
deduction trust, but the marital deduction can be left outright. Joint survivor-
ship property and life insurance left to the spouse will be subtracted from the 
marital deduction amount left from the probate estate. If you set up a power of 
appointment trust and have $200,000 qualifying for the marital deduction with a 
$50,000 home in joint survivorship and $501000 worth of life insurance with the 
wife as the beneficiary, the only amount you should ,have in that trust is 
$100,000. 
The balance of your estate does not have to be left in trust. It can be 
left to your children, grandchildren, parents or to whomever the testator chooses 
to leave his estate. However, in the vast majority of cases, he has to set up a 
primary concern is the protection of his wife for her lifetime. If the testator 
wishes his wife to have the benefits of his entire estate, he has to set up a 
trust for the balance of his estate. It is necessary to be careful with your 
drafting of the trust, because it isn't drafted properly, the residuary trust 
might be taxed to her estate at her death. 
I don't recall having prepared a trust where I didn't make".a provision 
for invasion rights of principal. If your wife gets sick and needs money and 
doesn't have a right to invade that principal, you can be sitting there with a 
trust that cannot be used to pay her medical bills. Therefore, I normally insert 
a clause saying that principal can be invaded for the "health and maintenance" 
of the wife. If you use such words as "general welfare" or "comfort", you can 
cause that part to be taxed again in her estate. So watch your wording. 
One of the vital areas of a will is a second trust for children, maybe 
grandchildren. Remember one basic point: in Kentucky and in many other states 
now the legal age is 18. If you don't leave a trust, but just leave it outright 
to the children and they're under 18, then at age 18 they're going to come to the 
administrator and ask for their money. Most clients feel that a child is not old 
enough at 18 to handle large sums of money. Normally, most clients decide to 
terminate the trust for their children somewhere between the age of 25 and 30. In 
preparing this type trust, it should be flexible so that the children or the 
grandchildren can use the principal as well as the income for their health, 
maintenance, and education. This is more human planning and has very little to 
do with taxes. These are the practicalities that you want to consider when you 
discuss a will for your client. 
You should have an executor in a will and this should not be left to 
chance. If you name an individual who doesn't know anything about estate admin-
istration, then you'd better have a good lawyer who does, because when you're 
dealing with an individual executor or executrix, a lawyer has to do everything 
but keep the checkbook. The alternative is to use a bank's trust department 
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which, if large enough, has the expertise in the various areas that have to be 
dealt with in handling the estate. 
A trust can last for a long time. If you make a will ,with the income to go 
to your wife for her lifetime and your wife is 35 years old, you could be talking 
about a trust that could last for 50 years if your wife dies at 85. If you have 
children and you want the trust to terminate when they're 25 and the youngest is 
3, you're talking about a trust with a minimum of about 22 years. In trusts of 
this type, it is probably best to use a corporate trustee. You don't necessarily 
have to give a corporate trustee carte blanche on everything. You can set up an 
advisory committee consisting of your loved ones. If ,they can't get along with 
the trust officer, they could be given the right to change to another corparate -
trustee. The testator cauld appoint a cansultant to the trustee relative to 
changes in investments. 
In the remaining time that I have, I'm going to. talk to you abaut planning 
you can do. prior to. death. I don't give investment advice; I dan't think this is 
a lawyer's function, but I do. discuss certain types af tax-favared investments. 
One papular type af investment is what we call flower bands, or tombstane bands. 
These are certain United States Treasury bonds that qualify far payment af federal 
estate taxes if awned by the testatar at his death. They seli at sizable dis-
counts--presently they are selling for $790 or $800 per $1,000 face'amaunt of the 
band. If you use them to pay federal death taxes, they can be delivered to. the 
Federal Reserve at face value. 
I did some estate planning for a client 3 or 4 years before he died, and 
he baught $280,000 in United States Treasury bonds (flawer bands). They were 
selling at that time at $700 per band. When he died, we took $200,000 face value 
of these bonds and delivered them to. the Federal Reserve in payment af his 
federal estate taxes. At the date of his death, the bonds were warth $800 per 
band. The estate made a $40,000 profit, minus the death taxes an the appreciatian, 
so. that developed into. a windfall prafit far the estate af $28,000. My ,client 
cauld have baught these bands a day before he died and they could have still been 
used for payment af his federal estate taxes. 
In Kentucky, a power af attarney can be used even in the event af disability. 
Under Kentucky law the individual who. has the power af attorney can buy flawer 
bands far his principal even though the principal is nat capable to. make such a 
decisian. The power af attarney can also. start upan the disability of the principal. 
There is a recent New Yark case where the IRS disallawed the use af a power af 
attorney to purchase flawer bands. The Court successfully claimed that the power 
af attarney at the time it was exercised: ,was nat valid because the individual was 
disabled. We don't have that prablem in Kentucky if the power af attarney 
pravides the power remains valid upon the disability of the principal. There are 
anly abaut eight ar nine states that have this braad pravisian in their law. 
In Series E U.S. Savings Bonds where the interest accumulates and is nat 
taxable far incame tax purpases until the bands are sold, it daesn't make any 
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difference whether the bonds are sold before or after the owner's death--the 
interest will be taxable for income tax purposes. However, the executor has a 
number of choices in how and who should pay the income tax on the accumulated 
bond income. The executor can accrue the bond interest and put it on the last 
income tax return of the decedent or he can continue to hold them and then make 
a distribution to the beneficiary and let the beneficiary sell them and pay the 
income tax on the income of sale; or the executor can accrue them in the executor's 
estate and sell part of them and hold part of them until a later'date and thus 
spread the income over more than I year. 
I had a case where the decedent died in February and her son (the only 
heir of her estate) was in the 60 percent income tax bracket. The estate was going 
to generate a considerable amount of taxable income. We decided to accrue the 
interest in her last income tax return because she had very little income in that 
I month before her death. We saved about $5,000 just on that one transaction. 
If the son had received the bonds and then sold them and took the interest income 
on top of his other income, it would have resulted in a payment of 60 percent of 
the interest income in taxes. 
Many of you probably have municipal bonds. Municipal ~onds are fully 
taxable for federal estate tax purposes and in most states for inheritance tax 
purposes. If you have $10,000 worth of municipal bonds, whatever the~ market 
value is worth, at the date of your death they will be taxed in your estate for 
federal estate tax purposes at that figure, even though they are free bonds for 
income tax purposes. 
As you know, in a corporate qualified plan, all of the proceeds representing 
the corporation's contribution to the plan are not taxable at your death if they are 
left to a named individual, to an inter vivos trust, or in a testamentary trust. 
If it's left to a testamentary trust, be sure that you make a provision that the 
proceeds from the qualified plan cannot be used for payment of death taxes or 
administrative costs of the estate, because if it can be used for that purpose, 
it might also be taxable in your estate for federal· estate tax purposes. 
If you have a situation where the husband has a sizable estate and the 
wife has a very small estate, sometimes it's wise to put in your will that in the 
event of the simultaneous death of the husband and the wife, it will be assumed 
that the wife has survived the husband. The same wording should be used in both 
wills, assuming the husband has the larger estate, in the event they die 
simultaneously and it cannot be determined which spouse died first. 
QUESTION AND ANSWERS: 
QUESTION: How are common stocks, owned by the deceased but held by a reliable 
brok:.era.ge firm, treated for death tax purposes? 
MR. ROTHSCHILD: They would be evaluated in your estate at the fair market value 
as of the date of death. Actually, you can evaluate the estate at the date of 
death or 6 months thereafter. If the value of those stocks, for instance, should 
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go down in that 6 months period, you might want to take the 
and perhaps save some death taxes. 
QUESTION: Is there any advantage to having a co-executor 
instance, your wife and a bank? 
MR. ROTHSCHILD: You can. It provides a little check and balance on the bank. 
It doesn't make any difference as far as the fee is concerned because the bank will 
take the full fee. 
QUES'I'ION: Is a trust to the wife for lifetime included in the decedent's estate 
for estate tax purposes? What's the tax treat~ent on that? You have listed in 
your outline short term trusts and irrevocable trusts and I was wondering about 
, 
the tax treatment of the different types of trusts, too. Could you comment on 
that? 
MR. ROTHSCHILD: What I was talking about in the outline were living trusts. 
These are not trusts connected with your will. These are inter vivos trusts you 
set up in estate planning for your family. Basically, this group covers three 
different types of trusts. A revocable trust, which you can revoke at any time 
you want to, has no estate tax significance, no income tax significance, and no 
gift tax significance. Then there is a short term trust. This is used where 
the individual is in a high income bracket but doesn't have aiarge estate. 
However, he does have enough property to put some aside in a trust fQr~ a period 
of no less than 10 years. The income from the short term trust principal is 
distributed to the income beneficiary, such as the grantor's children or to a 
parent of the grantor and then at the end of the 10 years, the property reverts 
back to the grantor. It's primarily an income tax advantage, but it also can 
have some estate tax disadvantage, because if the grantor dies before the 
short term trust terminates, a portion of the trust would not be taxable in 
the grantor's estate, based on the amount of the acturial part of the income 
which the grantor would not be entitled to receive until the end of the 10 
year period. There could be a gift tax on the trust proceeds; about 40 per 
cent of what you put into it would have to be included as a gift at the 
time that you set up the short term trust. 
The irrevocable trust is the best overall tax saving tool of all because 
that trust not only has the tax advantage of keeping its income from being taxed 
to the grantor, but it also eliminates federal estate tax if it's properly drawn. 
If your estate is large enough that you feel you can do without the property 
given away, this trust is often a very attractive tool. Property given to a 
revocable trust is a gift and might result in gift tax to be paid by the grantor. 
However, each of the parents has a $30,000 lifetime exemption, and the children 
have a $3,000 a year exclusion. 
QUESTION: How about these testamentary trusts? 
MR. ROTHSCHILD: With a testamentary trust, the object is to keep property out of 
the wife's estate as of the. date of her death. It goes on down to the children. 
QUESTION: This is not exactly a tax question, but as a physician, I'm constantly 
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hearing about people for whom a will has been provided, but there's absolutely 
nothing for them to operate on for the first year or two b~cause they can't get 
to the money. Is there some mechanism by which some insurance money can go 
directly to the family for immediate use, or do they always have to wait for all 
this probate business? 
MR. ROTHSCHILD: Of course, you know that insurance, if your contract calls for 
it, is not going to go through probate. If the wife is the outright beneficiary, 
she should be able to get the proceeds withln 30 days after your death. If I 
have a marital deduction where the wife gets the marital property outright and 
the balance goes in trust for the wife for her liftime and then in trusts~for 
the children, I'll normally recommend one-half of the proceeds be left outright 
to the wife and the other half of life insurance proceeds be left in trust. 
If all the property gets tied up in probate, a widow has an allowance in 
Kentucky. That's one of the reasons that it's important for you to develop 
liquidity in what you have--so that it doesn't get all tied up in property that 
you can't convert to cash for that allowance. Thus, it also becomes advisable 
for you to consider life insurance so that you do have immediate cash available. 
QUESTION: I have a question relating to a recent Kentucky Supreme Court 
decision about the valuation of several acres of farm land. It is,,-being used 
for agricultural purposes, but suppose that it actually has a higher value in 
terms of the possiblity that it is subdivided. Do you value it at the higher 
figure~or estate tax purposes? 
MR. ROTHSCHILD: I don't like to, but I do. That particular case was about 
property taxes. I'm talking about estate taxes.. They're not treated the same 
way. 
QUESTION: Do you still have to follow that higher figure? 
MR. ROTHSCHILD: Yes, until Congress comes up with some kind of relief, which I'm 
hopeful that they'll do, we are faced with that problem in Kentucky and allover 
the country. It's a serious problem because valuations have shot up rather rapidly. 
160 
